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Chapter 1
Introduction
In almost all industrialized countries, health care expenditures are rising at a faster rate
than gross domestic product. Switzerland is no exception, and OECD (2010a) statistics
for the country show the third highest spending per capita behind the United States
and France. Consequently, health care reforms trying to contain medical expenditure
are at the top of the political agenda in Switzerland. However, it is important to note
that high health care expenditures are not bad per se. If citizens’ preferences point to
a willingness to pay high insurance premiums (or taxes) for health care consumption,
reforms with the objective of rationing health care provision may decrease a nation’s
welfare. Therefore, policy makers should never design reforms only considering cost
and neglecting citizens’ preferences.
This dissertation is a collection of five essays and purports to provide information
about providers’ and consumers’ preferences for conventional health care provision and
for possible changes therein. In contrast to stated preferences, revealed preferences are
measured using observed instead of hypothetical choices. Unfortunately, measuring re-
vealed preferences is often impossible because choice alternatives of interest are not
on the market yet. While evidence based on actual behavior (revealed preferences)
would be preferable in principle, market experiments (stated preferences) can inform
policy makers and health insurers about the chances of success of planned reforms
and changes, helping them avoid costly failures. On the provider side, Swiss physi-
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cians’ preferences for Managed Care (MC) participation, acceptance of budgetary co-
responsibility, and choice of pharmaceuticals is investigated. On the consumer side,
citizens’ preferences for health insurance policies are measured to predict their resis-
tance against MC-type restrictions. This allows the estimation of implementation costs
for introducing incentives and to compare them with expected savings.
Two different types of data are used in this thesis. Experimental data from discrete
choice experiments constitute the first type and are used along with stated preferences
methods to expose hypothetical preferences (Chapter 2, 3, and 4). This data provides
information about what providers or consumers say they would choose. In contrast, the
second type is drug claims data. This data contains non-hypothetical choices that were
actually made. This type of data is utilized to study physicians’ revealed preferences for
drug versions (Chapter 5) and package choices (Chapter 6) to analyze their prescribing
behavior. The econometric models to expose providers’ and consumers’ preferences in
health care are estimated using classical maximum (simulated) likelihood (Chapters 2,
3, and 5) or modern Bayesian methods (Chapters 4 and 6).
Chapter 2 – What Do Physicians Dislike About Managed Care? Evidence from a
Choice Experiment – deals with physicians’ preferences for MC, which imposes restric-
tions on physician behavior but also holds promises, especially in terms of reducing cost
and increasing treatment quality. This chapter reports on private-practice physicians’
willingness to accept (WTA) different MC features such as: shared decision making,
treatment guidelines, quality circles, critical incident reporting, restricting referrals to
preferred providers, and acceptance of a mandate to prescribe generics if available. In
August 2011, a web-based survey was addressed to members of the Swiss Medical As-
sociation (FMH) containing a discrete choice experiment (DCE). With the exception of
shared decision making, the survey found that all attributes are associated with posi-
tive WTA values. On the basis of these findings, private health insurers must be able to
achieve substantial savings in order to create sufficient incentives for Swiss physicians
to participate voluntarily in MC.
Introduction 3
Chapter 3 – How Much Compensation for Accepting Budgetary Responsibility?
Stated Preferences of Swiss Physicians – measures the costs of implementing finan-
cial incentives for ambulatory care physicians. As long as conventional private practice
remains an alternative, physicians are only willing to join physician networks and ac-
cept budgetary co-responsibility if they are compensated for additional financial risk.
The results from a discrete choice experiment including 1,521 physicians in 2011 indi-
cate that costs of introducing budgetary co-responsibility is likely to exceed potential
savings.
Chapter 4 – Preferences for Health Insurance in Germany and the Netherlands:
A Tale of Two Countries – turns from provider to consumer preferences. Using two
DCEs, this chapter measures willingness to pay (WTP) for health insurance attributes
in Germany and the Netherlands. Two research questions naturally arise. First, what
are citizens’ preferences with regard to specific health insurance contracts in the two
countries? Second, how do the preferences differ between the two countries? While
the two populations agree in their resistance against MC-type attributes, German re-
spondents require much higher compensation for giving up free physician choice and
accepting a physician list.
The following two chapters return to provider preferences but use drug claims data
instead of experimental data. The data to analyze physicians’ prescribing behavior
contain information about single prescriptions and were merged with provider and
consumer characteristics. The data was provided by a major Swiss health insurer.
Chapter 5 – Generic Substitution, Financial Interests, and Imperfect Agency – tests
physicians’ imperfect agency, derived from the fact that some Swiss jurisdictions al-
low them to dispense drugs on their own account while others do not. Estimating a
model of physician drug choice, the findings indicate a significant positive association
between physician dispensing and the use of generic drugs. While profit considerations
affect drug choice and point to imperfect agency, generics are prescribed more often to
patients with high copayments or low incomes.
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Chapter 6 – Do Dispensing Physicians Optimize Their Own Drug Margins? Evidence
from Switzerland – investigates how pharmaceutical pricing may set financial incen-
tives for combined drug providers (dispensing physicians or prescribing pharmacists) to
conduct margin optimization. As in Chapter 5, the empirical analysis is based on the
co-existence of dispensing and non-dispensing physicians in Switzerland. Comparing
logistic drug margins and drug costs between dispensing physicians and pharmacies
reveals that dispensing physicians in fact achieve higher drug margins and produce
higher drug costs through inefficient package choices.
Three chapters were written in cooperation with co-authors. Peter Zweifel co-
authored Chapters 2, 4, and 5, while Maria Trottmann co-authored Chapter 5, and
Karolin Leukert co-authored Chapter 4. Because each chapter of this dissertation can
be considered as self-contained, all references across chapters are made explicit and the
list of references appears at the end of this dissertation.
WHAT DO PHYSICIANS
DISLIKE ABOUT MANAGED
CARE? EVIDENCE FROM A
CHOICE EXPERIMENT
by
Maurus Rischatsch and Peter Zweifel
SUMMARY
Managed Care (MC) imposes restrictions on physician behavior but also holds
promises, especially in terms of cost savings and improvements in treatment quality.
This contribution reports on private-practice physicians’ willingness to accept (WTA,
compensation asked, respectively) for several MC features. In 2011, 1,088 Swiss ambu-
latory care physicians participated in a discrete choice experiment which permits to put
WTA values on MC attributes. With the exception of shared decision making and up
to six quality circle meetings per year, all attributes are associated with non-zero WTA
values. Thus, health insurers must be able to achieve substantial savings in order to
create sufficient incentives for Swiss physicians to participate voluntarily in MC plans.

Chapter 2
What Do Physicians Dislike About
Managed Care? Evidence from a
Choice Experiment
2.1 Introduction
Many governments try to limit the rise in health care expenditure by prescribing or
encouraging Managed Care (MC) programs. In mixed systems permitting choice, con-
sumer participation in MC can be encouraged by lowered contributions to health in-
surance [for evidence about the reduction required to induce voluntary participation
by consumers, see e.g. Zweifel et al. (2006)]. However, health service providers must
also be won over to MC to avoid quality problems, in particular due to a lack of partic-
ipating physicians. For instance, expansion of MC plans in the United States has been
hampered by difficulties in recruiting service providers. In Germany, the creation of
so-called Integrated Care centers has been slow for the same reason. These difficulties
are compounded in countries with a notable shortage of general practitioners (GPs),
who play a crucial role in MC in acting as gatekeepers. In the case of Switzerland, only
about 10 percent of medical students intend to become GPs, while retiring GPs have
difficulties finding a successor for their practice [see Buddeberg-Fischer et al. (2006)].
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Hence, health care reforms designed to foster MC need to address the issue of sufficient
attractiveness of MC practice particularly to general practitioners.
Incentives for providers to participate in MC programs are mixed. On the one hand,
they have to accept limitations on their professional autonomy, and possibly increased
financial risk (especially if they participate in the financial success of the scheme). On
the other hand, they can benefit from regular work hours, shared investment cost, and
easier exchange of information within a network. The present paper purports to pro-
vide information about physicians’ preferences, expressed in terms of the compensation
sought (or willingness to accept, WTA) for departing from their conventional job char-
acteristics without MC obligations. The evidence comes from a stated preference exper-
iment of the discrete-choice type (DCE) performed with 1,088 Swiss private-practice
physicians working in ambulatory care in 2011. While evidence based on actual behav-
ior would be preferable in principle, market experiments can inform policy makers and
health insurers about the chances of success of planned changes, helping them avoid
costly failures.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 contains an overview of the existing
literature on physicians’ preferences, with special reference to evidence from DCEs.
The theoretical background to understand DCEs and the methods to derive WTA
values are given in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 outlines the study design and discusses the
MC attributes of interest. Section 2.5 describes the data. The estimation results are
discussed in Section 2.6 and conclusions are drawn in Section 2.9.
2.2 Literature review
The existing literature on physician behavior mainly revolves around the impacts of
different reimbursement systems [see Labelle et al. (1994), Pauly (1994), and McGuire
(2000) for an overview]. The precise nature of physician preferences usually is not ad-
dressed because they do not seem to affect predictions in a substantial way. Some au-
thors have nevertheless posited particular preferences by including professional ethics,
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which in principle should motivate physicians to hail MC treatment concepts such
as shared decision making (SDM) and critical incident reporting (CIR) [see Feldstein
(1970), Zweifel (1981), Dionne and Contandriopoulos (1985)]. Attributes of professional
activity originally received little attention, except for the rate of return associated with
specialization [Sloan (1971)]. More recently, Gagne and Leger (2005) have examined
the choice of specialty in Canada from 1976 to 1991 in response to changes in fee-for-
service rates. They find income differences to be a significant factor. However, gender,
mother tongue, medical school attended, state laws, and geographic conditions have
a bearing on the choice of specialty as well. With the spread of MC, research into
the determinants of choice of type of medical practice received new impetus. Hypoth-
esized attributes are reputation and status [Enthoven (1978) and Richardson (1981)],
properties of the medical practice [Beardow et al. (1993)], and intellectual satisfaction
[Feldstein (1970), Enthoven (1978)]. Kristiansen (1994) has claimed professional auton-
omy to be an additional attribute that needs to be taken into consideration. However,
the relevance of these attributes, especially the non-pecuniary ones, has been little
investigated.
Against the background of undersupply in rural areas of Norway, Kristiansen (1992)
analyzed the determinants of the decision where to locate. Place of birth, place of
residency, and spouse’s place of origin were found to be significant factors. However,
they are not of overriding importance, causing the author to conclude that the problem
of underprovision could be solved through the use of financial incentives. In addition,
non-pecuniary motives might be enhanced in order to relieve the public budget, e.g. by
favoring medical students with a rural background (who are particularly likely to settle
there). The same conclusion is drawn by Benarroch and Hugh (2004), who investigate
the migration of physicians in Canada. Urbanization has a significantly positive effect
on migration, whereas distance between major cities of a province has a significantly
negative effect. While this research is valuable for informing policy makers about what
motivates physicians to opt for existing alternatives, it is silent about their choices with
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regard to alternatives that are being considered but not available yet. In this situation,
surveys and market experiments can fill the gap.
The effects of non-pecuniary job characteristics on physicians’ labor supply decisions
have mainly been surveyed in the psychological and medical literature [Scott (1998)].
Buddeberg-Fischer and Klagho¨fer (2003) examine career paths of 497 last-year medi-
cal students over a period of eight years in Switzerland. Respondents stated versatility
of the field (96 percent), intensive patient contact (87 percent), positive experiences
during their studies (86 percent), compatibility of work with family (83 percent), and
possibilities of self-employment (61 percent) as determinants of their choice of spe-
cialty. In addition, male students exhibit a preference for specialties with a scientific
orientation, whereas females, for settings with intensive patient contacts. With regard
specifically to MC alternatives, Nordt (2003) finds that conflicts due to a changed
perception of the physician’s professional role put more strain on practitioners in solo
than in group practice. Similarly, incompatibility of work and family may be more of
a problem in solo practice (2.8 out of a maximum of 5 points) than in group practice
(2.3 points, difference statistically not significant).
Market experiments of the discrete-choice type (see Section 2.4 below) have been
performed by Scott (2001) to investigate the preferences of practitioners in the United
Kingdom with regard to working hours, work load, time spent on administration per
week, out-of-hours appointments, and use of guidelines. Performing a DCE as well,
Ubach et al. (2003) report WTA values for an extra hour of and on being on call
as extra day per month. Wordsworth et al. (2004) find differences between principal
and so-called sessional GPs.1 On the whole, the evidence is in accordance with the
theoretical predictions by Marinoso and Jelovac (2003), who compare the performance
of gatekeeping and traditional settings, emphasizing the importance of non-financial
motives for the payment of GPs to create favorable incentives.
While this research is valuable for pointing to job attributes that may be particu-
larly valued (or resisted) by physicians, it fails to inform about their attitudes with
1 Principal GPs have ownerships in their practice, whereas sessional GPs are freelancers (mainly
young females with childcare responsibilities) and employees of NHS boards (Scotland).
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regard to non-marginal changes. However, the transition from conventional indepen-
dent private-practices to contractual obligations with insurers constitutes such a non-
marginal change. Policy makers considering increasing the market share of MC through
regulation as currently discussed in Switzerland need to know how much it takes to
win physicians over.
2.3 Methods
Based on random utility theory [Luce (1959), Manski (1977), McFadden (1981) and
McFadden (2001)], discrete choice experiments (DCEs) are designed to allow individu-
als to express their preferences for non-marketed goods or goods which do not yet exist.
The number of applications of DCEs to the valuation of healthcare programs has been
increasing during the past few years [see Hole (2008), Ryan and Gerard (2003) and
Scanlon et al. (1997)]. For a review of the literature on discrete choice experiments in
health economics, see De Becker-Grob et al. (2010). In a DCE, individuals are given a
hypothetical choice between many or just two (binary choice) commodities. From these
choices, the importance (more precisely, the expected utility) of product characteristics
can be inferred. Inclusion of a cost or price attribute allows determining the valuation
of the remaining product attributes in terms of money. In the present context, the
price attribute is an extra payment per insured and month. The fact that respondents
have to weigh several attributes simultaneously makes biases that plague Contingent
Valuation (where individuals are asked about their willingness to pay directly, holding
all other attributes constant) less likely than in a DCE [see Ryan (2004)].
The first step of a DCE involves the definition of the attributes of the commodity
and the levels assigned to them [Louviere et al. (2000), Ryan and Gerard (2003)]. Here,
attributes of MC are chosen to describe the physicians’ work situation (for more details,
see Section 2.4). When comparing hypothetical alternative MC contracts, a rational
subject will choose the alternative with the higher level of utility. The decision-making
process in a DCE can be seen as a comparison of utilities Uni = Vni + εni and Unj =
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Vnj + εnj, where Vni represents the deterministic indirect utility of individual n from
alternative i and εni denotes the pertaining unobserved error term. Thus, individual
n chooses alternative i (MC) rather than alternative j (conventional practice) if (and
only if) Uni > Unj which implies Vni + εni > Vnj + εnj so that Pni = Pr(εnj − εni <
Vni − Vnj, ∀j #= i). Therefore, the probability of choosing i rather than j implies that
the error term is dominated by the systematic difference in utility.
In this study, physicians’ preferences are estimated with the aid of a random-
coefficient logit model (RCM) estimated by simulated maximum likelihood. The RCM
has three important advantages over the standard logit model.2 First, it allows for ran-
dom taste variation across physicians. Second, the RCM model permits unrestricted
substitution patterns.3 And third, it allows for correlation of unobserved factors over
time. The choice probabilities for the RCM are given by
Pni =
∫ T∏
t=1
eβ
′xnit∑J
j=1 e
β′xnjt
f(β|θ) dβ, (2.1)
where the logit probability is called the mixed function and f(β|θ) the mixing distribu-
tion with distribution parameters θ [see Train (2003), Chapter 6]. Subscript n identifies
the physician and i the MC alternative at choice situation t. Preference heterogeneity
is reflected by the mixing distribution f(β|θ), which is usually assumed to be nor-
mal or log-normal. The log-normal distribution serves to model a strictly positive or
negative preference, e.g. for the price attribute. However, in practice the log-normal
distribution may cause problems for different reasons (see Section 2.6). Therefore, ap-
plied researchers often keep the price attribute fixed. The choice of adequate mixing
distributions is important and discussed in Section 2.6.
The mixing distributions reflect unconditioned or population preferences. If no
choices were observed, one would only know that the coefficients follow f(β|θ). In
2 The RCM (or mixed logit) model is a generalization of the standard logit model. The RCM
reduces to the standard model if density f(β) = 1 for β = b and 0 for β #= b. Further, the
random-intercept logit model (RIM, also called random-effects model) treats the constant as
normally distributed with all other coefficients kept fixed.
3 This is irrelevant to this study, which is of the binary choice type.
What Do Physicians Dislike About Managed Care 13
contrast, observed choices allow to condition the distributions of β on the choices (y),
permitting to derive conditional or physician-specific distributions h(β|yn, xn, θ) of β
[see Train (2003), Chapter 11]. By the Bayes theorem,
h(β|yn, xn, θ) =
P (yn|β, xn) · f(β|θ)∫
P (yn|β, xn) · f(β|θ)dβ
∝ P (yn|β, xn) · f(β|θ), (2.2)
where the denominator is the normalizing constant. P (yn|β, xn) is the probability of
physician’s observed choice sequence yn given β and the attribute levels of the chosen
alternatives xn. Hence, all quantities are known to derive h(β|yn, xn, θ) and to calculate
moments of physician-specific coefficients. Means can be simulated as weighted averages
β¯ =
∑
r w
rβr, with wr = P (yn|βr, xn)/
∑
r P (yn|β
r, xn) where βr is a draw from f(β|θ).
2.4 Study design
In this section, we present attributes related to physicians’ professional activity that
distinguish MC from conventional practice. Specifically, we analyze preferences for dif-
ferent forms of treatment concepts, critical incident reporting, quality circles, preferred
provider lists, and generic drug lists.
Attribute Attribute levels
No contractual obligation to adhere to any item
below versus:
Treatment concepts Shared decision making: yes/no (SDM, ±),
Guidelines: yes/no (GL, ±)
Critical incident reporting Mandatory anonymous reporting: yes/no (CIR, ±)
Quality circles a) Mandatory meetings per year: 0/3/6/12 (QC, ±)
Preferred provider list Referrals only to listed providers: yes/no (PPL, ±)
Generic drug list Restricted to prescribe generics if available:
yes/no (GEN, ±)
Payment Payment of CHF 0.00/0.50/1.00/1.50/2.00 per
insured and month (PAY, +)
Note: a) quality circles are defined to last 1.5 hours per meeting. The signs after the
abbreviations in parentheses indicate our expectations about physician preferences.
Table 2.1: Attributes and attribute levels in the DCE
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The attribute ‘treatment concepts’ has two levels. First, shared decision making
(SDM) requires that patients are more strongly involved in the decision making pro-
cess concerning the choice of treatment. SDM is widely applied in practice (especially
encouraged by MC networks) in Switzerland, at least compared to other countries [see
Deveugele et al. (2002)]. It is recommended in the medical literature as a way to make
the physician a more perfect agent of the patient. An additional benefit of SDM from
the point of view of a risk-averse physician is to shift the burden of proof in a mal-
practice suit to the (now informed) patient; however, liability suits against physicians
are extremely rare in Switzerland. The downside of SDM is a certain curtailment of
professional autonomy. Therefore, the valuation of SDM can go either way (see Table
2.1). The second level is adherence to treatment guidelines (GL), to be developed by
physicians and accepted by insurers. They define how to proceed in the case of certain
medical interventions. Guidelines are typical of MC; they are little known in Switzer-
land. They entail a strong limitation of professional autonomy combined with extra
administrative work. They do shift the burden of proof in a malpractice suit to the in-
surer or agency (health administration) issuing them. In view of the very low likelihood
of this event, GL is expected to have a positive WTA (compensation required).
Critical incident reporting (CIR) obliges physicians to anonymously report critical
incidents that happened in their practice. On the one hand, CIR calls for extra time
and effort and may give rise to fears of being interpreted as a confession of malpractice.
On the other hand, CIR holds the promise of quality improvement in the treatment
provided. Hence, the valuation of CIR can go either way (see Table 2.1).
The third attribute is the obligation to attend so-called quality circles (QC), another
feature of MC. In QC, physicians meet on a regular basis to discuss new treatments
and interventions as well as experiences made. This benefit to participating physicians
has to be balanced against the sacrifice of time. Interviews with physician networks
indicated that many of their members like to participate in QC provided they take place
during lunches and are accompanied by presentations by fellow members or specialists.
On the whole, no clear prediction about the expected sign of WTA can be made.
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The fourth attribute is preferred provider list (PPL), which restricts referrals to
specialists and hospitals to providers selected by the MC organization. This restriction
is expected to be undesired by most physicians. However, some of them may support
PPL because they believe in the ability of the MC organization to identify providers
offering high quality and/or high cost-efficiency.
Fifth, mandatory prescription of generic drugs if available (GEN) is imposed by most
MC organizations in Switzerland. Physicians may perceive GEN a good instrument for
tackling rising drug expenditure; on the other hand, it does restrict their choice of
pharmaceutical treatment. Therefore, preferences could go either way.
The sixth attribute represents the price attribute in the DCE. It is measured as
a payment (PAY) over and above current income per MC-insured person per month
(IPM). To be in line with microeconomic theory, all physicians should positively value
PAY.
Attribute Obligation
You are to base treatment decisions on shared decision making yes
You obligate yourself to anonymously report critical incidents yes
Number of quality circles you agree to attend per year 6 (1.5 hours ea.)
You accept a preferred provider list for referrals yes
You prescribe exclusively generics if available no
You receive payment of CHF 1.50 / IPM a)
I am willing to sign the MC contract with these obligations !
I would like to remain independent without obligations !
Note: a) payment is in CHF per insured per month (IPM). 1 CHF ≈ 1.1 USD at 2011 exchange
rates.
Table 2.2: Example of choice scenario
An example of a choice scenario is shown Table 2.2. ‘Independent without obliga-
tions’ defines the status quo of conventional practice, an option available to all Swiss
physicians. In fact, only 13 percent of respondents report to be in MC practice (see
Section 2.5).
In Equation (2.3) below, the attribute levels for treatment concepts (SDM, GL),
critical incident reporting (CIR), preferred provider list (PPL), and generic drug list
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(GEN) are coded as dummy variables. Because SDM and GL are levels of one attribute,
they never appear together in an alternative. Quality circles (QC) have levels of zero,
three, six, and twelve (meetings per year). Coding them as three categorical variables
(QC3, QC6, and QC12) has the advantage of not imposing a specific functional form
such as the linear or quadratic. Finally, PAY denotes the payment a physician receives
in return for accepting MC-type obligations, ranging from zero to CHF 2.00 per insured
and month (IPM). With an enrolment of 600 (say), this maximum corresponds to about
8 percent of median monthly income [Ku¨nzi et al. (2011)]. Therefore, the deterministic
part of the random utility can be written as
β ′x = β1SDM+ β2GL+ β3CIR + β4QC3 + β5QC6 + β6QC12 (2.3)
+β7PPL + β8GEN+ β9PAY+ β10CONST,
where the β’s are the taste parameters of interest to be estimated.
The total of six attributes and their levels combine to form 480 possible combinations
of alternative MC contracts. Using JMP to optimize the experimental design, this
number was reduced to 40 D-optimal choice scenarios and randomly split into four
groups, resulting in 10 choice situations per respondent. Each of the 10 hypothetical MC
contracts had to be evaluated against the reference case with no obligations imposed.
2.5 Data
The Swiss Medical Association (FMH) supported to carry out the discrete choice ex-
periment (DCE) by including a link to the web-survey in a newsletter addressed to all
members in private practice. In July 2011, a pretest involved a randomly selected sam-
ple of 1,000 FMH members. Respondents had the opportunity of writing comments,
which indicated a good understanding of the survey. The main survey was fielded in
August 2011 with a return rate of 11 percent, resulting in 10,461 observed choices by
1,088 physicians. A high share of 87 percent completed all ten choice scenarios, with 9.6
the average number of choices made per respondent. The share of respondents always
What Do Physicians Dislike About Managed Care 17
choosing no obligations is 29 percent while 1 percent of physicians agreed to sign up
to all MC alternatives presented. In addition to the DCE, the survey included ques-
tions about general attitudes concerning experience with MC, education, and other
demographic variables.
Percentiles
Variable MN SD 5th MD 95th
Age of physician 53.73 8.25 40.00 54.00 66.00
Job experience (in years) 26.00 9.74 11.00 27.00 39.00
Male respondents 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 1.00
Married 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 1.00
Number of children under 18 1.65 1.70 0.00 2.00 4.00
Urban practices 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Suburban practices 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00
Rural practices 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00
General practitioners 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Specialists without surgery 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.00
Specialists with surgery 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.00
Psychiatrists 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.00
Note: General practitioners include gynecologists and pediatrics. Statistics are mean (MN),
standard deviation (SD), and median (MD).
Table 2.3: Respondent descriptives, Swiss ambulatory care physicians (2011)
The statistics compiled in Table 2.3 indicate that average age is a high 54 years [the
same as the national figure, see Kraft (2010)]. With 26 years of experience, participants
are somewhat past their halftime in independent practice on average. Accounting for
19 percent of the sample, women are underrepresented in the sample compared to their
overall share of 32 percent in the medical profession stated by Kraft (2010). About 77
percent of sampled physicians are married (5 percent are single, 9 divorced) and have on
average 1.65 children under 18 years. Some 52 percent have their practice in an urban
environment, while 25 percent are located in suburban and 23 percent in rural areas,
respectively. The majority of respondents are from the German-speaking northern and
eastern parts of Switzerland (73 percent) while 24 percent are from the French-speaking
western and the remaining 3 percent from the Italian-speaking southern parts.
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Approximately 45 percent of sampled physicians are general practitioners (including
gynecologists and pediatricians) while 13 percent are specialists without surgical and
13 percent with surgical activity. Psychiatrists constitute 16 percent of the sample,
while the remainder declared themselves to belong to other groups or failed to state
their specialty. Most respondents work in single practice on their own account (51
percent) or in shared practice on their own account (30 percent, not shown in Table
2.3). Shared practices with a common account are rare (5 percent). The MC setting
is predominantly characterized by networks where members continue to work on their
own account (12 percent of respondents); common-account networks are the exception
(1 percent). Among physicians in shared practice, 61 percent work in a team of two,
24 percent in a team of three, and 8 percent in a team of four physicians. Maximum
team size reported is a low nine physicians.
In the attitudinal part of the survey, participants were asked about their experiences
with MC. This information is used in Subsection 2.7 to explore experience-related dif-
ferences in WTA values with respect to MC attributes. Concerning treatment concepts,
57 percent have experience with shared decision making and 51 percent with treatment
guidelines. About 27 percent of sampled physicians collected experience with critical
incident reporting. Quality circles are the most prominent MC feature, with 60 percent
of physicians having attended meetings at least once. As to the most restrictive MC
features, only 14 percent stated experience with preferred provider lists and 27 percent
with generic drug lists.
2.6 Estimation results
Table 2.4 shows the estimated distribution parameters for two different model specifi-
cations. Both are estimated by simulated maximum likelihood using 500 Halton draws
[see Hole (2007)]. The left panel of Table 2.4 pertains to the random-intercept model
(RIM) specification, where all coefficients are kept fixed with the exception of the con-
stant, for which a normal distribution is assumed. The constant captures unobserved
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physician-specific effects. The right panel displays the parameters pertaining to the
random-coefficient model (RCM), where all coefficients are assumed to be normally
distributed (reflecting the theoretical expectations listed in Table 2.1), with the ex-
ception of a fixed coefficient for PAY. Revelt and Train (1999) give three reasons for
keeping the price attribute fixed. First, it facilitates the calculation of population WTA
values. Second, RCM estimates tend to be unstable when all coefficients are random
[see Ruud (1996)]. Third, the appropriate choice of mixing distribution for the price
attribute is not straightforward. The most frequently applied log-normal distribution
does often not convergence in practice. Further, it renders estimates of the price coeffi-
cient that are very close to zero, causing implausible high WTA values [see e.g. Sillano
and Ortuzar (2005)]. Therefore, the WTA values (see Figure 2.1 of Section 2.6.2) cap-
ture only preference heterogeneity from the MC attributes but no heterogeneity with
respect to PAY and hence marginal utility of income [which may be substantial in view
of the dispersion of medical income documented by Ku¨nzi et al. (2011)].
The simulated log-likelihood (SLL) values at convergence are -4,549.7 (RIM) and
-4,261.0 (RCM) while the AIC are 9,121.3 (RIM) and 8,559.9 (RCM), respectively.
Therefore, goodness of fit speaks in favor of RCM estimates, which are emphasized in
the discussion below. Table 2.4 shows estimated mean and standard deviation parame-
ters along with their standard errors (S.E.). The mean parameters are insignificant for
CIR (RIM) and six meetings per year for both specifications. All remaining parameters
are highly significant with a p-value below 0.01.
2.6.1 Share of physicians who dislike MC
The estimated parameters for the population distributions can be used to calculate
population shares of physicians with negative preferences for MC. For attribute k,
this share is given by P (βk < 0) = Φ(−MNk/SDk), where Φ is the cumulative normal
distribution and MNk and SDk are the estimated mean and standard deviation, as given
in Table 2.4. An alternative approach is to calculate the share of negative physician-
specific coefficients using Equation (2.2), which has the advantage of conditioning on
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Random- Random-
intercept coefficient
model (RIM) model (RCM)
Attribute Parameter Value S.E. Value S.E.
Shared decision making Mean 0.38 (0.07) 0.48 (0.09)
(SDM) Standard deviation 0.95 (0.16)
Guidelines Mean -0.66 (0.09) -1.49 (0.19)
(GL) Standard deviation 2.43 (0.26)
Critical incident reporting Mean -0.06 (0.06) -0.16 (0.09)
(CIR) Standard deviation 0.31 (0.16)
Three quality circles Mean 0.33 (0.09) 0.30 (0.11)
(QC3) Standard deviation 0.10 (0.22)
Six quality circles Mean 0.04 (0.09) 0.10 (0.11)
(QC6) Standard deviation 0.79 (0.18)
Twelve quality circles Mean -0.91 (0.10) -1.66 (0.18)
(QC12) Standard deviation 2.09 (0.20)
Preferred provider list Mean -1.42 (0.07) -2.28 (0.13)
(PPL) Standard deviation 1.95 (0.14)
Generic drug list Mean -0.89 (0.07) -1.66 (0.12)
(GEN) Standard deviation 2.09 (0.15)
Payment a) Mean 0.37 (0.05) 0.49 (0.06)
(PAY) Standard deviation
Constant Mean -0.73 (0.13) -0.64 (0.16)
(CONST) Standard deviation 1.79 (0.07) 1.86 (0.11)
Note: Number of physicians: 1,088; number of choices observed: 10,461. Coefficients for RCM are
all assumed to be normally distributed, with the exception of a fixed coefficient for PAY.
Table 2.4: Preferences for Managed Care attributes – regression results
individual choices observed. Therefore, the conditioned shares are discussed below,
while the unconditioned shares are shown in parentheses.
Regarding MC-type treatment concepts, only 9 (31) percent of physicians have a
distaste for shared decision making while no less than 86 (73) percent dislike guidelines.
Similarly, the share of physicians opposing critical incident reporting attains 93 (70)
percent. Almost all physicians (1 percent rejecting) like to attend three quality circles
per year. However, acceptance already decreases for six meetings per year, with 38 (45)
percent against. Finally, a full 92 (79) percent dislike to be obliged to participate in
twelve meetings per year. In sum, about one-half of sampled physicians are willing to
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participate in up to six quality circles without being compensated. The MC attribute
with the highest share of opposing physicians is the preferred provider list with 94
(88) percent. Restricting drug prescriptions to generics if available is still refused by
88 (79) percent. These findings suggest that with the exception of shared decision
making and up to six quality circle meetings per year, all MC-type attributes have to
be compensated if a majority of Swiss physicians were to be won over to MC.
2.6.2 Willingness to accept MC-type obligations
Next, we focus on the physician-specific willingness-to-accept (WTA) values for MC
attributes, shown in Table 2.5. The discussion concentrates on the median values from
the RCM because they are more robust to outliers than the mean values.
RIM RCM
Percentiles
Attribute Abbrev. MN MN MD 5th 95th
Shared decision making SDM -1.03 -1.00 -0.86 -2.56 0.31
Guidelines GL 1.80 3.05 3.57 -2.31 6.53
Critical incident reporting CIR 0.17 0.33 0.34 -0.10 0.66
Three quality circles QC3 -0.89 -0.61 -0.61 -0.73 -0.50
Six quality circles QC6 -0.11 -0.21 -0.17 -1.53 0.90
Twelve quality circles QC12 2.46 3.46 3.71 -0.83 6.67
Preferred provider list PPL 3.87 4.70 5.27 -0.18 8.15
Generic drug list GEN 2.43 3.53 4.06 -1.54 7.40
Note: WTA values are shown in CHF per insured and month (CHF/IPM). 1 CHF ≈ 1.1 USD
as of 2011.
Table 2.5: Willingness to accept MC-type obligations
The negative WTA value for SDM indicates that the median Swiss physician need
not to be compensated for involving patients in the decision making about choice
of treatment. In contrast, following guidelines has to be compensated with about 3.57
CHF per MC-insured per month (CHF/IPM). Critical incident reporting was shown to
have a small, insignificant effect on the choice probabilities (Table 2.4). This is reflected
by a WTA value of only 0.34 CHF/IPM; this low value likely reflects physicians’ belief
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Figure 2.1: Histograms of physician-specific WTA values
that CIR contributes to an increase in treatment quality. Quality circles are positively
valued up to six meetings per year by the median respondent; however, twelve meetings
have to be compensated at the tune of 3.71 CHF/IPM. Restricting referrals to providers
listed by insurers is strongly opposed and requires the highest compensation of all MC-
type attributes. Its median WTA is 5.27 CHF/IPM. The next-highest WTA value
pertains to the restriction to prescribe only generics if available (GEN), with 4.06
CHF/IPM. A likely reason for this high figure is the fact that about one-half of Swiss
physicians live in jurisdictions permitting them to dispense drugs on their own account
[Rischatsch et al. (2010)]. Therefore, the GEN attribute entails the loss of an option
to generate extra income for many respondents.
In view of the entries of Table 2.5, the question arises of whether current extra
payments by insurers suffice to win physicians over to MC. A typical value is 1.50
CHF/IPM for participating in a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), the most
restrictive MC variant (preferred provider organizations and gatekeeping networks, also
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exist in Switzerland). Clearly, this extra payment falls far short of what it takes to make
the median Swiss physician join an HMO. To the extent that it reflects achievable cost
savings due to MC, these savings could easily be insufficient for MC to increase its
current market share.
Because the coefficient of PAY is kept fixed, the WTA values have the same distri-
butions as the random coefficients for the MC attributes. The histograms of Figure 2.1
point to substantial heterogeneity of preferences especially with regard to GL, PPL,
and GEN. Opinions appear to be strongly divided concerning GL and GEN in partic-
ular, where bi-modality is evident. In the case of GEN, this likely reflects the divide
between physicians who dispense drugs on their own account and those who do not.
2.7 Effects of prior experience
The preference patterns and WTA values found in the previous section do not distin-
guish between different groups of physicians. This section is devoted to the question
of whether prior experience with a MC setting makes a difference; differences between
general practitioners and specialists are discussed in the next section.
To test for differences between physicians with and without MC experience, all
attributes are interacted with a dummy indicating whether respondents stated to have
made experience with this specific MC attribute. Table 2.8 of the Appendix (left-hand
side) shows the estimated distribution parameters for the RCM containing this type
of interaction. The physician-specific WTA values estimated for physicians with and
without experience with the pertinent MC attribute are displayed in Table 2.6. In
general, physicians with experience have lower WTA values, indicating less resistance
against or even a preference for the MC feature. There are two reasons for this effect.
First, physicians may like MC due to their favorable experience. Second, however,
self-selection may be at work. Physicians with a preference for MC are likely to have
selected this setting, causing them to have prior MC experience. As will be argued
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below, disentangling the two directions of causality in not worthwhile in the present
policy context.
Physicians Physicians
without experience with experience
Percentiles Percentiles
Attribute MN MD 5th 95th MN MD 5th 95th
Shared decision making 0.52 0.72 -1.40 2.25 -2.28 -2.09 -4.44 -0.40
Guidelines 3.80 3.85 1.46 5.55 0.89 1.22 -2.55 3.19
Critical incident reporting 0.72 0.75 0.13 1.20 -0.35 -0.34 -1.54 0.90
Three quality circles 0.37 0.37 0.30 0.44 -1.32 -1.32 -1.59 -1.04
Six quality circles 1.59 1.59 1.54 1.62 -1.39 -1.39 -1.44 -1.33
Twelve quality circles 5.08 5.18 1.95 7.45 2.95 3.05 -1.41 6.57
Preferred provider list 5.61 6.30 -0.37 9.38 2.78 2.98 -2.94 7.46
Generic drug list 4.64 5.52 -2.18 9.15 3.48 3.72 -2.24 8.69
Note: WTA values are shown in CHF per insured per month, IPM using physician-specific WTA
values from RCM, containing interactions. ‘Experience’ refers to the particular MC attributes
listed.
Table 2.6: Willingness-to-accept values by experience
The discussion is limited to the most salient differences. They concern SDM, PPL,
and GEN. First, physicians who stated that they never made experience with SDM
dislike to involve patients in the decision making process. They ask for a median com-
pensation of 0.72 CHF/IPM for SDM. In contrast, physicians with experience in SDM
have a positive preference for it and do not have to be compensated. Second, physicians
who have worked with a preferred provider list (PPL) exhibit a median WTA value of
2.98 CHF/IPM, less than one-half of that characterizing their colleagues without that
experience (6.30 CHF/IPM). Third, restricting drug prescription to generics has a me-
dian WTA of 3.72 CHF/IPM among physicians who have applied such a list, compared
to 5.52 CHF/IPM for those who have not.
While it would be of scientific interest to distinguish the effect of prior experience
from a possible self-selection effect, for policy makers attempting to increase the market
share of MC, this is a moot point. They need to win over physicians without prior MC
experience. This means that the achievable cost savings must suffice to finance the
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higher compensations asked by this group – letting alone the compensation asked by
Swiss consumers as estimated by another DCE [Zweifel et al. (2006)].
2.8 Differences between GPs and specialists
In the survey, physicians were asked to state if they are general practitioners (GPs,
including gynecologists and pediatricians), specialists with and without surgical ac-
tivities, or psychiatrists. Because GPs play a crucial role in MC as gatekeepers for
their patients, this section compares their preferences with those of their specialized
colleagues who are grouped together as ‘specialists’. The same RCM is estimated as
in Section 2.6, but this time with MC attributes interacted with a dummy variable
indicating whether the respondent is a specialist or not. In analogy to the previous
section, estimated distribution parameters are relegated to Table 2.8 of the Appendix
(right-hand side). Table 2.7 displays the calculated physician-specific WTA values.
General Specialists
practitioners
Percentiles Percentiles
Attribute MN MD 5th 95th MN MD 5th 95th
Shared decision making -0.58 -0.55 -1.62 0.46 -1.03 -0.70 -4.37 1.07
Guidelines 3.38 4.26 -3.34 7.63 3.47 4.15 -3.15 7.15
Critical incident reporting 0.23 0.24 -0.16 0.59 0.68 0.78 -0.59 1.46
Three quality circles -0.90 -0.90 -0.96 -0.85 -0.13 -0.12 -0.56 0.27
Six quality circles -0.98 -0.98 -1.32 -0.64 0.60 0.60 0.20 0.96
Twelve quality circles 2.50 2.49 -0.12 4.92 3.61 3.72 0.93 5.83
Preferred provider list 3.64 3.64 -0.11 6.91 5.94 6.53 -1.30 11.30
Generic drug list 2.93 3.06 -1.70 6.80 4.15 4.44 -0.84 7.55
Note: WTA values are shown in CHF per insured per month, IPM using physician-specific
WTA values from interacted RCM.
Table 2.7: Willingness-to-accept values, general practitioners vs. specialists
With regard to most MC-type attributes, WTA values do not markedly differ be-
tween GPs and specialists. There are two exceptions. One is the preferred provider list
(PPL), for which the median GP would have to be compensated at the tune of 3.64
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CHF/IPM, compared to 6.53 CHF/IPM for the median specialist, the overall maximum
found in this study. This discrepancy is intuitive for three reasons. First, a specialist
who joins a MC network depends on referrals from GPs (potentially governed by a
PPL) in an even more decisive way than in conventional practice, whereas referrals
play a minor role in either setting for a GP. Second, many specialists serve more than
one MC network, in which case a PPL imposed by one of the networks can hurt them.
By way of contrast, GPs typically work for a single MC organization; there is no need
for them to rely on demand emanating from other MC organizations. Finally, special-
ized physicians may feel that they know better than GPs which providers to choose
for their patients or networks. The second discrepancy concerns the generic drug list
(GEN), where GPs have to be compensated with a median of 3.06 CHF/IPM, but
specialists with 4.44 CHF/IPM. A likely explanation is that specialists are more likely
than GPs to treat rare diseases that might call for a brand-name drug, which is not
listed.
On the whole, general practitioners are found to be less strongly opposed to at-
tributes of MC. Thus, winning them over to MC is less costly than estimated in Section
2.6 based on the whole sample. Still, a payment of 1.50 CHF/IPM remains insufficient
for attracting a majority of GPs to a MC organization that imposes guidelines more
than six quality circle meetings per year, a preferred provider list, or a generic drug
list.
2.9 Conclusions
Policy makers try to limit increasing health care expenditure by mandating or encourag-
ing Managed Care (MC). However, attempts to increase the market share of MC often
fail due to a lack of participating physicians. As long as conventional practice remains
an alternative, health service providers must be won over to MC because they have
to accept limitations of their professional autonomy. The objective of this contribution
is to investigate physicians’ preferences for MC attributes measured as willingness-to-
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accept (WTA) values. The data come from a sample of 1,088 Swiss private-practice
physicians working in ambulatory care participating in a discrete choice experiment
(DCE) in 2011.
The MC attributes studied are shared decision making and guidelines, reflecting
treatment concepts, critical incident reporting, attending zero, three, six, or twelve
quality circle meetings per year, accepting a preferred provider list, and having drug
prescription restricted to generics if available. To determine the money valuation of
MC attributes expressed as WTA values, a price attribute is included, defined as a
payment per MC-insured per month (IPM) to compensate the physician for additional
cost and effort.
Estimated distribution parameters for the random-coefficient model show that the
median Swiss physician likes shared decision making, three quality circles, and payment,
is indifferent with regard to six quality circles per year, and dislikes all other MC
attributes. The highest share of opposing physicians is found for the preferred provider
list. All respondents like three quality circles per year. With respect to strength of
opposition, estimated WTA values reveal that preferred provider and generic drug lists
have to be compensated most, with median WTA ranging from 3.60 CHF/IPM to 5.30
CHF/IPM (1 CHF ≈ 1.1 USD in 2011). These figures exceed current level of 1.50
CHF/IPM, which already amounts to 8 percent of median physician income. Shared
decision making and up to six quality circles are accepted without compensation.
Clear signs of preference heterogeneity motivate distinctions between physician
groups. For an expansion of MC, physicians without prior experience with MC-type at-
tributes need to be attracted. However, some of their WTA values turn out to be twice
as high as those of physicians with prior experience. Another distinction of importance
is between general practitioners and specialists since some MC organizations have diffi-
culty offering the full range of specialties. Indeed, specialists are found to exhibit higher
WTA values than GPs almost without exception; their resistance against a preferred
provider list would have to be overcome by a payment of 6.53 CHF/IPM, the overall
maximum found in this study. Considering that a current rate for participating in an
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HMO is 1.50 CHF/IPM, these findings lead to the prediction that MC plans designed
to achieve cost savings will never enlist the majority of Swiss physicians as long as they
retain the option of conventional practice with full professional autonomy. Realistically,
the implementation of shared decision making, critical incident reporting, and up to
six quality circle meetings per year can be expected. It is doubtful that future cost sav-
ings achievable through treatment guidelines, preferred provider list and generic drug
lists are of a magnitude that would permit the current 1.50 CHF/IPM to be doubled
or even tripled, reaching compensation amounts that would render MC attractive to
the median physician. Prospects for a voluntarily, market-driven expansion of MC in
Switzerland look rather bleak indeed.
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Appendix
Experience Profession
Attribute Parameter Value S.E. Value S.E.
Shared decision making Mean -0.24 (0.14) 0.28 (0.11)
Standard deviation 1.14 (0.16) 0.71 (0.16)
SDM interacted Mean 1.32 (0.17) 0.18 (0.18)
Standard deviation 0.35 (0.96) 1.30 (0.27)
Guidelines Mean -1.71 (0.22) -1.55 (0.24)
Standard deviation 1.30 (0.32) 2.65 (0.26)
GL interacted Mean 1.25 (0.26) -0.07 (0.31)
Standard deviation 0.91 (0.38) 0.79 (0.34)
Critical incident reporting Mean -0.34 (0.10) -0.11 (0.11)
Standard deviation 0.37 (0.17) 0.34 (0.24)
CIR interacted Mean 0.54 (0.18) -0.22 (0.17)
Standard deviation 0.72 (0.28) 0.61 (0.26)
Preferred provider list Mean -2.50 (0.14) -1.62 (0.13)
Standard deviation 2.22 (0.18) 1.49 (0.20)
PPL interacted Mean 1.07 (0.31) -0.95 (0.21)
Standard deviation 0.36 (0.43) 2.09 (0.22)
Generic drug list Mean -2.10 (0.19) -1.31 (0.14)
Standard deviation 2.48 (0.24) 1.71 (0.14)
GEN interacted Mean 0.41 (0.23) -0.56 (0.20)
Standard deviation 0.41 (0.29) 0.65 (0.17)
Three quality circles Mean -0.17 (0.16) 0.42 (0.13)
Standard deviation 0.04 (0.29) 0.04 (0.20)
QC3 interacted Mean 0.78 (0.18) -0.37 (0.17)
Standard deviation 0.15 (0.19) 0.31 (0.29)
Six quality circles Mean -0.73 (0.17) 0.46 (0.14)
Standard deviation 0.03 (0.23) 0.23 (0.27)
QC6 interacted Mean 1.37 (0.19) -0.75 (0.19)
Standard deviation 0.01 (0.24) 0.10 (0.24)
Twelve quality circles Mean -2.33 (0.25) -1.15 (0.18)
Standard deviation 1.45 (0.25) 1.26 (0.24)
QC12 interacted Mean 0.94 (0.27) -0.49 (0.23)
Standard deviation 1.24 (0.34) 0.59 (0.25)
Constant Mean -0.56 (0.16) -0.42 (0.15)
Standard deviation 1.76 (0.11) 1.77 (0.09)
Payment Mean 0.46 (0.06) 0.47 (0.06)
Table 2.8: Preferences for Managed Care attributes (model with interactions)
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SUMMARY
Managed Care (MC) is expected to provide health care at lower cost than conventional
health care provision. Switzerland intends to promote MC by two major changes in
regulation. First, the government should be allowed to force insurers to write MC
contracts. Secondly, the introduction of budgetary co-responsibility for ambulatory care
physicians is intended. On the one hand, the obligation of writing MC contracts asks
for additional physicians working in networks or Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs). On the other hand, as long as conventional practice remains an alternative,
physicians are likely to oppose network participation due to budgetary co-responsibility.
The success of the reform depends on the ability to win enough physicians over to
join networks. Therefore, this study analyzes preferences of Swiss ambulatory care
physicians for payment attributes. Results from a discrete choice experiment conducted
in 2011 including 1,521 physicians show that the compensation for accepting budgetary
co-responsibility is likely to exceed insurer’s potential cost savings. This leads to the
conclusion that the discussed reform is likely to fail to increase the market share of
Managed Care.

Chapter 3
How Much Compensation for
Accepting Budgetary
Responsibility? Stated Preferences
of Swiss Physicians
3.1 Introduction and motivation
Health care expenditure in Switzerland is among the highest in the OECD countries
and rises at a faster rate than its gross domestic product (GDP). Statistics from the
OECD (2010a) show that only the United States and France have higher spending per
capita as well as higher shares of GDP. As a consequence, health insurance premiums
have steadily increased over the last decade encouraging the debate on possible health
care reforms.
While Managed Care (MC) is the dominant form of health insurance in the United
States, MC is less established in Europe. In 1990, Switzerland was the first Euro-
pean country to allow MC contracts in its social health insurance [Beck et al. (2009)].
Twenty years later, the promotion of MC is still at the top of the political agenda. Cur-
rently, the Swiss parliament debates a reform with the objective to increase its market
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share through new regulations, as several studies have shown that MC contributes to
lower health care expenditure and to an increase in treatment quality [compare Berch-
told and Hess (2006) and Beck et al. (2009) again]. Two major changes in regulation
are discussed. First, the reform intends to allow the government to force health in-
surers to write MC contracts without granting them the authority to establish their
own MC organizations or to invest in such organizations. Therefore, insurers have to
contract with independent physician networks or Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs) who currently insure about 12.5 percent of Swiss citizens. Second, budgetary
co-responsibility should be introduced for ambulatory care physicians who are cur-
rently remunerated through fee-for-service (FFS). According to Robinson (2001), FFS
‘[...] rewards inappropriate services, the fraudulent upcoding of visits and procedures,
and the churning ping-pong referrals among specialists [...]’. However, the introduction
of budgetary co-responsibility, which uses capitation for the calculation of spending
targets, may ‘[...] reward the denial of appropriate services, the dumping of the chron-
ically ill, and a narrow scope of practice that refers out every time-consuming patient
[...]’. Thus, introducing cost sharing to fight increasing health care expenditure comes
at a price.
In Switzerland, independent private practice physicians are mainly responsible for
providing ambulatory care. About 50 percent of all general practitioners (GPs) and
more than 400 specialists cooperated with one of 86 established networks or HMOs
in 2010 [see Berchtold and Peytremann-Bridevaux (2010)]. However, increasing the
share of MC-insured citizens requires the recruitment of additional physicians working
in MC organizations. Physicians working in HMOs are often employed and paid with
a fixed salary. Therefore, it is unlikely that enough physicians are willing to give up
their professional autonomy and join HMOs. In contrast, network physicians are often
less integrated. They work under conventional FFS on their own account, but accept
budgetary co-responsibility for a common spending target. Therefore, successful estab-
lishment of additional physician networks is more likely to be achieved than building
up new HMOs. This might also be true for medical students entering the market.
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Buddeberg-Fischer and Klagho¨fer (2003) find that the possibility of self-employment
is an important determinant for the choice of specialty for 61 percent of surveyed last-
year medical students. Thus, the focus of the present study is on physician networks.
Following the definition of Medswiss (2010), physician networks ‘provide healthcare
services geared to the requirements of the patients means of contractually agreed co-
operation among themselves, with service providers outside the network and with the
insurance companies’.
According to Berchtold and Peytremann-Bridevaux (2010), Swiss physician networks
and HMOs were all established by initiatives of physicians and health insurers. Because
the discussed health care reform does not grant the authority to insurers to establish
their own MC organizations, new physician networks can only be established by third-
party organizations. Insurers have to contract with these organizations, which on the
other hand have to attract enough physicians for their networks. Because many physi-
cians strongly oppose budgetary co-responsibility, voluntary network participation is
expected to be low as long as physicians are not compensated for the financial risk. In
sum, while the obligation to write MC contracts requires a high number of physicians
working in networks, imposing budgetary co-responsibility distracts them from joining
networks.
The objective of this paper is to elicit Swiss physicians’ stated preferences for pay-
ment attributes and to establish if savings created through the introduction of bud-
getary co-responsibility potentially exceed the cost of implementing such an incentive
system. Thus, willingness-to-accept (WTA) values for payment attributes used to de-
sign cost sharing are derived from the estimates of a discrete choice experiment, which
was carried out in 2011 and includes 1,521 ambulatory care physicians. Comparing
estimated implementation costs for incentives with potential benefits leads to the con-
clusion that the discussed reform is likely to fail to meet its objectives and that network
participation cannot be achieved on voluntary basis as long as conventional practice
remains an alternative.
36 Provider and Consumer Preferences in Health Care Markets
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives a short literature review of de-
signing incentives to increase agent’s performance in the principal-agent relationship.
Section 3.3 discusses how budgetary co-responsibility can be modeled in payment mech-
anisms and describes how physician’s financial risk aversion can be expressed in WTA
values. Section 3.4 derives expected theoretical preferences for or against payment at-
tributes. Section 3.5 discusses the design of the discrete choice experiment and explains
how preferences are measured. Section 3.6 specifies physician’s utility derived from
alternative payment mechanisms and discusses the econometric model used to elicit
preference weights. Section 3.7 describes the experimental data. Estimation results are
interpreted in Section 3.8. The concluding Section 3.9 highlights policy implications.
3.2 Literature review
The existing economic literature on incentive pay mainly revolves around the impacts
of differently designed incentive mechanisms to improve performance of employees [see
Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) and Gibbons (1996) for an overview]. However, optimal
designs may differ if one is interested in containing medical expenditure.
Burgess and Ratto (2003) analyze the importance of incentive pay to improve public-
sector efficiency in the United Kingdom. They point out that the optimal design of in-
centives in the public sector may differ from those in the private sector. Not all mecha-
nisms used in private firms, like piece rates, options, discretionary bonuses, promotions,
profit sharing, efficiency wages, or deferred compensation, are necessarily optimal to
provide incentives in the public sector, where employees are often multi-tasking and
performance measurement is difficult [compare Prendergast (1999)]. Similar problems
are present in the principal-agent relationship between health insurers and providers,
where especially performance measurement is difficult because treatment quality does
not only depend on provider’s performance but also on unobserved patient character-
istics. Burgess and Ratto (2003) conclude that ‘team-based rewards may be preferred
to individual compensation schemes, in contexts where cooperation is important for
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the outcome of the organization or where only aggregate measures of performance
are available’ speaking in favor of group-based budgetary co-responsibility for physi-
cians. Moreover, they find that bonuses from better performance should be invested
in a better working environment instead of paying individual bonuses in organizations
where employees are strongly intrinsic motivated. Hence, instead of paying gain-sharing
bonuses for achieved cost savings to individual physicians, insurers or networks could
invest cost savings in e.g. new equipment.
Again, since the interests of health insurers and providers are not always aligned,
designing optimal payment mechanisms to induce providers to practice in the insurer’s
interest has stimulated the literature on physician incentives. Introducing cost con-
sciousness in health care is a special case of incentive designs that can arise whenever
principals rely on the judgment of skilled agents to ration resources. Town et al. (2004)
assess the influence of incentives on physicians and medical groups. They show that
psychological and organizational factors influence incentive effects. Because we are
interested in introducing cost consciousness through budgetary co-responsibility, we
concentrate on financial incentives only. Gaynor et al. (2004) study how primary care
physicians in MC networks respond to financial incentives to contain medical expen-
diture in the United States, where MC is the dominant form of health insurance. MC
organizations rely on a system of financial and non-financial incentives that encourage
physicians to control costs. They find that group-based incentives are more effective
in reducing medical expenditure for small physician panels because many group-based
incentives rely to some extent on the power of peer pressure to abolish moral hazard. In
the present context, introducing budgetary co-responsibility on network level therefore
requires an optimal choice of panel size.
In contrast to the studies cited above, this study is interested in how much the
implementation of incentives costs. While Gaynor et al. (2004) estimate contained
medical costs through incentives, they do not establish if created savings exceed the cost
of implementation. The objective is to measure the asked compensation of physicians
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for accepting budgetary co-responsibility. The next section turns to incentive designs
with respect to physician payment mechanisms.
3.3 Physician payment mechanisms
This section describes conventional and alternative physician payment mechanisms.
It starts with modeling a payment system for a network including budgetary co-
responsibility, which can be reduced to conventional fee-for-service, depending on the
choice of payment parameters.
Considering a network including N physicians, network profit can be written as
Π = (1− s)R +
[
sR + b(T − C)
]
(C ≤ T )−
[
m(C − T )
]
(C > T )− C, (3.1)
with R = (1 + µ)C
where (·) is an indicator function being one if the expression in parenthesis is true
and zero otherwise.1 For simplicity, only one medical service is considered so that
network’s total costs are given by C =
∑NT
n=1 cn where n indicates patients and cn
denotes patient’s cost within a year. It is assumed that physicians can only influence
cn by choosing cost-efficient treatments but that they do not ‘dump’ patients so that
total number of patients seen per year (NT ) is exogenous. To limit risk caused by
patients with unexpectedly high cn, a stop-loss provision limit L per patient per year
is introduced so that in the case of cn > L only L contributes to C instead of actual
cn. Revenues are given by R = (1 + µ)C with µ denoting a mark-up added to C to
compensate physicians for delivering health care (income contribution). The spending
target (T ) (which is bargained ex ante between insurer and network) depends on the
number of enrollees in the network (NE) and expected average treatment cost across
networks (c˜). The target level is determined by T = λwc˜NE , where w is a weighting
1 In this study, we investigate physicians maximizing network’s profit. Individual profit for each
member is then given by the network-specific internal income allocation. Commonly, network
members receive their own fee-for-service (FFS) claims and are participated in a gain/loss. How
specific gains or losses are distributed among members is not discussed further in this study.
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factor taking into account network-specific characteristics (e.g. specialization and skill
mix), forecasts of changes in demand, and expected price changes. Factor λ defines
intended cost reduction compared to non-MC insured.2
Gaynor et al. (2004) investigate an HMO payment mechanism where a certain share
of fees is retained by the insurer until the end of the year (payment at risk) and only
paid to the HMO if costs are below the spending target. Otherwise, the insurer keeps
the retained fees. This type of incentive is represented in Equation (3.1) by parameter s.
A bonus/malus contribution is more common in practice. The bonus can be defined in
absolute or relative terms. Absolute values are more likely to be accepted by physicians
because the limits of the gain-loss contribution are known ex ante. However, in this
study different types of physicians with different cost structures are analyzed making
the use of relative bonus and malus payments more appropriate. Thus, parameter b
denotes the share of achieved cost savings that goes to the network as a gain-sharing
bonus and m defines the share of cost above spending target that the network has
to bear as a loss-sharing malus. Therefore, in addition to the income contribution
through fee-for-service, a network is able to increase profit or decrease losses by using
cost-effective treatments (gain-loss contribution).
Using Equation (3.1), we can define state-dependent profit to be Π1 if costs are
below spending target (state 1) and Π2 in the case where costs exceed the spending
target (state 2) with C1 < T < C2. In this case expected profit reads
E[Π] = τ
[
µC1 + b(T − C1)
]
+ (1− τ)
[
µC2 − s(1 + µ)C2 −m(C2 − T )
]
, (3.2)
where τ denotes the probability that state 1 occurs. If no budget responsibility is
introduced, i.e. s = b = m = 0, networks are reimbursed by conventional FFS and
Equation (3.2) reduces to
E[ΠFFS] = τ [µC1] + (1− τ)[µC2]. (3.3)
2 In reality, many different groups can be defined according to e.g. enrollee’s age and gender. The
spending target is then given by T = λw
∑
g c˜gNE,g, with c˜g denoting group-specific average cost
where groups are identified by g = 1, ..., G.
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Next, one can single out the expected gain-loss contribution to profit and write expected
profit as the sum of income and gain-loss contribution. Uncertainty caused by budgetary
co-responsibility is reflected by E[Π] = E[ΠFFS] + E[ΠPBR] with
E[ΠPBR] = τ
[
b(T − C1)
]
+ (1− τ)
[
−s(1 + µ)C2 −m(C2 − T )
]
. (3.4)
As seen from Equation (3.4), introducing budgetary responsibility increases uncer-
tainty. Assuming risk averse physicians, a von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) utility
function υ(·) permits to compare certain with uncertain profits and to measure com-
pensation asked to bear higher risk through budgetary co-responsibility. The VNM
utility function can be written as
υ(Π0) = υ(E[Π
PBR]−WTP), (3.5)
where Π0 denotes a certain profit. Physicians’ willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid
uncertainty can then be used to derive willingness to accept (WTA, denoted by ρ)
budgetary responsibility [compare Zweifel and Eisen (2011), Chapter 2]. Therefore, ρ
serves as the price attribute in the discrete choice experiment (DCE) to measure risk
compensations for introducing budgetary co-responsibility. Physicians’ participation in
networks is commonly reimbursed through a payment per network-insured per month.
The price attribute used in the DCE outlined in Section 3.5 is therefore defined to be
a payment per insured per month (IPM).
3.3.1 Conventional reimbursement of independent practices
In Switzerland, independent private-practice physicians are paid according to a fee-for-
service (FFS) schedule. Therefore, FFS constitutes the reference payment system for
the no-network option in the DCE (see Section 3.5) because it does not include bud-
get co-responsibility. The profit function given by Equation (3.1) reduces to Π = µC
because s = b = m = 0 and N = 1 with no spending target nor stop-loss provision.
Thus, physicians may be incentivized to provide expensive medical services resulting
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in high cn and/or try to treat more patients than necessary so that NT rises. The lat-
ter constitutes the classical supplier-induced demand [see McGuire (2000)]. Therefore,
alternative payment systems including budgetary co-responsibility are of great interest
for insurers to help contain medical costs.
3.3.2 Payment mechanisms with budgetary co-responsibility
Budget co-responsibility can be modeled in different ways. A first example is described
and analyzed by Gaynor et al. (2004). This payment system can be modeled using
Equation (3.1) where s > 0, b > 0, m = 0, and µ > 0. Network profit is then given by
Π = (1− s)R + [sR + b(T − C)] (C ≤ T )− C
with R = (1 + µ)F and a spending target which is derived as discussed above.3 The
stop-loss provision is limited at USD 15,000 per patient per year and revenues are
calculated based on Medicare’s fee schedule (denoted by F instead of cost C). Bonuses
are based on the performance of panels of doctors which vary between three and 30
physicians. Realized cost savings (T − C) are divided in equal shares between insurer
and network. If costs exceed the spending target, network loss amounts to the retained
revenues.
A second example imposes budgetary co-responsibility through a bonus combined
with a malus instead of a bonus and retained revenues. The gain-sharing bonus is often
designed to be more generous than the loss-sharing malus, i.e. 0 < m < b < 1. The
reason is that insurers are better able to manage risks than networks. Services are
paid through FFS (income contribution) where revenues are R = (1 + µ)C. With this
specification, Equation (3.1) reduces to
Π = µC + b(T − C) (C ≤ T )−m(C − T ) (C > T ).
3 More specific, the values are s = 0.2, b = 0.5, m = 0, and µ = 0.25).
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3.4 Predicted preferences for payment attributes
Depending on the choice of payment parameters, higher or lower responsibility can
be modeled. In this section, preferences for or against these payment parameters are
derived theoretically with the aid of Equation (3.4). Because payments at risk and
changes in mark-ups are not of interest in the Swiss context, these attributes are
neglected and physician utility reads
υ(E[ΠPBR], ρ) = υ(βbb+ βmm+ βLL+ βNN + βTT + βρρ), (3.6)
with υ′(·) > 0, υ′′(·) < 0. According to Gaynor et al. (2004), the number of physicians
(N) in a panel working under the same target is an important decision variable for
physicians to join a network. Implementing network-level incentives introduces the
problem of moral hazard and the intensity of incentives might depreciate as panel size
increases. Thus, one may expect preferences for medium size panels. Hence, in addition
to the five attributes discussed previously, the number of physicians in the network is
included in the DCE (see Section 3.5). The variables b,m, L, N , T and ρ now denote the
alternative-specific attribute levels and the β’s are the parameters of interest mirroring
physicians’ preference weights. Again, the risk premium permits to measure the price
an insurer has to pay for introducing budget co-responsibility.
It is assumed that physicians are not completely certain of ending up in the state 1
or state 2, respectively, so that 0 < τ < 1. The first derivative of expected profit with
respect to the gain-sharing bonus parameter is given by ∂E[ΠPBR]/∂b = τ(T−C1) > 0.
Thus, physicians are predicted to prefer higher bonuses so that βb > 0 is expected.4
Increasing the loss-sharing malus parameter m is undesired by physicians because
∂E[ΠPBR]/∂m = −(1 − τ)(C2 − T ) < 0. A higher malus parameter means that physi-
cians have to bear a higher share of cost above target if they end up in state 2 and
therefore βm < 0 is predicted.
4 Again, we assume that C1 < T < C2 so that indifference arising from C1 = T = C2 is excluded.
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The stop-loss provision limit is not modeled in Equation (3.4), but increasing L
decreases τ and reduces (increases) gains (losses) in absolute terms. Therefore, physi-
cians are predicted to dislike an increase in the stop-loss provision leading to βL < 0.
Further, the equation does not allow to derive predictions for network size N . In this
case, expected preferences are discussed in the next section.
Increasing the spending target T increases expected profit because ∂E[ΠPBR]/∂T =
τb+ (1− τ)m > 0 predicting that physicians like higher targets and therefore dislike a
target reduction. Thus, one expects that βT > 0 as long as at least b or m is positive.
Finally, increasing the risk payment is predicted to have a positive effect on physician
utility because υ′ρ > 0 so that βρ > 0 is expected. The predicted preferences are
summarized in Table 3.1.
3.5 Design of the discrete choice experiment
Physicians’ preferences for budgetary co-responsibility are measured using a discrete
choice experiment (DCE) with Equation (3.6) from Section 3.3 constituting the main
effects specification. This section turns to the choice of attributes and attribute levels
that allow measuring physicians’ preferences for differently designed budgetary co-
responsibility.
The gain-sharing bonus (b) representing the share of potential cost savings (target
minus actual cost) and the loss-sharing malus (m) measuring the share of excess cost
(actual cost minus target) to be borne by the network is modeled using the attributes
BON and MAL with six levels ranging from zero to 50 percent. Higher values are
expected to be very unrealistic in the Swiss context.
In practice, the stop-loss limit (L) for GPs is often approximately CHF 10,000 per
patient per year (1 CHF ≈ 1.1 USD in 2011). For specialists, this value is very low
and costs are likely to reach this limit. Therefore, the stop-loss limit (LIM) has three
levels being CHF 10,000, 20,000, and 30,000 per patient per year. For an international
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Attributes Expected Description of attributes and their levels
sign
Bonus (BON) βb > 0 Share of cost savings paid to network of
0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 percent
Malus (MAL) βm < 0 Share of excess cost borne by network of
0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 percent
Limit (LIM) βL < 0 Stop-loss provision limit per patient and year of
CHF 10,000, 20,000, or 30,000
Physicians (PHY) βN ≶ 0 Number of network members with same target of
10, 50, or 100 physicians
Target (TAR) βT > 0 Spending target compared to non-MC insured cost
reduced by 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, or 25 percent
Payment (PAY) βρ > 0 Risk payment per insured per month (IPM) of
CHF 0.00, 0.50, 1.00, 1.50, 2.00, or 2.50 per IPM
Table 3.1: Summary of attributes, levels, and expected signs
comparison, the HMO analyzed by Gaynor et al. (2004) uses a stop-loss provision
limited at USD 15,000 (≈ CHF 13,630) for primary care physicians.
The attribute PHY representing the team size of a network (N) is important be-
cause intensity of incentives may decrease with panel size and imposing network-level
incentives might introduce moral hazard. On the other hand, larger networks are bet-
ter able to manage financial risks. The HMO analyzed by Gaynor et al. (2004) have
physician panels ranging from three to 30. The present DCE models networks with 10,
50, and 100 physicians.
The spending target (TAR) is included in the DCE as percentage reductions of the
reference budget determined upon the cost of comparable non-MC insured citizens.
Reduction in spending target ranges from zero to 25 percent using intervals of 5 percent.
Finally, monetary compensation for additional risk (ρ) is included as risk payments
(PAY) per insured per month (IPM). In 2010, a major Swiss health insurer paid ap-
proximately CHF 1.50 per IPM and therefore PAY is defined to range from zero to
CHF 2.50 per IPM (see Table 3.1).
In each scenario respondents were asked to choose between two alternative networks
(Network A or B) differing only in their payment mechanism and team size or to
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remain working independent (no-network option). As long as physicians are not forced
to work in networks, general opposition against network participation that is regardless
of network-specific characteristics is of great relevance. Including the opt-out option in
the choice-based conjoint analysis allows the quantification of this resistance. Table 3.2
shows one choice scenario presented to physicians.
Attributes Attribute levels
Network A Network B
Share of cost savings paid to network as a bonus 50 percent 30 percent
Share of excess cost borne by network as a malus 50 percent 50 percent
Stop-loss provision limit per patient and year CHF 10,000 CHF 20,000
Physicians in network with same target 10 phy. 50 phy.
Target reduction compared to non-MC insured 10 percent 0 percent
Risk payment per insured per month (IPM) CHF 1.50 CHF 1.00
Choice: I prefer to join... Network A !, Network B !, or no network !.
Table 3.2: Example of a three-alternative choice scenario
The total of six attributes and their levels combine to form 11,664 (=64 × 32) pos-
sible combinations of alternative payment systems. Using the D-optimality criteria, 80
hypothetical alternatives were selected and grouped to 10 binary choice scenarios in 4
blocks.5
3.6 Utility specification and econometric model
Preferences are measured based on the stochastic utility maximization theory [Luce
(1959), Manski (1977), McFadden (1981)]. The utility of alternative payment mecha-
nisms is defined as a function of alternative-specific attribute levels. While respondent’s
utility from network participation is specified as linear in network attributes, the util-
ity from independent private practice (no-network option) is given by an alternative-
specific constant [compare Marshall et al. (2009)]. For later interpretation, a network
5 The experiment was designed using the JMP software.
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constant (NETW) is used instead, being one for network alternatives (Network A or
B) and zero otherwise.
The levels for the three attributes BON, MAL, and LIM are included as categorical
characteristics, while PHY, TAR, and PAY are treated as continuous variables. In the
case of remaining independent and joining no network (no-network option), PHY is
defined to be one. In contrast, all network options require a value higher then one
so that including PHY as a categorical variable predicts the outcome perfectly. Thus,
PHY is included as a continuous variable. Testing the functional relation between TAR
and utility supports a linear specification so that TAR is included as a continuous
variable. The price attribute PAY is assumed continuous to facilitate the derivation
of willingness-to-pay values. The same is true for the calculation of marginal rates of
substitution for TAR (see Section 3.9).
Two different models are estimated. The deterministic part of the random utility
for the first specification (Model A) reads
β ′x =
5∑
i=1
βib · BONi0 +
5∑
i=1
βim ·MALi0 +
3∑
i=2
βi−1L · LIMi0 (3.7)
+β1N · PHY + β
2
N · PHY
2 + βT · TAR + βρ · PAY + βc · NETW.
The second specification (Model B) includes additional interaction terms between the
network constant and demographic variables. The first three interactions are between
NETW and physician’s specialization. General practitioners (GPs) constitute the refer-
ence category and are compared to specialists without (SPw/o) and with (SPw/) surgical
activities, and psychiatrists (PSY). The interaction with physician’s age (AGE) and
gender (MALE) enables to investigate if network participation differs between gener-
ations and between male and female physicians, respectively. Finally, network partici-
pation is interacted with a dummy TAU being one if physicians think their probability
of producing cost below comparable practices is above 50 percent [τ > 0.5 in Equation
(3.2)] and zero otherwise.
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Taste parameters are simulated by maximum likelihood using random-coefficient
logit models. This has three important advantages compared to the conventional stan-
dard logit model. First, it allows for preference heterogeneity among physicians. Sec-
ond, it permits unrestricted substitution patterns in the present three-alternative case.
And third, it allows for correlation of unobserved factors over choice scenarios. Choice
probabilities are given by
Pni =
∫ T∏
t=1
exp(β ′xnit)∑J
j=1 exp(β
′xnjt)
f(β|µ, σ)dβ, (3.8)
where f(β|µ, σ) is called mixing (or population) distribution for coefficient β with
mean parameter µ and standard deviation σ [see Train (2003), Chapter 6]. The index
n indicates the physician and subscript i the alternative available in the choice set of
choice scenario t = 1, ..., 10.
All mixing distributions for the random coefficients are assumed to be normal even
if this contradicts microeconomic theory for some respondents, e.g. PAY is expected
to be liked by all respondents. Non-negative or non-positive preferences are commonly
modeled using the log-normal distribution. However, the log-normal distribution has
many disadvantages in practice, e.g. convergence problems and implausible values due
to its long fat tails. Treating the coefficients for PAY and TAR fixed facilitates the
derivation of willingness-to-pay (WTA) values or marginal rates of substitution, re-
spectively. To ease the estimation of Model B due to the high number of parameters
to estimate, coefficients pertaining to the interaction terms are assumed fixed.6
The mixing distribution f(β|µ, σ) can be used to derive physician-level parameters
by combining population information with observed respondent’s choices [see Train
(2003), Chapter 11 for more details]. The conditioned physician-level distribution is
proportional to the product of the unconditioned population distribution and the prob-
ability that a respondent’s choice sequence would be observed if his or her coefficient
were β. If a respondent’s choices are observed, all quantities are known to derive in-
6 The estimation of a model with random coefficients for all interaction terms did not converge.
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dividual preference weights (see Section 3.8.1). These coefficients can then be used to
calculate physician-specific WTA values (see Section 3.8.2).
3.7 Data
The discrete choice experiment (DCE) was included in an online-survey addressed
to approximately 11,000 Swiss physicians working in ambulatory care. A pretest was
conducted in July 2011 to check the choice of attributes, their levels, and the un-
derstanding of the questionnaire. Comments indicated that only minor changes were
required and the main survey was finally fielded in August 2011. The rate of return
was about 14 percent resulting in 13,073 observed choices by 1,521 physicians. Table
3.3 summarizes respondent demographics for the sampled physicians. First evidence
that many physicians oppose network participation is given by the fact that about one
fifth of all respondents (22 percent) always chose to continue to work in independent
private practices (no-network option) instead of choosing one of the presented network
alternatives. Less than one percent always chose the network options.
Percentiles
Variable MN SD 5th MD 95th
Age of physicians (in years) 53.54 8.37 40.00 54.00 66.00
Years of experience 25.88 10.01 11.00 26.00 39.00
Share of males 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 1.00
Married 0.79 0.40 0.00 1.00 1.00
Number of children under 18 1.67 1.70 0.00 2.00 4.00
Urban practice 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Suburban practice 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00
Rural practice 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00
General practitioners 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Specialists without surgery 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00
Specialists with surgery 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.00
Psychiatrists 0.17 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.00
Note: General practitioners include gynecologists and pediatricians
Table 3.3: Respondent demographics (Swiss ambulatory care physicians, 2011)
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Average age of sampled physicians is 54 years and equals average age reporter by
the Swiss Medical Association for all members working in practices in 2010 [Kraft
(2010)]. Respondents have 26 years of job experience on average. Males are slightly
oversampled with a share of 80 percent compared to 68 percent from the source cited
above. The majority (79 percent) is married, while 8 percent are divorced, 6 percent
live in concubinage, and 6 percent are single. The median respondent has two children
below 18 years. Respondents are located in urban (52 percent), suburban (23 percent),
and rural (25 percent) areas. General practitioners (including gynecologists and pedi-
atricians) account for 45 percent of respondents, specialists without surgical activities
for 12 percent, specialists with surgical activities for 13 percent, and 17 percent are
psychiatrists. The remainder (18 percent) did not declare themselves to belong to one
of these categories. The majority of physicians work in independent single practice (52
percent). Kraft (2010) reports a share of 63 percent working in single practice indi-
cating an undersampling of single practice physicians. About a third works in shared
practice on their own account (30 percent), while only 5 percent work in shared practice
on common account. Network participation in Switzerland is low and predominately
characterized by networks where physicians continue to work on their own account (12
percent). Common-account networks are the exception (1 percent). Average team size
in shared practice is 2.75 physicians.
Physicians were asked about their experience with different payment mechanisms.
Only 6 percent of sampled physicians have experience with capitation. The share of
private-practice physicians stating that they have never been paid through a fixed salary
is lower with 4 percent. Regarding a gain-sharing bonus or loss-sharing malus, 6 percent
have experience with a bonus and 4 percent with a malus. These low shares show
that most Swiss physicians have no experience with alternative payment mechanisms.
Information campaigns addressed to physicians could lower expected resistance against
cost sharing.
Parameter τ in Equation (3.2) denotes the probability of producing annual cost
below the spending target. In the survey, respondents were asked to assess their own
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probability of producing total cost (including pharmaceuticals and referrals to special-
ists and hospitals) lower than comparable practices. Response options ranged from zero
to 100 percent in steps of 10 percent. On average, physicians stated their probabilities
to be at 52 percent (median category is 50 percent). Of these surveyed, 11 percent state
that they are certain to be over the target, while 8 percent are sure to be below. These
probabilities are used to investigate if physicians who assess their probabilities to be
above 50 percent (τ > 0.5) have a lower resistance against budgetary co-responsibility.
In addition, physicians were asked if they believe that decreasing health care ex-
penditure is only possible with decreasing treatment quality. Of this query, 79 per-
cent think that decreasing expenditure is impossible without degradation in treatment
quality, whereas only 10 percent think that reducing cost is possible without affecting
quality. Physicians see the highest potential for reducing health care expenditure via
the prescription of generic drugs which contradicts the strong resistance against generic
drug lists (see Section 3.8). The majority of 76 percent stated that they consider cost
when choosing treatments for their patients while 11 percent do not consider cost when
deciding about medical services provided. Approximately 60 percent perceive cost dis-
cussions in Switzerland to endanger health care quality, while 23 percent think that
quality is unaffected. The remainder is indifferent.
3.8 Results
Table 3.4 shows population parameters (µ and σ) for both random-coefficient logit
specifications (Model A and B) discussed in Section 3.6. The left panel pertains to
Model A, while Model B (with interactions) is shown in the right panel. The discussion
below concentrates on the values and standard errors (S.E.) of Model B.
3.8.1 Preferences for payment attributes
As predicted in Section 3.4, the preference weights for a gain-sharing bonus are positive.
They are increasing with attribute levels with one exception: a bonus of 40 percent
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is valued less than a bonus of 30, which contradicts rational behavior. In general, a
quadratic relationship between network utility and bonus levels is found. Increasing
the bonus has a stronger impact on utility in the lower domain. The mean parameters
for the malus levels are negative and monotonically decreasing in attribute levels as
predicted. The effect of a malus on physician’s utility is found to be linear. A higher
stop-loss limit increases physician’s expected total costs. As predicted, estimated mean
parameters reveal a decrease in respondent’s utility if LIM rises. The positive estimates
for PHY and PHY2 show that increasing team size is preferred by physicians because
risk can be better diversified in larger networks. The coefficient pertaining to TAR
measures preferences for an increase in the spending target. However, insurers are
interested in decreasing TAR to achieve cost savings. A reduction is undesired from
the physician perspective because it reduces expected profit. The risk payment increases
utility as expected. The strongest impact on utility is found for the network constant
(NETW) with its strongly negative mean parameter. This reveals a strong opposition
against network participation of Swiss physicians.
The interactions between NETW and job categories reveal that GPs have the lowest
resistance against network participation, followed by specialists without surgical activ-
ities, and psychiatrists. The strongest opposition is found for specialists with surgical
activities. No significant preference heterogeneity for network participation is found due
to respondent’s age and gender. In contrast, physicians who believe that their proba-
bility of meeting the spending target is higher than 50 percent, have a lower resistance
against network participation. This is intuitive because they are likely to profit from
a gain-sharing bonus. However, the magnitude of the coefficient is not high enough to
compensate general resistance against network participation.
All estimated mean parameters other than βage and βmale are significant with a
p-value below 0.01.
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Model A Model B
Mean (µ) Std.Dev. (σ) Mean (µ) Std.Dev. (σ)
Attribute Level Abbrev. Coeff. Value S.E. Value S.E. Value S.E. Value S.E
Gain-sharing bonus of 10 percent BON10 β1b 0.82 (0.14) 0.16 (0.40) 0.83 (0.15) 0.46 (0.27)
20 percent BON20 β2b 1.09 (0.12) 0.30 (0.23) 1.10 (0.13) 0.40 (0.23)
30 percent BON30 β3b 1.30 (0.12) 0.14 (0.24) 1.36 (0.12) 0.15 (0.19)
40 percent BON40 β4b 1.07 (0.14) 0.45 (0.22) 1.06 (0.16) 0.61 (0.36)
50 percent BON50 β5b 1.38 (0.13) 0.34 (0.14) 1.42 (0.12) 0.07 (0.21)
Loss-sharing malus of 10 percent MAL10 β1m -0.77 (0.11) 0.17 (0.15) -0.79 (0.11) 0.13 (0.15)
20 percent MAL20 β2m -0.88 (0.11) 0.17 (0.11) -0.87 (0.11) 0.08 (0.16)
30 percent MAL30 β3m -1.31 (0.12) 0.25 (0.14) -1.30 (0.13) 0.47 (0.20)
40 percent MAL40 β4m -1.66 (0.14) 0.07 (0.15) -1.67 (0.14) 0.24 (0.16)
50 percent MAL50 β5m -2.02 (0.12) 0.27 (0.12) -2.03 (0.12) 0.02 (0.14)
Stop-loss provision limit of CHF 20,000 LIM20 β1L -0.26 (0.08) 0.08 (0.09) -0.24 (0.08) 0.08 (0.10)
CHF 30,000 LIM30 β2L -0.31 (0.09) 0.06 (0.09) -0.30 (0.09) 0.20 (0.12)
Number of physicians PHY β1N 0.03 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
Physicians2 PHY2 β2N 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Spending target a) TAR βT 0.04 (0.00) – – 0.04 (0.00) – –
Risk payment b) PAY βρ 0.42 (0.04) – – 0.44 (0.04) – –
Network participation NETW βc -5.73 (0.25) 4.35 (0.20) -5.14 (0.95) 4.20 (0.20)
× specialist w/o surgery SPw/o β
w/o
sp – – – – -1.30 (0.41) – –
× specialist w/ surgery SPw β
w/
sp – – – – -3.33 (0.39) – –
× psychiatrist PSY βpsy – – – – -2.09 (0.50) – –
× physician age AGE βage – – – – -0.00 (0.02) – –
× male physician MALE βmale – – – – 0.10 (0.36) – –
× physician w/ τ > 0.5 TAU βτ – – – – 0.98 (0.26) – –
Note: a) in %-points; b) in CHF per MC-insured per month.
Table 3.4: Preferences for payment attributes – regression results
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3.8.2 Willingness to accept budgetary co-responsibility
The estimated parameters discussed above can be used to predict how much it costs
an insurer or network to attract physicians to work in a network with budgetary co-
responsibility. Different methods can be applied to derive willingness-to-accept (WTA)
values from random-coefficient models. Taking the ratio of population mean parameters
(µ) from Table 3.4 is the simplest way as long as the price attribute has a fixed coeffi-
cient and the coefficient pertaining to the attribute of interest is normally distributed.
However, Sillano and Ortuzar (2005) recommend to determine WTA point estimates
using individual-level taste parameters [see Train (2003), Chapter 11 for more details].
Table 3.5 describes physician-specific WTA values derived from Model A and B, re-
spectively. The mean (MN) and median (MD) values do not significantly differ from
each other supporting the assumption of a symmetric mixing distribution.
On average, introducing a gain-sharing bonus of 10 percent lowers the required
compensation by 1.89 CHF/IPM (1 CHF ≈ 1.1 USD in 2011). Compensation reduces
by 2.51 CHF/IPM for BON20, by 3.11 for BON30, and by 2.41 CHF/IPM for BON40.
Granting the highest bonus level of 50 percent reduces the payment by 3.25 CHF/IPM.
Again, the value for BON40 is not in line with an expected monotonic decrease in
required compensations.
A loss-sharing malus of 10 percent has to be compensated on average with 1.80
CHF/IPM. This compensation increases to 1.99 CHF/IPM for MAL20, 2.98 CHF/IPM
for MAL30, and 3.82 CHF/IPM for MAL40. A malus of 50 percent requires an average
compensation to the tune of 4.62 CHF/IPM. Comparing the values between BON and
MAL shows that physicians are surprisingly accepting a symmetric bonus/malus of 30
percent without being compensated for. A bonus and malus of 50 percent, where insur-
ers and networks share cost savings or exceeding costs in equal measure, is estimated
to have an average WTA to the tune of 1.37 CHF/IPM.
Accepting a stop-loss provision limit of CHF 20,000 instead of CHF 10,000 requires
an average payment of 0.55 CHF/IPM while a limit of CHF 30,000 requires 0.70
CHF/IPM. Physicians prefer to work in larger networks because risk diversification
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Model A Model B
Percentiles Percentiles
Attribute MN MD 5th 95th MN MD 5th 95th
Gain-sharing bonus of
10 percent -1.94 -1.93 -2.01 -1.87 -1.89 -1.88 -2.17 -1.67
20 percent -2.56 -2.56 -2.77 -2.39 -2.51 -2.50 -2.81 -2.28
30 percent -3.07 -3.07 -3.16 -3.00 -3.11 -3.11 -3.19 -3.04
40 percent -2.52 -2.52 -2.86 -2.12 -2.41 -2.41 -2.91 -1.91
50 percent -3.25 -3.24 -3.72 -2.90 -3.25 -3.25 -3.32 -3.18
Loss-sharing malus of
10 percent 1.81 1.81 1.65 1.99 1.80 1.80 1.66 1.91
20 percent 2.07 2.07 1.85 2.29 1.99 2.00 1.90 2.08
30 percent 3.09 3.09 2.76 3.45 2.98 2.97 2.44 3.57
40 percent 3.92 3.92 3.82 4.03 3.82 3.82 3.49 4.15
50 percent 4.75 4.75 4.37 5.18 4.62 4.62 4.59 4.66
Stop-loss provision limit of
CHF 20,000 0.62 0.62 0.49 0.75 0.55 0.55 0.44 0.67
CHF 30,000 0.72 0.73 0.61 0.83 0.70 0.69 0.38 1.03
Number of physicians a) -0.72 -0.71 -0.78 -0.66 -0.66 -0.66 -0.77 -0.57
Physicians2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Spending target b) -0.10 – – – -0.10 – – –
Network participation 13.90 18.67 -1.24 20.21 12.08 15.15 -2.57 19.13
× specialist w/o surgery – – – – 2.96 – – –
× specialist w/ surgery – – – – 7.59 – – –
× psychiatrist – – – – 4.78 – – –
× physician age c) – – – – 0.00 – – –
× male physician – – – – -0.23 – – –
× physician w/ τ > 0.5 – – – – -2.24 – – –
Note: WTA values are shown in CHF per insured per month (IPM). 1 CHF ≈ 1.1 USD at 2011
exchange rates. Units: a) per 10 physicians, b) in %-points, c) in years.
Table 3.5: Individual-level WTA values of Swiss ambulatory care physicians
regarding patients with unexpected high costs is more easily manageable. For an in-
crease of network size by ten physicians, respondents are willing to reduce compensation
by 0.66 CHF/IPM.7
The reason why insurers are interested in introducing budgetary co-responsibility is
to contain medical expenditure. Therefore, they have an interest in imposing a spending
7 The effect of the quadratic term is negligible.
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target below cost of comparable non-MC insured individuals. Conversely, reducing the
target shrinks expected profits for networks and requires a compensation payment for
additional risk. For each percentage point reduction in TAR, physicians ask for an
average compensation of 0.10 CHF/IPM. One should keep in mind that a reduction in
TAR has only an effect for insurers and physicians if a bonus/malus is introduced [see
Equation (3.1) in Section 3.3].
The largest WTA values are found for joining a network regardless of network-
specific payment mechanisms. On average, GPs can be attracted to participate in
networks if they receive 12.08 CHF/IPM, which exceeds by far current compensation
payments of 1.50 CHF/IPM. Specialists without surgical activities ask for a payment
of 2.96 CHF/IPM in excess of what GPs demand, while psychiatrists ask for addi-
tional 4.78 CHF/IPM. Physicians with surgical activities have to be compensated by
approximately 1.6 times the amount for GPs. Willingness to accept does not signif-
icantly change with respondent’s age and gender. Physician’s expectation of having
costs below comparable practices reduces the required payment by 2.24 CHF/IPM.
3.9 Discussion and conclusions
In Switzerland, increasing health care expenditure fuel political debates of possible reg-
ulatory changes to promote Managed Care (MC). While MC constitutes the dominant
form of health insurance in the United States, only 12.5 percent of Swiss citizens are MC
insured. Two major changes in regulation are considered. First, the government should
be allowed to force health insurers to write MC contracts. Secondly, the introduction
of budgetary co-responsibility for physicians working in ambulatory care to encourage
physicians to control costs is intended. However, introducing incentives through bud-
getary co-responsibility is only realistic on network level and not on individual basis.
Global budgets for panels of physicians permit risk diversification. Therefore, intro-
ducing budgetary co-responsibility for all physicians equals an enforcement of network
participation. On the other hand, if budgetary co-responsibility is only implemented for
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MC organizations, physicians’ voluntary network participation and risk bearing has to
be compensated. Because insurers are not allowed to establish their own MC organiza-
tions providing care, they have to rely on contracting with independent organizations.
Increasing the share of MC-insured citizens requires the recruitment of additional physi-
cians to work in networks or Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), which is derailed by
imposing budgetary co-responsibility. Physicians have to be compensated for giving
up fee-for-service and to accept budgetary co-responsibility. Therefore, it is crucial to
assess if enough physicians can be won over to join networks and how much an insurer
would have to pay for attracting physicians to join networks.
The WTA values for the payment attributes presented in this study can be used to
predict required compensations asked to accept payment systems with different incen-
tive intensities. Let us consider a soft version of budgetary co-responsibility, e.g. one
with a symmetric bonus/malus of 10 percent, a stop-loss provision of CHF 10,000, a
network size of 50 physicians, and a spending target which is 10 percent below the
cost of a comparable non-MC insured collective. In this case, total compensation to
attract a general practitioner is 9.69 CHF per MC-insured per month.8 If we further
assume that a physician has 600 patients enrolled, an average payment of CHF 5,814
per month is required. Average income for a Swiss general practitioner is CHF 16,118
[see Reichert (2010)]. In this case, GP income has to rise by 36 percent to attract
them to accept this form of budgetary co-responsibility. These results show that imple-
menting a low budgetary co-responsibility requires already a high compensation. It is
unlikely that cost reductions for health insurers are high enough to allow them to pay
such a high price for introducing incentives through budgetary co-responsibility. The
literature review by Berchtold and Hess (2006) assesses potential cost containments
through MC to be between 20 and 30 percent, mainly due to gatekeeping and cap-
itation. Schwenkglenks et al. (2006) show that replacing fee-for-service based health
8 Total compensation asked is given by BONWTA10 +MAL
WTA
10 + 5× PHY
WTA + 10× TARWTA10 +
NETWWTA and equals −1.89 + 1.80 − 5 × 0.66 + 10 × 0.10 + 12.08. Note that PHYWTA is
measured for an increase of ten physicians and therefore multiplied with five instead of fifty
(compare Table 3.5).
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insurance with gatekeeping amounts to cost savings between 15 and 19 percent not
attributable to risk selection.
Instead of compensating physicians with additional income, an insurer could also
try to design a payment mechanism, which is accepted without monetary compen-
sation. Then, the question is for example which spending target physicians accept if
a bonus/malus system is introduced. The marginal rates of substitution between the
spending target and the attribute levels of bonus and malus can be used to estimate
accepted spending targets. Introducing a symmetric bonus/malus of 10 or 30 percent
is accepted if the spending target is one percentage point below the cost of comparable
non-MC insured individuals (see Table 3.6 in the Appendix). The highest target re-
duction can be achieved for a bonus/malus of 20 percent (minus 5 percentage points).
In contrast, the introduction of higher levels is only accepted if the spending target is
set 14 percentage points above cost of comparable non-MC insured individuals.
Therefore, the discussed health care reform which intends to force insurers to write
MC contracts to increase the market share of MC is unlikely to meet its objectives if
budgetary co-responsibility is introduced at the same time.
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Appendix
Model B
Percentiles
Attribute Level MN MD 5th 95th
Gain-sharing bonus of 10 percent -18.79 -18.68 -21.61 -16.57
20 percent -24.92 -24.81 -27.93 -22.69
30 percent -30.95 -30.92 -31.73 -30.24
40 percent -23.92 -23.96 -28.93 -19.01
50 percent -32.29 -32.30 -32.97 -31.59
Loss-sharing malus of 10 percent 17.86 17.85 16.50 19.01
20 percent 19.83 19.84 18.90 20.72
30 percent 29.63 29.53 24.27 35.50
40 percent 37.94 37.96 34.68 41.27
50 percent 45.97 45.97 45.65 46.30
Stop-loss provision limit of CHF 20,000 5.50 5.51 4.35 6.70
CHF 30,000 6.92 6.86 3.78 10.27
Note: Marginal rates of substitution with respect to TAR (in %-point).
Table 3.6: Accepted spending targets (marginal rates of substitution)
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SUMMARY
Using two Discrete Choice Experiments, this contribution measures willingness to
pay (WTP) for health insurance attributes in Germany and the Netherlands. Two
research questions naturally arise. First, what are the preferences with regard to con-
tract attributes in the two countries? Second, how do the preferences differ between the
two countries? Based on hierarchical Bayes mixed logit estimates, the distributions of
individual-specific WTP values are derived and compared. While the two populations
agree in their resistance against Managed Care-type attributes, German respondents
would have to be compensated much more for giving up free physician choice and ac-
cepting a physician list. In addition, they reveal a stronger preference for their current
status quo contract than the Dutch, who had to specifically choose a policy as part of
the 2006 reform.

Chapter 4
Preferences for Health Insurance in
Germany and the Netherlands – A
Tale of Two Countries
4.1 Introduction and motivation
Governments in industrial countries have been trying to respond to the rising cost of
health care by modifying health insurance (copayments, deductibles, bonus options
for no claims) or changing the provision of health care (Managed Care). However, it
is far from clear whether citizens are ready to accept these changes. If they conceive
e.g. Managed Care as constraining their choice of physician, compensation must be
offered to gain their acceptance. In insurance-based systems, observed past choices
provide little guidance because they are distorted by regulated contributions to health
insurance, while in National Health Service-type systems, medical care has a tax price
that is the same at a given income level.
In this situation, experimental evidence concerning citizens’ preferences may be
of value to avoid costly mistakes by health insurers and policy makers. The present
contribution purports to report on so-called market experiments of the Discrete Choice
(DCE) type in two insurance-based countries, Germany and the Netherlands. It should
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be of interest for at least three reasons. First, international comparisons of preferences
for health insurance are rare. Second, German health policy has been characterized by
new laws and regulations that have increased uncertainty on the part of patients (see
Boecken et al. (2005)). By way of contrast, in the Netherlands a major pro-competitive
reform was enacted in 2006, accompanied by a major information campaign designed to
help citizens choose a health insurance contract. This raises the question of whether this
provision of information makes a difference in the way choices are made. Third, the two
experiments deal with potential crossovers between the two countries. The status quo
in the Netherlands is gatekeeping by physicians (a variant of Managed Care), whereas
consumers possibly prefer free choice of physician, which constitutes the status quo in
Germany (where policy makers consider introducing Managed Care). Also, the Dutch
population is familiar with a bonus for no claims reminiscent of auto liability insurance
but might want to return to conventional health insurance with almost no copayment
(see VWS (2005)), whereas such bonus options have been discussed in Germany as a
reform option.
Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to answer two questions: What are the pref-
erences of German and Dutch consumers with regard to attributes of health insurance?
Are they similar or dissimilar? In the context of this second question, it is hoped to
find evidence on whether the information campaign launched by the Dutch government
in the context of the 2006 reform had an effect.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 shortly discusses the health insurance
systems in the two countries. Section 4.3 is devoted to the hierarchical Bayes mixed
logit model used to estimate preferences for insurance options and Section 4.4 compares
the two data sets. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 are devoted to the country-specific DCEs while
Section 4.7 compares the results for the two countries before concluding remarks are
made in Section 4.8.
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4.2 Health insurance in Germany and the Nether-
lands
This section provides some institutional background in the aim of motivating the choice
of insurance attributes and attribute levels in the respective DCEs.
In Germany, individuals with a gross monthly income exceeding 3,862 Euros (as
of 2004) can opt out of statutory health insurance (SHI) scheme in favor of private
health insurance. Individuals with an income below this threshold (about 88 percent of
German citizens) are obliged to join one of the 300 statutory sick funds, while approx-
imately 6 percent are fully covered by private insurance. The remaining 6 percent are
civil servants and pensioners who are insured by governmental schemes (see Schreyoegg
and Grabka (2010), Tamm et al. (2007)). This study is limited to SHI members only.
At the time of the survey (2005), members of a SHI were obliged to sign the status
quo contract described in Table 4.3 of Section 4.5.1, with little variation. German SHI
is financed through income-related premiums that are equally paid by employers and
insured individuals (see Grabka (2004)). The last major reform occurred in the year
2000. It introduced choice of sickness fund for SHI members. A minor change followed
in 2004 in the guise of a copayment of 10 Euros per quarter and initial physician
visit. Referrals to a specialist by general practitioners are exempted. Otherwise, there
continues to be free physician choice (see Table 4.3).
The Dutch health insurance system underwent a major reform in 2006, with two
main features. First, all health insurers were obliged to offer a uniform basic health
insurance plan. Second, every citizen had to explicitly choose a health insurance policy
covering at least the basic package with the option to purchase additional coverage
voluntarily. In the Netherlands, health care is financed through two sources: income-
related payments to the risk-adjustment scheme, and direct premium payments to an
insurer of one’s choice which sets its own community-rated premiums (see Becker-
Leukert et al. (2007)).
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4.3 Econometric model
In this study, preferences for health insurance options are estimated using a hierarchi-
cal Bayes mixed logit model for binary choices. The dependent variable (y) is one if
the respondent opts for the hypothetical alternative rather than the current (status
quo) contract and zero otherwise. Due to increased computation power and developed
simulation methods, the mixed (or random-coefficient) logit model plays an increasing
role in applied econometrics. It contains the standard and random-effects logit models
as special cases but allows for random taste variation, unrestricted substitution pat-
terns, and correlation of unobserved factors over time (see Train (2003), Chapter 6). It
implements the random utility model, which for individual n and alternative i at time
t is given by
Unit = β
′
nxnit + εnit, with εnit
iid
∼ EV, (4.1)
where alternative i is chosen if (and only if) Unit > Unjt ∀j #= i (EV = extreme value).
The mixed logit choice probability is given by
Pn(yn|b,W ) =
∫ ∏
t
eβ
′
nxnyntt∑
j e
β′nxnjt
k(βn|b,W ) dβn, (4.2)
where the vector xnyntt contains the attribute levels of the chosen insurance contract
of individual n at time t and k(βn|b,W ) is the prior distribution of βn with parame-
ters b and W .1 Therefore, the mixed logit model requires the specification of adequate
prior distributions representing the researcher’s expectations about the distribution of
preferences among respondents. Most DCE studies assume normally distributed (N)
coefficients, thus allowing negative and positive preferences. In some cases, microe-
conomic theory imposes sign restrictions on coefficients such as a negative marginal
utility of the price attribute for all respondents. In such cases, the coefficients are com-
monly assumed to be log-normally distributed. But the log-normal distribution can
cause problems because it allows unbounded coefficients with thick tails and often fails
to converge with simulated maximum likelihood.
1 In the frequentist literature, k(βn) is called mixture distribution giving the mixed logit its name.
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This has given rise to concern about the effect of distributional assumptions on esti-
mated preferences and willingness-to-pay values. The objective is to find distributions
that are as easy to estimate as the normal and log-normal but more flexible. For exam-
ple, Train and Sonnier (2005) prefer Johnson’s SB distribution to the log-normal for
the cost attribute because the SB distribution can be shaped like a log-normal but with
an upper bound and thinner tails, or inverted u-shaped between a lower and an upper
bound, or it can even be bimodal. Hess et al. (2005) compare different distributions for
characterizing consumers’ tastes with respect to changes in travel time and travel cost.
Their results suggest the use of bounded distributions like the SB distribution rather
than the log-normal.
In this study, two attributes are expected to have negative coefficients only, a de-
ductible and the premium. For them, SB priors are estimated and tested against the
log-normal alternative. A random variable R = ln[r/(u−r)] is SB distributed if r ∼ N ,
where u denotes an upper bound.2 In addition, some attributes are expected to be ir-
relevant to a considerable share of respondents, e.g. the availability of a counselor on
the telephone (PHONE, see Tables 4.2 and 4.6, respectively). Following Train and Son-
nier (2005), normal priors truncated at zero from below are assumed in these cases.
The random variable R is truncated normal distributed if R = max(0, r) and r ∼ N .
More detail about the choice of prior distributions is given in Sections 4.5.1 and 4.6.1
describing the design of the two DCEs.
The joint posterior density function is computed using Bayes theorem, which allows
to combine the observed data with the researcher’s expectations about the parameters
of interest. The joint posterior used for statistical inference is given by
K(βn|Yn) =
L(Yn|βn) · k(βn)
L(Yn)
∝ L(Yn|βn) · k(βn), (4.3)
where L(Yn|βn) is the likelihood of observing Yn given βn, k(βn) is the prior about βn,
and L(Yn) is the normalizing constant which is independent of βn. It can be dropped
because it does not affect the posterior’s shape. Inference is performed by taking
2 Here, the lower bound is set to zero throughout.
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draws from this posterior distribution and calculating its moments. The individual-
level parameters are modeled using a hierarchical structure where the mean (b) and
the covariance-variance matrix (W ) of k(βn|b,W ) have their own distributions k(b) and
k(W ), respectively. If independent priors are assumed, the joint prior amounts to their
product so that Equation (4.3) can be rewritten as
K(βn ∀n, b,W |Y ) ∝
∏
n
L(yn|βn) · k(βn|b,W ) · k(b) · k(W ). (4.4)
Unfortunately, distribution K(·) does not have a standard form, which would be con-
venient for analyzing its properties. Still, conditional posteriors for βn ∀n, b, and W
can be derived (see Train (2003), Chapter 12). Given the assumption that k(b) is mul-
tivariate normal and k(W ) is inverted Wishart distributed,3 the conditional posterior
for b|βn ∀n is multivariate normal andW |βn ∀n, b is inverted Wishart distributed. Both
conditional posteriors are of standard form and easy to take draws from. In contrast,
the conditional posterior for βn ∀n|b,W has no such form and would have to be directly
simulated using the time-consuming Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (see Gelman et al.
(2004), Chapter 11). As an alternative, Gibbs sampling from these three conditional
posteriors simulates draws from the joint posterior and is much faster than simulating
directly from the joint posterior. The Gibbs algorithm calls for starting values W (0)
and β(0)n ∀n and taking a draw b(1) from the first layer K(b|W (0), β
(0)
n ∀n). Next, b(1) is
used together with β(0)n to take a draw W (1) from K(W |b, βn ∀n). Finally, one vector
βn per individual is simulated from K(βn|b,W, yn). This procedure is repeated many
times. In this study, we used 105 draws for burn-in and retained every 100th draw from
the following 106, resulting in 104 draws available for inference.
Convergence of the algorithm, indicating that the retained sample consists of draws
from the correct target distribution, was checked by monitoring trace plots (see Lan-
caster (2004), Chapter 4) and the evolution of the ergodic mean over iterations. The
ergodic mean is calculated over all previous draws up to the current iteration (see Nz-
3 The inverted Wishart distribution is the conjugate prior of the multivariate normal distribution.
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toufras (2009), Chapter 2). If it does not change after the burn-in phase, the algorithm
has converged.
4.4 Data
In this section, we shortly present some socio-economic characteristics of the respon-
dents in Germany and the Netherlands. Since the two experiments will be compared
without conditioning on covariates that are likely to influence willingness-to-pay (WTP)
values, the two populations should not differ too much. Respondents in Germany are on
average 55 years old, those in the Netherlands, 49 years. In Germany, only respondents
older than 25 years were interviewed while in the Netherlands individuals older than
18 years took part in the experiment. Both samples contain about 45 percent males,
and the share of married respondents is 62 and 70 percent, respectively. The median
size of the household is two persons in both samples, and stated household income is
about the same. These similarities suggest that the two samples are not very different
and that the comparison between them (see Section 4.7) should not be mainly driven
by differences in socio-economic characteristics.
Germany Netherlands
Characteristics MN MD SD MN MD SD
Age of respondent (in years) 55 56 13 49 48 15
Share of males 0.44 0.00 0.50 0.46 0.00 0.50
Share of married respondents 0.62 1.00 0.48 0.70 1.00 0.46
Number of household members 2.66 2.00 1.35 2.86 2.00 1.31
Stated household income (in Euros)a) 2,114 2,250 983 2,431 2,250 1,027
Statistics are: means (MN), medians (MD), and standard deviations (SD)
a) Approximation because only income brackets were indicated.
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of some characteristics
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4.5 The choice experiment for Germany
4.5.1 Study design for Germany
The choice of attributes describing a health insurance contract is crucial for ensuring
realistic scenario for the DCE. The attributes included in the experiment reflect the
political debate in Germany at the time (2005) and were subjected to a pretest in-
volving in-depth interviews with 20 persons. They all turned out to be important in a
qualitative pretest. In the following, we discuss the DCE design with its attributes and
attribute levels.
Attributes Attribute levels
Physician choice Free physician choice versus physician list (LIST, ±),
gatekeeping (GATE, ±), and network (NETW, ±)
Second opinion 10 Euros per quarter for additional opinion versus
one free second opinion per quarter (SECOP, 0+)
Additional services No particular services or information provided versus
counselor available on the telephone (PHONE, 0+)
Incentives No incentives (NOINCT) versus bonus of 500 Euros for no
claims (BONUS, 0+), deductible of 500 Euros per year
(DEDUC, −), bonus for preventive behavior (PREV, 0+)
Contribution Respondent’s current annual premium (in Euros) versus
changes of ±200, ±300, ±400, and ±500 Euros (PREM, −)
Note: The signs after the abbreviations in parentheses indicate our expectations about
respondents’ preferences: (±) positive or negative preferences possible, (+) all respondents like
attribute, (−) all dislike attribute, (0+) are indifferent or like attribute.
Table 4.2: Attributes and attribute levels (Germany)
The first attribute concerns the amount of physician choice. The status quo is free
physician choice. One alternative is a physician list established by the health insurer,
based on cost and quality criteria (LIST). A second alternative is gatekeeping (GATE),
meaning that a primary care physician must be contacted first in the event of illness.
It is only then that the patient can choose a specialist. The third, most restrictive
alternative is gatekeeping combined with a list of specialists participating in a network
(NETW). Again, the gatekeeping physician must be contacted first; in addition how-
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ever, referrals can only be made to other network physicians (who must take part in
quality assurance meetings and continued education). In total, this attribute thus has
four levels.
The second attribute refers to the cost of a second opinion (SECOP). In the status
quo, patients must come up with 10 Euros per quarter for every additional physician
they contact unless referred by the treating physician. In the alternative, one second
opinion per quarter is free of charge. Therefore, this attribute has two levels.
Additional services provided by health insurers constitute the third attribute. The
status quo is no particular services or information provided. However, when insurers are
to offer contracts with new ways of providing care, consumers’ demand for information
quite likely increases. Therefore, the alternative scenario comprises a qualified patient
counselor available on the telephone 24 hours per day (PHONE) for helping to organize
medical care and to assess the seriousness of symptoms. Again, this attribute has two
levels.
The fourth attribute revolves around incentives designed to limit moral hazard ef-
fects. Since the insured do not have to fully bear the financial consequences of an illness,
they might be tempted to skim on preventive effort or opt for the more costly therapy
(see Zweifel et al. (2009), Chapter 6). The status quo is characterized by the absence
of any measures counteracting these moral hazard effects. The first alternative is a
bonus option for no claims (BONUS). If no health care services (except recommended
preventive and screening services) are utilized during a year, a premium rebate of 500
Euros is offered. The second alternative is a yearly deductible of 500 Euros (DEDUC),
again with the exceptions just mentioned. Third, an insured who proves to have per-
formed preventive activities recommended by the insurer would obtain a bonus such
as reimbursement of pertinent fees or a free week-end at a spa (PREV).
Finally, increases or decreases of the annual health insurance contribution define
the fifth attribute (PREM). Participants were asked to check their pay slip in order to
calculate their personal share of the total contribution in Euros. The alternatives are
increases and decreases of 200, 300, 400, and 500 Euros annually. The higher amounts
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Attributes Attribute levels
Status quo contract Alternative contract
Physician choice Free physician choice Physician list
Second opinion 10 Euros fee without referral 10 Euros fee without referral
Phone counselor No free phone counselor Free phone counselor
provided by insurer provided by insurer
Incentives No bonus system Bonus of 500 Euros for no claims
Contribution Your current annual Reduction by 500 Euros
contribution (in Euros) annually
I opt for... the current policy ! this alternative !
Table 4.3: Example of decision card (Germany)
seem unrealistic; however, the price attribute needs to be set in a way to cause respon-
dents to sometimes move away from the status quo, generating information about their
preferences. In total, this attribute has eight levels.
These five attributes and their levels combine to form scenarios that can be compared
to the status quo. There is a total of 512 (= 42 · 22 · 81) combinations of attribute
levels in the full factorial design, too many for an experiment. 24 choice sets of a
hypothetical alternative combined with the status quo alternative were designed using
a D-optimality algorithm that produces unbiased parameter estimates (see Carlsson
and Martinsson (2003)).4 The resulting scenarios were then randomly blocked into
three sets with eight decisions each. This number was compatible with the maximum
length of telephone interviews suggested by the marketing agency in charge on the one
hand and the number of attributes found relevant on the other. Table 4.3 contains an
example of a decision card.
The DCE was fielded in September 2005, involving 1,003 individuals of age 25 and
older, all members of statutory health insurance. Subscribers to private health insur-
ance were excluded because different attributes would have been relevant to them. Ten
respondents never made a decision and were excluded, leaving 963 respondents in the
data with 7,155 observed choices after deleting single observations without a decision.
About 21 percent never switched from the status quo contract to a hypothetical al-
4 The design was made using the Gosset software (www2.research.att.com)
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ternative, while two percent always preferred the alternative. Testing the influence of
non-movers revealed no significant changes in estimated WTP values.
4.5.2 Results for Germany
Choice of priors and estimated posterior distributions
Choices were analyzed using the hierarchical Bayes mixed logit model described in Sec-
tion 4.3. The left panel of Table 4.4 contains estimates based on fixed (non-hierarchical)
coefficients with the exception of the normally distributed constant, making them
equivalent to random-effects (RE) estimates.5 The negative estimated mean of CONST
points to a preference for the current insurance contract but may also reflect the cost of
decision making that causes the alternative to be valued less highly. Its high estimated
standard deviation constitutes a first sign of preference heterogeneity, with 85 percent
of respondents having a preference for the status quo contract. The remaining coeffi-
cients suggest that the three attributes of Managed Care (LIST, GATE, NETW) are
negatively valued. The same is true of a deductible (DEDUC) and the price attribute
(PREM). By way of contrast, a bonus for no claims (BONUS) as well as a bonus for
preventive behavior (PREV) appear to contribute to utility on average, as expected.
The center and right panels of Table 4.4 display random-coefficient estimates based
on the same prior distributions, with the exception of the deductible (DEDUC) and the
price (PREM) attributes, where the prior can be a log-normal (L) or a Johnson’s SB
distribution, respectively. Both sets of estimates reveal substantial preference hetero-
geneity. The columns labeled SH display shares of negative estimates for all assumed
priors but the truncated normal, where shares of zero estimates are shown. For in-
stance, according to the discussion of Section 4.5.1 a physician list (LIST) could be
valued both positively or negatively by respondents. Assuming a normal prior to reflect
this belief (k = N in Table 4.4), one obtains a posterior distribution of coefficients per-
taining to LIST with a share of 92 percent negative values. However, the remaining 8
percent like a physician list. They presumably value the fact that only physicians who
5 The estimated distribution parameters are displayed in Table 4.10 of the Appendix.
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satisfy the insurers’ quality and cost criteria are admitted. About half of the sample
is in favor and against gatekeeping (GATE) compared to free physician choice. Appar-
ently, the restriction of choice of primary care provider inherent in LIST weighs more
heavily than the channeling imposed by GATE. Joining a network (NETW) is valued
negatively by 83 percent of respondents, reflecting the additional requirement that a
participating specialist must be selected.
Fixed coefficients Random coefficients
RE L SB
k MN SD SH k MN SD SH k MN SD SH
LIST F -1.26 0.00 – N -2.58 1.82 0.92 N -2.64 1.87 0.92
GATE F -0.39 0.00 – N -0.01 1.27 0.50 N -0.04 1.29 0.51
NETW F -0.74 0.00 – N -1.44 1.50 0.83 N -1.49 1.56 0.83
SECOP F 0.28 0.00 – T 0.92 1.46 0.55 T 0.79 1.35 0.59
PHONE F 0.45 0.00 – T 1.29 2.20 0.59 T 1.22 2.10 0.59
BONUS F 1.25 0.00 – T 2.39 1.73 0.12 T 2.38 1.76 0.13
DEDUC F -0.94 0.00 – L -65 1,483 1.00 SB -0.17 0.27 1.00
PREV F 0.67 0.00 – T 1.13 1.82 0.56 T 1.13 1.97 0.60
PREM F -0.36 0.00 – L -1.15 2.04 1.00 SB -0.10 0.13 1.00
CONST N -1.75 1.70 0.85 N -4.24 3.61 0.88 N -4.11 3.57 0.88
Sim-LL: -3,064.40 -2,878.90 -2,877.00
Note: Simulated population means (MN) and standard deviations (SD) under assumed priors. For
the random-effects logit, k = F indicates that coefficients are kept fixed. Assumed priors k(βn) are
normal (N), log-normal (L), truncated normal at zero from below (T ), and Johnson’s SB. Share of
population (SH) with negative coefficients for k = N,L, SB and zero coefficient (indifferent) for
k = T .
Table 4.4: Posterior descriptives (Germany)
A second opinion free of charge (SECOP) and a phone counselor (PHONE) provided
by the health insurer are assumed to have truncated normal (T ) priors as discussed in
Section 4.3. A share of 59 percent (55 percent, respectively) are found to be indifferent
with regard to SECOP; this is also true of 59 percent with regard to PHONE. Although
of equal magnitude, a bonus of 500 Euros for no claims (BONUS) and a deductible of
500 Euros (DEDUC) calls for different priors. In the first case, individuals who expect
health care expenditure in the following year below 500 Euros stand to obtain a net
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gain by paying themselves and preserving their bonus. In the case of expenditure in
excess of 500 Euros, the option value of the bonus is zero. This suggests a truncated
normal distribution. Indeed, only about 13 percent of respondents are estimated to
be indifferent regarding a bonus for no claims. In contrast, respondents would have to
foot the bill up to the 500 Euros of the deductible under all circumstances. This fact
precludes indifference with regard to the deductible option, ceteris paribus (note that
the price attribute PREM is varied independently). It can be modeled by a log-normal
(L) or SB distribution.
The downside of the log-normal is that its long tail can cause implausible mean
WTP values (see Hess et al. (2005)). In the center panel of Table 4.4, the implausible
coefficient of -65.01 pertaining to DEDUC combined with an excessive standard devia-
tion reflects this weakness. Therefore, an estimate derived from a SB prior distribution
with a lower bound at zero and an upper bound u (see Section 4.3) is displayed in
the right panel of Table 4.4. Similar to Rigby and Burton (2006), we reduce the upper
bound in an iterative process, resulting in u = 30.6 The outcome is a posterior mean
value of -0.17 for the coefficient of DEDUC.
The third incentive option, a bonus for preventive behavior (PREV), may be irrel-
evant for some individuals because they know that their lack of preventive effort will
make them non-eligible for the bonus for sure. The truncated normal indicates that
between 56 and 60 percent of respondents fall in this category.
The annual contribution (PREM) is the price attribute; it is negatively valued ac-
cording to economic theory. In analogy to DEDUC, its (absolute) marginal utility is
assumed to follow a log-normal or SB prior distribution with an upper bound found
at u = 10. This time, both alternatives yield plausible mean posterior values; however,
the SB specification fits the data slightly better than the log-normal.
Finally, now that the other parameters besides the constant allow for preference het-
erogeneity, the share of respondents who prefer their current health insurance contract
increases from 85 to an estimated 88 percent.
6 Models were compared using the simulated log-likelihood value for each model.
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Willingness-to-pay estimates for Germany
From the three sets of coefficient estimates exhibited in Table 4.4, marginal WTP values
can be derived. The left panel of Table 4.5 displays those obtained for the random-
effects (RE) specification. They are consistently on the low side because they neglect
the considerable skewness found in the individual-specific WTP estimates (see Fig-
ure 4.1). Generally, simulating WTP values using the population parameter estimates
without conditioning on observed choices in the experiment can result in implausible
WTP estimates. According to Greene et al. (2005), this problem can be mitigated by
using individual-specific coefficients, conditioning on the respondents’ observed choices.
The center and right panels of Table 4.5 contain individual-specific estimates derived
from the log-normal (L) and SB specifications, respectively. For all attributes except
DEDUC, the choice between the L and SB specification does not matter. In the case of
DEDUC (compared to no incentives, NOINCT), the WTP value in the L specification
attains as much as -7,780 Euros (5th percentile) for bearing a risk of no more than 500
Euros, which is clearly unrealistic. This makes the bounded SB the preferred specifi-
cation. Therefore, the SB results shown in the right panel of Table 4.5 are discussed
below.
Individual-specific WTP values
RE L SB
Statistic MN MN MD 5% 95% MN MD 5% 95%
LIST a) -348 -618 -359 -2,435 116 -717 -363 -2,910 145
GATE a) -107 -201 3 -1,624 414 -278 -0 -2,144 476
NETW a) -205 -210 -171 -1,341 766 -197 -166 -1,631 925
SECOP 77 149 0 0 744 141 0 0 731
PHONE 124 156 0 0 721 163 0 0 730
BONUS b) 346 513 286 0 1,716 576 280 0 2,086
DEDUC b) -260 -3,776 -122 -7,780 -2 -513 -123 -2,458 -2
PREV b) 184 463 0 0 2,195 586 0 0 2,632
CONST (SQ=0) -482 -567 -535 -2,633 1,211 -585 -523 -3,299 1,199
Note: a) versus FREE, b) versus NOINCT; The descriptives of the WTP values are displayed in
Euros per year. Statistics are mean (MN), median (MD), and 5th and 95th percentiles.
Table 4.5: Individual-specific WTP values (Germany)
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The three attributes typical of Managed Care options reveal neither a positive mean
nor a positive median for the WTP values. Judging by the medians, the highest com-
pensation is asked for accepting a physician list (LIST), amounting to 363 Euros per
year, followed by participation in a physician network (NETW) with 166 Euros and
by the gatekeeping option (GATE) with no compensation asked. This is intuitive be-
cause LIST constitutes the harshest restriction whereas GATE and NETW apply only
when the need for specialist care arises, which is less likely. The median values are
closer to zero than the means throughout, while the negative 5th percentiles are much
further away from zero than the positive 95th. All of this points to skewness towards
strongly negative values. This impression is confirmed by the top three panels of Figure
4.1, which show the distribution of individual-specific WTP values among the sampled
population.
The two attributes SECOP and PHONE with their truncated normal priors do not
allow for negative WTP values. On average, obtaining a second opinion free of charge
is valued at 141 Euros and an extra phone service provided by the health insurer,
at 163 Euros per year.7 Therefore, neither of these offers would be sufficient to make
up for imposing one of the three Managed Care restrictions. In addition, the median
value is zero in both cases, pointing to skewness towards positive WTP values (see the
pertinent panels of Figure 4.1).
The first two incentive attributes (BONUS, DEDUC), are of particular interest. One
could argue that a bonus for no claims amounting to 500 Euros exposes the insured
to the same risk as a fixed deductible of 500 Euro. In the former case, an insured
does not claim expenses up to 500 Euros because he or she would not be eligible for
the 500 Euro bonus anymore, making a loss. Therefore, the insured pays the first 500
Euros out of pocket, exactly as in the case of a 500 Euro deductible. However, this
argument overlooks the fact that a bonus option permits consumers to separate two
losses in time that occur simultaneously under the deductible, viz. the health loss and
7 The distribution parameters for these two attributes are not statistically different from zero. Even
though the truncated normal is best from a microeconomic perspective, we estimated additional
models with different priors. If a normal distribution is assumed, both mean and variance differ
from zero. The mean WTP for SECOP is 176 Euros and 179 Euros for PHONE.
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Figure 4.1: Kernel densities of individual-specific WTP values (Germany)
the financial loss caused by the cost of medical care. With a deductible, these two
losses are perfectly correlated during a quarter (say). With a bonus option, they are
separated in time because consumers can sacrifice their bonus to obtain full coverage,
shifting the financial loss to later in the guise of a higher premium (Zweifel and Waser
(1992), Chapter 3). Table 4.5 shows that respondents value the bonus option favorably
with a mean WTP of 576 Euros, while resisting a deductible of the same amount to the
tune of 513 Euros. However, values in excess of 500 Euros are not rational in view of
a positive probability of incurring health care expenditure of less than 500 Euros. The
median values are in the acceptable range, indicating a willingness to pay of 280 Euros
for a no claims bonus but a compensation required of 123 Euros for the deductible.
The bonus for preventive effort (PREV) again cannot have negative WTP values
due to its truncated normal prior. The mean is a high 586 Euros annually, which implies
that respondents value a free weekend at the spa at least as high as this. At the same
Preferences for Health Insurance in Germany and the Netherlands 77
time, the median WTP is zero. The pertinent panel of Figure 4.1 again exhibits a
marked degree of skewness.
As to the constant (CONST), the negative mean WTP indicates that respondents
on average would have to be compensated by 585 Euros anually to accept a deviation
from their current (status quo) contract. This time, the median does not differ much
(523 Euros) but conceals considerable skewness towards negative values (see the last
panel of Figure 4.1).
4.6 The choice experiment for the Netherlands
4.6.1 Study design for the Netherlands
A second DCE was performed in the Netherlands in May 2006, after a major reform.
By March 2006, every citizen had to have explicitly chosen a health insurance contract,
with a great deal of information provided by the government through flyers and the
media. Therefore, respondents had borne the (lowered) cost of decision making asso-
ciated with the choice of a health insurance policy. While most of the attributes were
the same as in Germany, two adjustments had to be made. First, the status quo for
physician choice and incentives had to be defined differently. Already before the reform
of 2006, physician choice had been constrained in that patients were obliged to con-
tact a gatekeeping physician first. Therefore, one of the alternatives in the experiment
became free physician choice (FREE). Second, in the pretest a second opinion free
of charge turned out to be far less important than expeditious (defined to be within
four weeks in the DCE) access to hospital care (HOSP), waiting for hospital treatment
being a hotly debated topic in the Netherlands at the time. Therefore, the HOSP op-
tion was included as an alternative. Moreover, there was already a bonus for no claims
under the status quo, attaining a maximum of 255 Euros annually. The design of the
DCE is summarized in Table 4.6. Similar to the experiment in Germany, the number
of alternatives was reduced with a D-optimal algorithm (see Section 4.5.1).
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Attributes Attribute levels
Physician choice a) Gatekeeping versus physician list (LIST, ±),free physician
choice (FREE, ±), network (NETW, ±)
Hospital access b) Current waiting time versus waiting time less than four
weeks (HOSP, 0+)
Additional services No particular services or information provided versus
counselor available on the telephone (PHONE, 0+)
Incentives c) Bonus of max. 255 Euros for no claims versus no incentives
(NOINCT, 0−), deductible of 500 Euro per year (DEDUC, −),
bonus for preventive behavior (PREV, ±)
Contribution Respondent’s current annual premium (in Euro) versus
changes of ±200, ±300, ±400, and ±500 Euros (PREM, −)
Note: a) different status quo (Germany = free physician choice), b) attribute replaces second
opinion, c) different status quo (Germany = no bonus) and bonus for no claims is max.
225 Euros (Germany, 500 Euros).
Table 4.6: Attributes and attribute levels (Netherlands)
In the DCE for the Netherlands, 763 respondents took part in the main survey, of
which only five never made a decision, leaving 758 respondents with a total of 5,976
observed choices. About every fifth respondent (20.3 percent) never chose a hypothet-
ical alternative while 1.3 percent always preferred the alternative to the status quo
contract. Similar to the experiment in Germany, excluding non-movers would not have
affected the estimated WTP values.
4.6.2 Results for the Netherlands
Choice of priors and estimated posterior distributions
In the left panel of Table 4.7, the RE estimates suggest that free physician choice
(FREE) is positively valued in comparison to gatekeeping in the status quo. Having
guaranteed hospital access within four weeks (HOSP) also contributes to utility, which
may be true of dropping the bonus for no claims (NOINCT) as well. A deductible of 500
Euros (DEDUC) is resisted, as is an increase in premium (PREM), both as expected.
The negative mean of the constant (CONST) in combination with its high standard
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deviation provides a first indication of status quo preference as well as preference
heterogeneity.
For the random-coefficient estimates displayed in the center and right panels of Table
4.7, the priors were chosen in analogy to the DCE in Germany, with four modifications.
First, guaranteed hospital access within four weeks (HOSP, replacing SECOP) can
hardly induce a loss of utility, calling for a truncated normal. Second, dropping the
bonus for no claims amounts to the loss of an option with non-negative value (see the
analogous argument in Section 4.5.2 for Germany) and is modeled using a truncated
normal. Third, the bonus for preventive behavior (PREV) has to be compared to the
existing bonus for no claims (rather than no incentives at all, as in Germany). Therefore,
respondents can be in favor of one or the other type of bonus, suggesting a normal prior
for PREV. Finally, in the case of DEDUC the upper bound for the SB distribution was
found to be best at u = 50, while the upper bound for PREM remains at u = 10.
The choice between the log-normal (L) and the SB prior hardly matters except for
DEDUC, where the L specification results in a posterior mean estimate that is clearly
implausible. Moreover, the SB alternative yields a higher simulated log-likelihood value.
Therefore, the SB estimates are discussed below.
A change from the gatekeeping contract to free physician choice is positively valued
by an estimated 72 percent of respondents, whereas accepting a physician list (LIST)
would be welcomed by 27 percent only. If gatekeeping were to be complemented by lim-
iting the choice of specialists to those participating in the network (NETW), this would
trigger a negative WTP among 76 percent of respondents. The 24 percent who prefer
the network may expect improved communication among participating physicians as a
benefit. Guaranteed hospital access within four weeks (HOSP) is valued positively by
31 percent of respondents only, a phone counselor provided by the insurer (PHONE),
by 50 percent. Giving up the bonus for no claims option (NOINCT) is resisted by
20 percent of the sample. Indeed, estimated means and variances of HOSP, PHONE,
and NOINCT do not differ significantly from zero (see Table 4.11 of the Appendix).
About two-thirds (68 percent) of all respondents like the bonus for preventive behavior
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Fixed coefficients Random coefficients
RE L SB
k MN SD SH k MN SD SH k MN SD SH
FREE F 0.36 0.00 – N 0.84 1.38 0.27 N 0.82 1.41 0.28
LIST F -0.69 0.00 – N -0.81 1.37 0.72 N -0.83 1.34 0.73
NETW F -0.43 0.00 – N -0.94 1.50 0.74 N -1.17 1.64 0.76
HOSP F 0.35 0.00 – T 1.04 2.05 0.67 T 1.48 3.07 0.69
PHONE F 0.30 0.00 – T 0.97 1.48 0.52 T 1.52 2.23 0.50
NOINCT F 0.02 0.00 – T -0.50 1.29 0.78 T -0.81 2.20 0.80
DEDUC F -2.17 0.00 – L -326 4,416 1.00 SB -0.34 0.34 1.00
PREV F -0.04 0.00 – N -1.13 2.68 0.66 N -1.35 2.94 0.68
PREM F -0.52 0.00 – L -1.43 2.25 1.00 SB -0.15 0.17 1.00
CONST N -1.26 1.49 0.80 N -2.46 2.10 0.88 N -2.67 2.24 0.88
Sim-LL: -2,536.90 -2,384.60 -2,381.60
Note: Simulated population means (MN) and standard deviations (SD) under assumed priors. For
the random-effects logit, k = F indicates that coefficients are kept fixed. Assumed priors k(βn) are
normal (N), log-normal (L), truncated normal at zero from below (T ), and Johnson’s SB. Share of
population (SH) with negative coefficients for k = N,L, SB and zero coefficient (indifferent) for
k = T .
Table 4.7: Posterior descriptives (Netherlands)
(PREV) less than the current bonus for no claims. Finally, negative coefficients of the
constant have a frequency of 88 percent, indicating that a great majority prefers the
status quo contract to the alternatives presented.
Willingness-to-pay estimates for the Netherlands
The left panel of Table 4.8 displays the WTP estimates derived from the RE specifi-
cation. Neglecting the skewness present in the posterior distributions (see Figure 4.2),
they are likely underestimated. By way of contrast, the WTP values shown in the cen-
ter and right panel are derived from the estimated individual-specific coefficients. In
view of entirely implausible estimates based on the L specification, discussion focuses
on the SB variant (see the right panel of Table 4.8). One notes first that returning from
gatekeeping (GATE) to free choice of physician (FREE) would trigger a mean WTP
value of 311 Euros with a much lower median value of 59 Euros, while changing to
Preferences for Health Insurance in Germany and the Netherlands 81
a physician list (LIST) would require a mean compensation to the tune of 150 Euros
per year (median 63 Euros). However, to accept the most restrictive network option
(NETW), the Dutch insured ask on average for an annual premium reduction of only
17 Euros. Here, the median WTP amounts to 73 Euros per year, indicating a cumu-
lation of respondents who are but mildly opposed to participating in a network also
restricting their choice of specialist.
Individual-specific WTP values
RE L SB
Statistic MN MN MD 5% 95% MN MD 5% 95%
FREE a) 69 192 68 -352 1,065 311 59 -471 1,491
LIST a) -134 -151 -68 -869 441 -150 -63 -1,212 537
NETW a) -83 -80 -66 -813 480 -17 -73 -948 785
HOSP 67 93 0 0 509 67 0 0 350
PHONE 57 107 0 0 501 112 0 0 512
NOINCT b) 4 -29 0 -194 0 -26 0 -168 0
DEDUC b) -419 -17,503 -1,223 -60,502 -38 -2,253 -905 -8,936 -38
PREV b) -7 -279 -87 -2,143 775 -430 -106 -3,198 971
CONST -243 -362 -244 -1,480 265 -353 -240 -1,888 412
Note: a) versus GATE, b) versus BONUS; The descriptives of the WTP values are displayed in
Euros per year. Statistics are mean (MN), median (MD), and 5th and 95th percentiles.
Table 4.8: Individual-specific WTP values (Netherlands)
On average, guaranteed hospital access (HOSP) is valued at 67 Euros annually.
The offer of a phone counselor (PHONE) has a mean WTP of 112 Euros annually.
Abolishing the bonus for no claims (NOINCT) would require a mean compensation of
26 Euros. However, these three WTP values reflect the influence of few respondents with
very high positive (negative) WTP values, while the median WTP is zero throughout
(see the panels of Figure 4.2 pertaining to HOSP, PHONE, and NOINCT). With
reference to the bonus for no claims in particular, neither the mean of the random-
coefficient model (see Table 4.10 in the Appendix) nor the coefficient in the random-
effects model (Table 4.12) is statistically different from zero. Therefore, Dutch health
insurers could stop providing the bonus for no claims without having to reduce their
annual premium. In stark contrast, replacing it by a deductible of 500 Euros per year
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Figure 4.2: Kernel densities of individual-specific WTP values (Netherlands)
(DEDUC) would have to be compensated by an average of no less than 2,253 Euros.
This value is implausible, however, because consumers cannot lose more than 755 Euros
due to this change. This sum applies to individuals who are eligible for the bonus at the
beginning of the year (loss of 255 Euros) but then have to pay up to the full amount of
the deductible due to high current health care expenditure (loss of 500 Euros). For all
others, a maximum WTP of 500 Euros for avoiding the deductible is predicted. Even
the median of 905 Euros is almost twice this maximum value.
Accepting a change from the current bonus for no claims (BONUS) to a bonus
for preventive behavior (PREV) has to be compensated on average by 430 Euros.
The median of 106 Euros reflects the fact that some respondents ask for a very high
compensation (3,198 Euros at the 5th percentile, see Table 4.8) which is implausible.
Respondents apparently viewed themselves as being exposed to a financial risk (loss of
the bonus for prevention) in addition to the loss of the bonus for no claims, resulting
in a cumulation of risks (see the argument in Section 4.5.2).
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Finally, the status quo preference represented by the constant (CONST) amounts
to an estimated mean of 353 Euros. As can be gleaned from the last panel of Figure
4.2, this value reflects the presence of a few respondents who would require very high
compensation for deviating from the status quo.
4.7 Germany and the Netherlands compared
In this section, a comparison between the two DCEs is attempted. One motivation is to
detect similarities and differences in preferences between the two countries with regard
to health insurance. An additional motivation, however, concerns the impact of the
2006 reform in the Netherlands. Recall that citizens were obliged to specifically select
an insurance policy. Therefore, they had already borne the cost of decision making
associated with the choice at the time the DCE was fielded. As a likely consequence,
Dutch respondents might be less resistant to consider an alternative to the status quo
than their German counterparts.
Such a comparison rests on several assumptions. In particular, calculated WTP val-
ues must be related in the same way to the latent preference structure in the two DCEs
(reliability), and for validity, they must not be confounded by unobserved influences
(see Telser and Zweifel (2007) for details). Finally, since comparison will be in terms
of distributions of individual-specific WTP values without conditioning for observable
covariates, the two samples should not differ strongly with regard to determinants of
WTP such as age and income.
While a systematic test of these conditions is beyond the scope of this paper, there
are several indications suggesting that they might be satisfied to an approximation.
Concerning reliability, the probability of never choosing the alternative is found to
positively depend on age, female sex, and low income in both samples, with similar
coefficients (Becker-Leukert et al. (2007), Appendix Tables A.6.1 and A.6.2). Validity
is helped by the fact that the two DCEs were conducted only six months apart and
in neighbouring countries with a similar GDP growth record at the time (see OECD
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(2010b)), which makes a differential impact of the business cycle unlikely. Finally, major
determinants of WTP for health insurance were shown to have comparable values in
the two samples (see Table 4.1).
However, the differences in status quo makes an additional assumption necessary.
The objective is to estimate the WTP of Dutch respondents for a transition from a
counterfactual status quo of free physician choice (the actual status quo in Germany) to
the Managed Care options LIST and NETW. For this to be possible, the marginal rates
of substitution between these two attributes and the price attribute (PREM) must be
constant. Then, the known WTP for the transition from GATE to FREE is equal to the
WTP for a transition from FREE to GATE. In addition, the WTP for a change from
FREE to LIST amounts to the sum of WTP values for a counterfactual change from
FREE to GATE and from GATE to LIST. Referring to the fixed WTP values from
the RE specification for simplicity, the entry for LIST vs FREE for the Netherlands
(-203) in Table 4.9 is the sum of the (negative of) FREE vs GATE (-69) and LIST vs
GATE (-134) taken from Table 4.8. In analogy, accepting a network contract (NETW
Germany Netherlands
RE SB RE SB
Statistics MN MN MD 5% 95% MN MN MD 5% 95%
LIST a) -348 -717 -363 -2,910 145 -203 -460 -137 -2,166 448
GATE a) -107 -278 0 -2,144 476 -69 -311 -59 -1,491 471
NETW a) -205 -197 -166 -1,631 925 -152 -328 -128 -2,219 816
PHONE 124 163 0 0 730 57 112 0 0 512
CONST b) -482 -585 -523 -3,299 1,199 -243 -353 -240 -1,888 412
Note: a) versus FREE, b) with SQ=0; Entries for Germany taken from Table 4.5 (left and
right panel). The RE entries for the Netherlands are taken from Table 4.8 (left panel) and are
adjusted for difference in status quo (see text). The SB entries aresummary statistics of
adjusted individual-level values.
Table 4.9: Comparison of German and Dutch individual-specific WTP values
vs FREE) requires a premium reduction of 152 Euros (= −69− 83), the sum of FREE
vs GATE (-69) and NETW vs GATE (-83) in Table 4.8.
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Adjustment of the WTP values from the SB specification is performed in the same
way (see Table 4.9) except that summation concerns individual-specific values, causing
entries in Table 4.9 to deviate from the pertinent sum of WTP values in Table 4.8 (e.g.,
−460 #= −311 − 150).8 The two remaining attributes that can be compared are a free
phone counselor (PHONE) and the constant (CONST), measuring the preference for
or against the status quo contract. These two attributes do not require a recalculation
and can be compared directly. This is not possible for BONUS, NOINCT, DEDUC,
and PREV because they differ not only with regard to the status quo but also the
status quo level.
Focusing on the median WTP values which are less sensitive to outliers, one finds
the same preference order in both countries for Managed Care attributes if compared
to free physician choice. A physician list (LIST) has to be compensated most, followed
by joining a network (NETW), and gatekeeping (GATE). However, the median com-
pensation asked in Germany for accepting a physician list (363 Euros) is more than
2.5 times the value in the Netherlands (137 Euros) indicating that physician lists are
more strongly opposed in Germany than the Netherlands. With regard to a network,
the multiplier falls to 1.3 (166 vs 128 Euros). In contrast, accepting gatekeeping and
giving up free physician choice does not have to be compensated in Germany but with
59 Euros in the Netherlands. This might be an indication that experience with gate-
keeping need not reduce resistance against it. In both countries, more than 50 percent
of respondents are not willing to pay for PHONE, resulting in a median WTP of zero.9
The median compensation asked for changing away from the current contract amounts
to 523 Euros in Germany but only 240 Euros in the Netherlands. In addition, the dif-
ference between the 5th and 95th percentile is as high as 4,498 Euros (= 1, 199+3, 299)
8 SB estimates are used for the comparison even though different upper bounds for the prior
distribution of DEDUC are assumed in the two DCEs (see Sections 4.5.2 and 4.6.2). However,
Tables 4.4 and 4.7 show that a change from a log-normal to a SB prior for DEDUC does not
affect the remaining estimates so that the differences in WTP values between German and Dutch
respondents can hardly arise due to this difference in upper bounds.
9 On average, the WTP is higher in Germany with 163 Euros compared to 112 Euros in the Nether-
lands. These mean values are on the high side, especially if one considers the 95th percentiles of
1,199 and 412 Euros, respectively.
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in Germany compared to 2,300 Euros (= 412 + 1, 888) in the Netherlands. Since there
is no sign of systematically greater preference heterogeneity in Germany (see the pan-
els for LIST, NETW, PHONE, DEDUC, and PREV in Figures 4.1 and 4.2), one may
conclude that the necessity to choose in combination with the information campaign
of the Dutch government had the effect of reducing status quo preference.
4.8 Conclusions
This contribution seeks to measure preferences for health insurance in two countries
and to compare them, using two Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs) performed in
Germany (with no effective reform, but ongoing discussions about the introduction of
Managed Care-type insurance contracts) and in the Netherlands right after the 2006
reform which made citizens explicitly choose their health insurance. Bayesian mixed
logit estimation was applied to derive individual-specific willingness-to-pay (WTP)
values, with the prior distribution selected to reflect constraints suggested by economic
theory. In view of the considerable skewness found, emphasis is on median rather than
average values. In the case of Germany, where free physician choice characterizes the
status quo, the three Managed Care-type features included in the DCE (a physician list
established by the health insurer, gatekeeping, and adherence to a physician network)
must be compensated with up to 363 Euros annually. As to new financial incentives,
resistance against a 500 Euro annual deductible could be overcome by a 123 Euro
reduction in premium, whereas a bonus for no claims in the same amount triggers a
WTP of 280 Euros. However, preference heterogeneity is especially marked with regard
to these two attributes.
In the case of the Netherlands, the status quo was gatekeeping in combination with
a bonus for no claims of up to 255 Euros per year. Here, a return to free physician
choice would have an estimated WTP of 59 Euros; conversely, transition to a physician
list or network would have to be compensated with 63 Euros. A deductible of 500
Euros is resisted at the tune of 905 Euros (the random-effects logit estimate is 419),
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an implausible value due to an extreme degree of preference heterogeneity. By way of
contrast, a possible abolishment of the bonus for no claims would meet with indifference.
A comparison of the two countries reveals that compared to free physician choice, the
three Managed Care-type features included in the DCE require compensation in terms
of a premium reduction. The same is true of a 500 Euro deductible. A quantitative
comparison requires assumptions regarding validity, reliability, and local constancy of
marginal rates of substitution for adjustment of the status quo in the Netherlands to a
counterfactual free choice of physician. On these assumptions, acceptance of a physician
list would have to be compensated most in both countries, followed by adherence to
a network and gatekeeping. The one salient difference is status quo preference, which
demands much less compensation to be overcome in the Netherlands than in Germany.
A plausible explanation is that the need to explicitly choose a contract in combination
with the information campaign launched by the Dutch government in the context of
the 2006 reform lowered the cost of decision making with regard to health insurance
to Dutch citizens.
This study is subject to several limitations. The first and most important is the
hypothetical nature of choices made by respondents. Even in the absence of privacy
constraints, it would have been extremely difficult to link stated choices to future
actual ones because insurance policies having the selected attributes were not becoming
available. For the same reason, associating stated choices with past ones would not be
informative. Another issue is the selection of relevant attributes. Pretests can provide
qualitative indications only, which may not be vindicated by estimated WTP values in
the actual DCE. In addition, an attribute may be relevant in one DCE (e.g. rapid access
to hospital services in the Netherlands) but not in the other. Comparison is limited
to the overlapping attributes, whose WTP values may however depend on the level
of the left-out ones. More generally, these values could be influenced by unmeasured
determinants such as the political agenda and the economic climate in the respective
country. To this must be added the (known) difference in the status quo.
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However, these limitations are unlikely to invalidate the major finding of this study,
a resistance of citizens against limitations of physician choice. One might have expected
that Dutch respondents, having already adjusted to gatekeeping, would be indifferent
towards adherence to a network that also limits choice of specialists. The available
evidence does not support this notion; indeed, the similarity between the Dutch WTP
values and their German counterparts is striking. On the other hand, the Dutch reform
in 2006 makes a difference in that it seems to have mitigated status quo preference and
hence resistance to future changes in health insurance.
Appendix
L-Model SB-Model
k Mean Variance k Mean Variance
LIST a) N -2.59 (0.33) 3.29 (1.18) N -2.65 (0.35) 3.47 (1.28)
GATE a) N -0.01 (0.28) 1.62 (0.60) N -0.04 (0.31) 1.67 (0.63)
NETW a) N -1.44 (0.25) 2.25 (0.81) N -1.48 (0.27) 2.44 (0.90)
SECOP T -0.33 (0.97) 7.31 (6.40) T -0.63 (0.85) 7.25 (5.26)
PHONE T -0.97 (1.32) 18.97 (14.98) T -0.98 (1.25) 17.53 (11.81)
BONUS b) T 2.28 (0.28) 3.70 (1.75) T 2.26 (0.28) 3.89 (1.77)
DEDUC n,b) L -0.38 (0.65) 9.57 (6.30) SB -3.75 (0.54) 11.91 (5.63)
PREV b) T -0.47 (1.32) 11.48 (11.12) T -0.99 (2.15) 15.61 (18.53)
PREM n,b) L -0.60 (0.09) 1.48 (0.20) SB -2.83 (0.10) 1.97 (0.30)
CONST c) N -4.24 (0.42) 13.04 (2.49) N -4.11 (0.44) 12.79 (2.56)
Notes: Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses. Assumed priors k(βn) are N normal,
L log-normal, T normal truncated at zero from below, and Johnson’s SB. a) status quo is free
physician choice, b) status quo is no bonus system, c) status quo = 0, n) for negative value of
coefficient.
Table 4.10: Estimated distribution parameters (Germany)
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L-Model SB-Model
k Mean Variance k Mean Variance
LIST a) N -0.81 (0.32) 1.85 (0.75) N -0.83 (0.38) 1.77 (0.70)
FREE a) N 0.85 (0.25) 1.91 (0.75) N 0.82 (0.27) 1.99 (0.78)
NETW a) N -0.94 (0.33) 2.26 (0.96) N -1.16 (0.38) 2.69 (1.15)
HOSP T -2.02 (2.02) 22.14 (27.96) T -3.76 (4.01) 56.00 (64.42)
PHONE T -0.16 (0.88) 6.99 (5.38) T -0.01 (0.94) 14.68 (15.25)
NOINCT n,b) T -3.08 (1.80) 15.56 (14.18) T -5.99 (3.89) 51.37 (49.78)
DEDUC n,b) L 2.32 (0.46) 7.21 (4.17) SB -1.39 (0.47) 7.98 (3.89)
PREV b) N -1.13 (0.51) 7.24 (2.95) N -1.35 (0.60) 8.68 (3.61)
PREM n) L -0.27 (0.10) 1.27 (0.28) SB -2.40 (0.14) 2.25 (0.82)
CONST c) N -2.46 (0.33) 4.40 (1.19) N -2.67 (0.42) 5.02 (1.51)
Notes: Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses. Assumed priors k(βn) are N normal,
L log-normal, T normal truncated at zero from below, and Johnson’s SB. a) status quo is free
physician choice, b) status quo is no bonus system, c) status quo = 0, n) for negative value of
coefficient.
Table 4.11: Estimated distribution parameters (Netherlands)
Germany Netherlands
Mean Variance WTP Mean Variance WTP
LIST -1.26 (0.11) – – -348 -0.69 (0.12) – – -134
GATE -0.39 (0.10) – – -107 – – – – –
FREE – – – – – 0.36 (0.11) – – 69
NETW -0.74 (0.11) – – -205 -0.43 (0.12) – – -83
SECOP 0.28 (0.08) – – 77 – – – – –
HOSP – – – – – 0.35 (0.09) – – 67
PHONE 0.45 (0.08) – – 124 0.30 (0.09) – – 57
BONUS 1.25 (0.10) – – 346 – – – – –
NOINCT – – – – – 0.02 (0.10) – – 4
DEDUC -0.94 (0.11) – – -260 -2.17 (0.13) – – -419
PREV 0.67 (0.14) – – 184 -0.04 (0.15) – – -7
PREM -0.36 (0.01) – – – -0.52 (0.02) – – –
CONST -1.75 (0.12) 2.91 (0.23) -482 -1.26 (0.13) 2.23 (0.22) -243
Notes: Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses. While all attributes have fixed coefficients
CONST has an assumed normal prior.
Table 4.12: Estimated distribution parameters (random-effects specification)
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SUMMARY
Policy makers around the world seek to encourage generic substitution. In this paper,
the importance of prescribing physicians’ imperfect agency is tested using the fact
that some Swiss jurisdictions allow physicians to dispense drugs on their own account
(physician dispensing, PD) while others disallow it. We estimate a model of physician
drug choice with the help of drug claim data, finding a significant positive association
between PD and the use of generics. While this points to imperfect agency, generics
are prescribed more often to patients with high copayments or low incomes.

Chapter 5
Generic Substitution, Financial
Interests, and Imperfect Agency
5.1 Introduction
Policy makers around the world seek to encourage generic substitution (i.e. the replace-
ment of brand-name by generic drugs) in an attempt to reduce the pharmaceutical
bill. In the United States for instance, several state policies promote the use of generic
products by Medicaid beneficiaries [CMS (2004)]. Similar initiatives exist in Germany
[Leutgeb et al. (2009)], Sweden [Andersson et al. (2007)], Switzerland [Decollogny and
Ruggli (2006)], and Japan [Matsuda (2008)]. To be successful, these initiatives must be
aligned with prescribing physicians’ (or pharmacists’) incentives. Generic substitution
not only requires effort and time on the part of these professionals but also entails the
risk of meeting with patient resistance. Three components of prescribers’ utility can
work to overcome resistance against generic substitution. First, prescribers may earn
higher contributions to income from generic than from brand-named drugs. Second,
acting as agents by taking patients’ total (rather than merely health-related) utility
into account, physicians are predicted to prescribe the generic if the savings accruing
to the patient are important enough. Third, in view of public concern about growing
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health care expenditure, cost savings accruing to insurers might motivate physicians
to prescribe lower-priced generic drugs.
In this context, evidence from Switzerland is of considerable interest. In some Swiss
jurisdictions (cantons), physicians are allowed to dispense drugs to their patients on
their own account. This setting will be referred to as ‘physician dispensing’ (PD) in the
remainder of this paper.1 In the remaining jurisdictions, physicians are obliged to let a
pharmacy fill their prescriptions. Thus, both the PD and the non-PD (i.e. pharmacy-
based) setting can be observed under otherwise very similar conditions. PD may well
affect generic substitution provided physicians act as imperfect agents and given that
generic drugs differ from brand-name drugs in terms of their contribution to physician
income.
Retail prices paid by patients are regulated to be equal for all drug sellers (physicians
and pharmacies). The contribution to the sellers’ income, then, is the difference between
manufacturers’ prices and retail prices. Concerning manufacturers’ prices, there is room
for discounts and individual bargaining, causing the effective contributions to income to
be unknown. However, several factors indicate that contributions to physician income
can be higher for generic than for brand-name drugs. First, many generic alternatives
are usually available for the same brand-name drug, leading to fierce competition for
access to prescribers among generic producers. Second, the retail prices of generic drugs
are markedly higher in Switzerland than in comparable European countries, suggesting
that generic producers have ample leeway for rebates to prescribers.2 Third, while
there is no public information about such rebates, interviews conducted with Swiss
wholesalers and physicians support the notion that prescribers derive more income
from generic than brand-name drugs.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 5.2 contains a short
review of the literature. Section 5.3 describes the institutional setting. Section 5.4
1 PD is the counterpart of prescribing pharmacists, who exist e.g. in the case of refills in the United
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand [Emmerton et al. (2005)]. In both cases,
the prescriber and the dispenser is one and the same person or institution, respectively.
2 The prices for brand-name drugs are also higher in Switzerland, but the markups for physicians
are smaller (see Section 5.3.2).
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presents a theoretical model of physician prescribing behavior, along with a set of
testable hypotheses. The empirical strategy used for hypothesis testing is explained in
Section 5.5. Section 5.6 contains a description of the data. Results are shown in Section
5.7, while Section 5.8 rounds off with a summary and conclusions.
5.2 Literature review
To keep this survey concise, there will be no discussion of research into physician be-
havior in general. Rather, focus is on prescribing behavior. An early pertinent study
is the one by Morton-Jones and Pringle (1993), who compare prescription patterns of
PD and non-PD providers in the UK, finding that the share of generic drugs is lower
in the PD segment. Liu et al. (2009) analyze the choice between generic and brand-
name drugs in Taiwan, where PD is the dominant mode. According to them, financial
incentives markedly influence this choice. Specifically, providers on a global budget are
more likely to prescribe generic drugs than those reimbursed fee-for-service. Moreover,
cheaper brand-name drugs (which in Taiwan contribute less to physician income, as in
Switzerland) are more often replaced by generics than expensive ones. Using Japanese
data on hypertension drug sales, Iizuka (2007) concludes that markups available to
physicians significantly influence drug choice. However, he also finds that physicians
take the cost of the drug to their patients into account. Finally, the 2000 reform in
South Korea provides an interesting natural experiment. At that time, both drug dis-
pensing by physicians and drug prescribing by independent pharmacists were outlawed.
Descriptive statistics presented by Kim and Ruger (2008) indicate a marked increase
in the market share of high-price drugs in the year following the reform. However, the
longer-term effects of the reform could not be assessed on the basis of their data.
Papers that are methodically related to ours are Hellerstein (1998), Lundin (2000),
and Hellstrom and Rudholm (2010). They analyze the choice between generic and
brand-name drugs in a non-PD setting. Hellerstein argues that physicians bear higher
information costs when prescribing generic rather than brand-name drugs because they
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have more personal experience with the brand-name than with the generic drugs. Con-
trary to the hypothesis of perfect agency, she finds that prescription is not influenced
by patients’ insurance status and hence financial burden. However, physicians who pre-
dominately treat patients in capitated or Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) set-
tings are more likely to prescribe generics (controlling for individual insurance status).
Her panel data specification also shows that a large part of the unexplained variance is
physician-specific, which also holds true of Lundin’s contribution. Interestingly, Lundin
argues that physicians may want to honor R&D expenditure and pioneering effort by in-
novators, causing them to bear added psychic cost when prescribing a generic. He finds
evidence that higher cost to the patient through copayment increases the probability
of generics being prescribed, while higher cost to the insurer does not. Hellstrom and
Rudholm argue that the uncertainty about the quality of generic drugs incites physi-
cians to prescribe brand-name drugs. Their empirical evidence shows that physicians
are indeed less likely to allow generic substitution for older (and presumably sicker)
patients. However, their measure of uncertainty about quality came out insignificant
in the decision equation.
Another reason why the prescription of generic drugs might require extra effort on
the part of the physician is given by Griliches and Cockburn (1994). They argue that
many patients perceive generic drugs as less safe and of lower quality, making the
patient suffer a ‘putative loss’ when using them. Therefore, a physician prescribing the
generic drug needs to convince the patient of its bioequivalence.
To our knowledge, there is no Swiss study that analyzes the effect of PD on the
choice between generic and brand-name drugs. The one exception is Hunkeler (2008)
who presents corroborating evidence for the hypothesis that PD leads to margin opti-
mization or even margin maximization3 through dispensing packages and dosages with
higher official physician margins. These packages are launched first by companies en-
tering the generics market; later, they are complemented by additional package sizes
3 The difference between margin optimization and maximization is that in the first case, PD
providers prescribe several small packages instead of one large package while in the second case,
they prescribe a higher quantity to maximize their income.
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and dosages (for more institutional detail regarding Swiss health insurance, see Sec-
tion 5.3). The other studies of PD in Switzerland have focused on its impact on total
physician billings or health care expenditure (HCE), respectively. An early investiga-
tion by Zweifel (1985) concluded that while PD creates incentives to keep patients out
of the hospital (where different physicians are in charge as a rule), the savings achieved
through a reduced rate of hospitalization fall short of the extra drug expenditure in-
duced in ambulatory care. At a more aggregate level, Dummermuth (1993) compares
two otherwise similar neighboring cantons (Lucerne with PD and Argovia without PD),
finding PD to be associated with slightly higher per capita drug expenditure as well
as HCE. This finding is in line with Beck et al. (2004), who relate per-capita drug
expenditure to several properties of cantons, among them, their PD status. By way of
contrast, Vatter and Ruefli (2003), who control for a very comprehensive set of polit-
ical and socioeconomic covariates, indentify a significantly negative effect of the share
of PD providers on per capita HCE. More surprisingly still, Schleiniger et al. (2007)
estimate a significantly negative effect of PD on cantonal drug expenditure which is
robust across several specifications.
5.3 Institutional setting
Basic health insurance coverage in Switzerland written by some 80 competing private
not-for-profit insurers is mandatory for a broad basket of services and drugs. Physicians
in private practice are mostly paid according to a nationwide uniform fee schedule called
TARMED [see Zweifel and Tai-Seale (2009) for description and criticism].4 Provision of
health care is decentralized and the 26 Swiss cantons (‘jurisdictions’) have considerable
say in its regulation, including the regulation of drug dispensing.
4 A small number of physicians works in managed-care type arrangements, where other modes of
payment are possible.
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5.3.1 Physicians’ dispensing rights
Thirteen of the twenty-six Swiss cantons give dispensing rights to all physicians, seven
apply mixed systems while six generally disallow PD. Physicians who dispense on aver-
age derive about 18 percent of their revenue from PD. This number is higher for general
practitioners (28 percent) and lower for specialists (8 percent) [see Hunkeler (2008)].
Therefore, the financial incentives linked with the amount and structure of PD are
substantial. Acknowledging problems of asymmetric information between physicians
and patients, some cantons with PD require physicians to inform patients about their
right to obtain a prescription to be filled by the pharmacy of their choice.
In the context of the present study, an important question is whether cantons that
allow PD attract substantially different types of physicians than do non-PD cantons.
Since the data is provided by a health insurer, they do not contain information about
the determinants of locational choice such as regional origin of the physician and her
spouse, or the location of her medical school. This makes an analysis of physicians’
choice of location impossible. Moreover, it is known that young physicians mainly take
over existing practices rather than opening new ones in response to large administrative
hurdles, pointing to a narrowed choice of location. Still, if physicians who are very
susceptible to financial incentives are disproportionately located in the PD cantons,
our estimates in Section 5.7 might be upwardly biased.5
5.3.2 Contributions to income from drug dispensing
For non-PD practitioners, the contribution to income from dispensing is zero. For PD
practitioners, the contribution earned by selling a specific drug consists of three com-
ponents, namely (i) a fixed lump sum, (ii) a percentage of the regulated manufacturer
price, and (iii) discounts that are conceded to physicians by pharmaceutical companies.
The first two components are regulated by the government and published in official reg-
isters. The third component is the outcome of an individual bargaining process between
5 This may be true although dummy variables for cantons and community types are included in
the estimation in order to control for differences between regions (see Section 5.7).
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prescriber and sales representative, which is unobservable to us. However, they ulti-
mately reflect the bargaining position of the pharmaceutical company, about which a
few facts are known.
According to Liu et al. (2009), the discount on manufacturers’ prices offered increases
with market size, competition, and retail price but decreases with marginal cost. First,
market size is small in Switzerland for both brand-name and generic drugs. With regard
to competition, the market usually contains one brand-name drug only but a large
number of generic alternatives (more than 10 in this analysis). Therefore, producers
of generic drugs are more likely to use discounts in their attempt to increase market
share. Next, marginal cost of brand-name and generic drugs can be assumed equal in
the present setting.
In addition, international comparisons of reimbursement prices offer indirect evi-
dence suggesting that generic producers in Switzerland have ample leeway for discounts.
For fixing the reimbursement price of brand-name drugs, Switzerland uses a reference
group comprising Germany, Denmark, UK, the Netherlands, France, Italy, and Austria.
Reimbursement prices for generic drugs have to be at least 40 percent lower than those
of the original drug. However, this does not imply that generic producers earn lower
effective margins. In fact, Santesuisse (2009) and IMS (2009) calculate price indexes for
drugs with and without patent protection for Switzerland and the seven countries cited
above. The two studies conclude that both prices for band-name (pb) and generic drugs
(pg) are higher in Switzerland, i.e. ∆pb = pb − pRb > 0 and ∆pg = pg − p
R
g > 0, where
R denotes the average drug price in the reference group. But they also find that the
international price difference is larger in the case of generic than for brand-name drugs
(∆pg > ∆pb). Assuming that producers have the same cost structure in Switzerland
and elsewhere, the extra profit margin earned in Switzerland is therefore higher for
generic than for brand-name producers, i.e. m˜ = ∆pg − ∆pb > 0. They can use their
net advantage m˜ for inducing physicians to prescribe their products.
In all, manufacturers of generic drugs are likely to offer larger discounts to physicians
than brand-name producers. Indeed, interviews conducted with Swiss wholesalers and
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physicians support the notion that prescribers derive more income from generic drugs,
although no market participant is willing to publish the exact discounts that are offered
or accepted.
In the context of the present study, it is important to note that the law forbids to
give, promise or accept any monetary or monetary equivalent reward for the prescrip-
tion of a specific drug. Therefore, manufacturers are not allowed to promise rewards
(for example higher discounts) for the achievement of a higher sales volume.
5.3.3 Copayment arrangements
Prescription drugs are covered by compulsory health insurance, which kicks in when
the annual deductible is exceeded. The minimum annual deductible amounts to CHF
300 (1 CHF ≈ 1.1 USD at 2011 exchange rates). Voluntary deductibles range from
CHF 500 to 2,500 and are chosen by the insured at the beginning of the year. The
deductible applies to all health care services except those related to maternity. When
the deductible is exceeded, there is a 10 percent rate of coinsurance up to a stop-loss
of CHF 700 per year. For instance, a patient with a deductible of CHF 2,500 would
spend a maximum of CHF 3,200 out of pocket. For certain brand-name drugs, the
rate of coinsurance was increased to 20 percent during our observation period (2005 to
2007). However, producers of brand-name drugs can escape this increased coinsurance
by lowering their prices. As a consequence of different deductibles and changing rates
of coinsurance, some patients have a stronger interest in receiving cheaper drugs than
others.
5.4 Theoretical model of physicians’ drug choice
Because of their central role in the resource allocation in health care markets, the
behavior of physicians has spawned a very rich literature [see McGuire (2000) for
an overview]. The purpose of this section is to derive testable hypotheses concerning
generic drug substitution from existing theoretical models. Many of these models posit
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patients’ health benefit as an argument in the physician’s objective function. Thus, a
physician (i) who prescribes a drug (d) to a patient (j) at time (t) has utility
Vijdt = αi
[
piidt − eijdt
]
+ βi
[
bjd − θjdtpdtu
′{Yjt}
]
− γi
[
(1− θjdt)pdt
]
(5.1)
with piidt = fdt + vdtpdt + ηidt.
Here, piidt denotes the contribution to physician income. As explained in Sec-
tion 5.3.2, it consists of a fixed lump sum (fdt), a price-dependent component (vdtpdt),
and an unobserved discount that is the outcome of an individual bargaining process
between the physician and the pharmaceutical company (ηidt). For the reasons listed
in Section 5.3.2, we assume that both discounts and total contributions to physician
incomes are higher for generic than for brand-name drugs.
The effort (in money terms) associated with prescribing is denoted eijdt. In keeping
with the literature cited in Section 5.2, this effort is higher for a generic (d = g) than
a brand-name (d = b) drug. For simplicity, the cost of prescribing b is normalized to
zero (eijbt = 0). The higher prescribing effort for generic drugs stems from two main
sources. First, the physician needs to gather personal experience with the generic drug,
which she has already collected for the brand-name drug during the period of patent
protection. This cost decreases over time, hence the dependence on time index t. Still,
every patient is different, making matching patients with drugs challenging even after
an initial information effort. Second, the physician needs to convince the patient that
the lower-priced generic drug is not of lower quality. Otherwise, the patient might
suffer a ‘putative loss’ in the sense of Griliches and Cockburn (1994), which might
jeopardize the physician’s reputation. This cost also declines over time as patients
become acquainted with the generic drug. The parameter αi > 0 in Equation (5.1)
denotes the weight the physician attaches to the drug’s contribution to income. It may
well differ between GPs and specialists.
The second term of Equation (5.1) symbolizes net patient benefit. Therefore, a
weight βi > 0 (with no systematic difference between GPs and specialists assumed)
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reflects a consideration for the patient’s total utility derived from health benefit and
disposable income [Bradley and Lesu (2006), De Jaegher and Jegers (2000)] rather than
merely for the patient’s health benefit [Ellis and McGuire (1986)]. Net patient benefit
equals health benefit bjd minus the drug’s out-of-pocket price θjdtpdt, with θjdt denoting
the patient’s rate of coinsurance (which can be drug-specific) and pdt, the price of the
drug. The patient’s utility from consuming other goods is u{Yjt}, which is increasing
and concave in patient’s income Yjt as well as additively separable from health. Since
copayment for a single drug θjdtpdt is small in our context, multiplying it by u′{Yjt}
yields a good approximation of its impact on patient utility. As low-income patients
have a high marginal utility of income, they suffer a particularly high utility loss from
a given drug cost θjdtpdt. In the remainder of this paper, there will be no difference
in health benefits between the brand-name and the generic drugs (bjb = bjg) because
bioequivalent drugs are compared (see Section 5.6 for details).
The third term of Equation (5.1) is motivated by agency on behalf of the insurers.
Agency towards insurers can be motivated by fear of sanctions or tighter regulation
in future.6 Both types of threats concern GPs and specialists alike. Moreover, high
and rapidly increasing health insurance premiums are one of the top concerns of the
Swiss population. Therefore, promoting a cost-efficient practice style could create a
warm-glow effect of doing what is good for society. Here, (1 − θjdt)pdt symbolizes the
cost of the drug treatment falling on the patient’s insurer, with γi > 0 indicating the
importance of this concern. In view of Equation (5.1), types of (im)perfect agency can
be defined as in Table 5.1.
The generic drug is prescribed if Vijgt > Vijbt, hence
Vijgt − Vijbt = αi
[
piigt − piibt − eijgt
]
+ βi
[
(θjbtpbt − θjgtpgt)u
′{Yjt}
]
(5.2)
+γi
[
(1− θjbt)pbt − (1− θjgt)pgt)
]
> 0.
6 The Swiss health insurers’ association (Santesuisse) scrutinizes physicians who exhibit inexplica-
bly high cost of treatment compared to their peers and occasionally sues them.
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Types of agency Parameter values
Physician Patient Society
Perfect agency αi = 0, βi > 0, γi > 0
Imperfect agency on behalf of patients αi > 0, βi > 0, γi ≥ 0
Imperfect agency on behalf of insurers αi > 0, βi ≥ 0, γi > 0
Lack of agency αi > 0, βi = 0, γi = 0
Table 5.1: Types of (im)perfect agency
Physician agency can now be analyzed with the help of Equation (5.2). To begin with,
non-dispensing physicians do not obtain income from drug prescription (piigt = piibt =
0), while dispensing physicians are likely to receive a higher income contribution from
generic than from brand-name drugs (piigt > piibt > 0, see Section 5.3.2).7 PD is therefore
expected to increase the prescription of generic drugs.
Hypothesis 1: Given imperfect or lack of agency, dispensing physicians are more
likely to prescribe a generic drug compared to non-dispensing ones due to its
higher income contribution.
Recall that due to bioequivalence, drug choice affects patient utility exclusively
through differences in coinsurance. According to Equation (5.2), both perfect and im-
perfect patient-related agency thus leads to the prediction that generic drugs are pre-
scribed more often to patients with a high rate of coinsurance (high θjdt) or low income
(high marginal utility of income, u′{Yjt}), than to other patients.
Hypothesis 2: Given imperfect agency on behalf of patients, generic drugs are pre-
scribed more often to patients with higher rate of coinsurance as long as the
brand-name drug is more expensive than the generic, pbt > pgt.
Hypothesis 3: Given imperfect agency on behalf of patients, generic drugs are pre-
scribed more to patients with lower incomes because of their higher marginal
utility of income.
7 In fact, non-dispensing physicians get a fee (TARMED) for prescribing a drug, which however
does not differ between brand-name and generic drugs. This fee is therefore irrelevant to our
analysis.
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For the decision whether or not to prescribe a generic drug, only the sign of Equation
(5.2) is relevant. If the first term of Equation (5.2) is zero (as for all non-dispensing
physicians), the second term becomes relatively more important for the determination
of its sign. Therefore, to the extent that agency motivates physicians to prescribe
generic drugs, the effect of patient coinsurance should be more marked for non-PD
providers.
Hypothesis 4: Given imperfect agency on behalf of patients, patients’ rate of coin-
surance is more influential if the physician does not dispense drugs on his or her
own account.
Many models of physician agency neglect the third term of Equation (5.2). However, if
the influence of copayment represented by [(θjbtpbt − θjgtpgt)u′{Yjt}] is low and (piigt −
piibt) is zero, as applies to non-PD providers, all that remains is the (extra) effort of
prescribing the generic eijgt. Therefore, non-PD providers who treat patients with low
coinsurance or high incomes should have a very low propensity to prescribe generics
due to their higher cost of effort. It takes agency towards the payers of health care
[γi > 0 in Equation (5.2)] to make them prescribe a generic.
Hypothesis 5: Given agency on behalf of insurers, non-PD providers prescribe generic
drugs to some degree.
In addition to the standard fee-for-service arrangement, Swiss insurers may also offer
policies with managed care-type restrictions. Most of these arrangements are aimed
at increasing the cost-consciousness of physicians, either by introducing provider cost
sharing or by selectively contracting physicians based on indication of efficiency. In
both cases, these arrangements are expected to align the interests of physicians with
those of the insurers, resulting in an increased influence of the price difference (pbt−pgt)
on physicians in managed care-settings.
Hypothesis 6: Physicians working in managed care-type settings prescribe more
generic drugs because of their increased consideration of the cost of care.
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A limitation of our model is that it focuses on physician utility only. This is justified to
the extent that asymmetric information about treatment options makes patients dele-
gate their decision-making authority to physicians. However, this delegation is unlikely
to be complete in practice. If patients play a more active role, observed choices are
the outcome of a bargaining process between them and physicians [Ellis and McGuire
(1990)]. It is important to keep this limitation in mind when interpreting the empirical
results in Section 5.7. For example, the patient’s rate of coinsurance may impact drug
choice not only because of physician agency (as our model suggests), but also because
of the patients’ own actions.
5.5 Econometric specification
We estimate the choice between brand-name and generic drugs using a binary choice
model. The dependent variable takes on the value one if the physician prescribes g and
zero otherwise. Following Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985), the physician’s utility is split
into a deterministic and a random component, i.e. Uijdt = Vijdt + εijdt, where εijdt is
unobserved by the researcher. A physician prescribes drug g instead of b if and only if
Uijgt > Uijbt. Hence, the probability of physician i prescribing g to patient j at time t
is given by
Pijgt = Pr(Vijgt + εijgt > Vijbt + εijbt) = Pr(Vijgt − Vijbt > εijbt − εijgt) (5.3)
with Vijgt−Vijbt given by Equation (5.2). If we assume the random term εijt ≡ εijbt−εijgt
to have a logistic distribution, we get the logit choice probability
Pijgt =
(
1 + e−(Vijgt−Vijbt)
)−1
(5.4)
which permits to derive and interpret odds ratios. The drawback of the logit model
compared to the probit is that no simple estimators are available as soon as a physician-
specific random effect is included. In the probit model, the linear combination of the
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normal error term and the normal random effect results in a normal distribution. This
is not the case for the logit model [see Wooldridge (2002), Chapter 15]. By including
a physician-specific error term, we allow for within correlation among the observations
belonging to the same physician while still assuming independence of observations
across physicians. The physician-specific error captures unobserved factors that we are
not able to control for [see also Lundin (2000)]. Examples of unobserved factors that
may affect drug choice are favorable experience with a specific drug or the impact
of pharmaceutical sales representatives visiting the physician. Therefore, we extend
the random utility model above to allow for a physician-specific random effect, i.e.
Uijdt = Vijdt + νi + εijdt. If ν ∼ N(0, σ2ν) one obtains the one-level random-effects logit
model [see Wooldridge (2002), Chapter 15], with the share of total variance contributed
by physician-level variance given by ρ = σ2ν/(σ
2
ν + σ
2
ε) where σ
2
ε denotes the variance
of the overall error term. In addition, one could allow for patient-specific random ef-
fects by nesting them with physician-level ones, resulting in a two-level hierarchical
regression model (also called mixed-effects model, see Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2001)).
While theoretically attractive, the mixed-effects model could not be estimated due to
the complexity of the estimation equation and the size of the dataset.8 Therefore, we
estimated the one-level random-effects model discussed previously. Testing the impor-
tance of the physician-specific error term using a likelihood ratio test showed that the
one-level random-effects model performed better than the pooled logit regression.
To estimate the coefficients of interest, the systematic component of the utility
function (Vijgt− Vijbt) needs to be specified. Unfortunately, it is not possible to unam-
biguously relate the variables of the theoretical model to observed quantities. Still, it
is possible to test all the hypotheses that were stated in Section 5.4. The assignments
are displayed in Table 5.2.
As explained in Section 5.3.2, we cannot observe the true income contribution from
physician dispensing, but we expect it to be higher for generic than for brand-name
drugs [piigt − piibt > 0 in Equation (5.2)]. Therefore, we can only include a dummy that
8 The mixed-effects model did not converge using Stata 10.
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Variable Term No. Hyp. Exp. Con-
Eq. (2) No. sign firmed?a)
Physician dispensing (PD) 1 1 + Y (O,A)
General Practitioner (GP) 1 n.a. + Y
Interaction of PD and GP 1 1 + Y
Deductible category (DED2, DED3) 2 2 + Y (O,A)
Interaction of PD and DED2, DED3 2 4 - N
Increased rate of coinsurance (COINS) 2 2 + Y
Interaction of PD and COINS 2 4 - N
Extra hospital insurance (HOSP) 2 3 - Y
Accident coverage (ACC) 2 3 - Y (O,A)
High income area (HIA) 2 3 - Y (O,A)
Price difference (P) 3 5 + N (Y for O)
Interaction of PD and P 2,3 n.a. - N (Y for O)
HMO contract (HMO) 3 6 + Y
Gatekeeping contract (GATE) 3 6 + Y
Control variables: six area types, 25 cantonal dummies, complementary insurance,
time trend, patient age and sex, dosage, prescriptions per patient, year of first
prescription.
Note: a) see Section 5.7.
Table 5.2: Overview of the variables used for hypothesis testing
indicates whether or not a physician earns an income contribution from dispensing
(PDit = 1). We expect the coefficient pertaining to the income contribution to be
positive, implying that PD increases the probability of choosing g.
The information cost (eijgt) in Equation (5.2) cannot be measured and thus is ab-
sorbed by the random term. A dummy for general practitioners (GP) is interacted with
PD to test for systematic differences in αi of Equation (5.2), i.e. whether GPs react
in a different way to the financial incentives from PD than specialists do. A positive
interaction effect is expected due to the lower average income of GPs and hence higher
marginal utility of income.
Copayment borne by patients is known from the patient’s health insurance policy
on the one hand and the drug-specific rate of coinsurance on the other. As explained in
Section 5.3.3, policies differ in terms of deductibles (DED). Physicians acting as agents
[βi > 0 in Equation (2)] would want to keep patients’ out-of-pocket cost low. The higher
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DED, the more they are expected to prescribe the cheaper generic (Hypothesis 2). In
formulating this hypothesis, DED is viewed as exogenous. Admittedly, high deductibles
are typically chosen by higher-income individuals, making θjdt a function of u{Yjt} in
Equation (2). However, the dataset lacks information that would permit to control for
this relationship. Hypothesis (2) can be detailed further. Before January 2006, drug
expenditure in excess of DED was subject to a 10 percent coinsurance rate regardless
of type g or b. A natural experiment is provided by the policy change of 2006, when
the coinsurance rate for (some) brand-name drugs was increased from 10 to 20 percent
while it stayed at 10 percent for generics. Producers of brand-name drugs can escape
the increased rate of coinsurance by lowering their prices, which is observed in our
dataset (see Section 5.6). The effect of the patient’s rate of coinsurance on drug choice
can be tested by including a dummy COINS that is one if the prescribed drug faces the
increased rate of coinsurance at the time of purchase and zero otherwise. In addition,
an interaction term PD·COINS serves to test for the influence of financial incentives on
physician agency. According to Hypothesis 4, its coefficient is predicted to be negative,
indicating less additional generic substitution in the case of physician dispensing.
The hypothesis that generic drugs are prescribed less to patients with higher income
due to their lower marginal utility of income (Hypothesis 3) is tested by including
dummies for residence in a high-income area (HIA), the purchase of extra hospital
insurance (HOSP), and the purchase of accident insurance (ACC). Accident coverage
is inversely related to labor force participation because it is usually provided by the
employer rather than the health insurer. It thus may be interpreted as an indicator of
high income, causing less prescription of generics according to Hypothesis 3.
As to the third term of Equation (5.2), Hypothesis 5 (bearing on γi, the role of
agency on behalf of insurers) can be tested using the price difference between the
brand-name and generic drug (pt = pbt − pgt), to be detailed below. Concerning the
relevance of this agency, the following argument can be made. Beyond the deductible,
the price difference borne by patients is very small compared to average income. Thus,
it is unlikely that consideration for the patients’ coinsurance [second term in Equation
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(5.2)] provides enough motivation for most of non-dispensing physicians to bear the
greater cost of prescribing generic drugs (eijgt). Therefore, the fact that the market
share of generic drugs in our dataset is substantial in the non-PD setting (see Table
5.3) supports the view that γi > 0 in Equation (5.2), suggesting that physicians do
consider the cost to insurers when choosing a drug. The interaction term PD·P is used
to test whether physician agency is weakened by physician dispensing. As the price
difference is part of both the second and the third term of Equation (5.2), both agency
on behalf of insurers or agency on behalf of patients could be affected here.
For calculating the price difference, note that it has to be calculated for each com-
bination of package size and dosage, with pgt denoting the average price of N generic
products each time. Further, since prices are subject to change, the price difference
for a specific size-dosage combination has to be calculated for each month t, i.e.
pt = pbt − (
∑
n pnt)/N ∀n = g. For some of these combinations, only one version
is available and no price difference can be calculated. These observations are excluded
from the regression analysis. This is not a problem because a prescriber who needs this
specific amount of pills and dose does not have a choice between b and g.
For testing Hypothesis 6, differences in health insurance policies can be exploited.
Apart from conventional fee-for-service contracts with varying deductibles, consumers
can opt for a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) or a gatekeeping alternative
(GATE). In the HMO setting, physicians are paid by capitation rather than the usual
fee-for-service. The gatekeeping arrangement uses fee-for-service payments but requires
patients to obtain a referral from their general practitioner (chosen from a list issued
by their insurer) before seeing a specialist. Moreover, patients in a gatekeeping plan are
required to ask for generic drugs. Hypothesis 6 states that both kinds of arrangements
should lead to increased consideration of the cost of care by prescribing physicians
[higher γi in Equation (5.2)] and hence more generic drugs being prescribed. However,
it is important to note that patients choosing these contracts are likely less risk-averse
and more price sensitive than patients opting for the standard fee-for-service setting.
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These differences relate to the second rather than third term of Equation (2) yet also
contribute to more generic drugs being prescribed.
We complete the econometric specification by a few control variables. Because we
expect a positive time trend in favor of generic drugs as practitioners get more fa-
miliar with them, we include a variable for the time trend. Patient age and gender
serve to control for demographic effects. Also, political attitudes and institutions vary
between cantons. In some, PD is widely accepted or even desired while in others, it
is disputed. Moreover, unobserved detailing effort by pharmaceutical companies likely
differs between cantons. This calls for the inclusion of 25 cantonal dummies, with
Zurich constituting the reference category. Individuals can also purchase complemen-
tary insurance that covers additional procedures (such as traditional Chinese medicine
or otherwise uncovered drugs). These dimensions of complementary insurance likely
reflect risk aversion on the part of consumers, making them eschew drug substitution
because they are less familiar with the generic alternative.
Drug substitution may also depend on dosage and package size. The reason is that
the unobserved contribution to physician income could vary with these two parameters.
Therefore, total prescribed dose (number of pills times dosage per pill) is included in
the regression. The number of prescriptions per patient controls for long-run chronic
patients. Because there is a high likelihood that a patient initiated with a given va-
riety of the drug remains with it, two dummies indicate whether the patient’s first
prescription took place in 2006 or 2007, when the higher coinsurance rate was already
in place.
The deterministic part of utility for generics is estimated as
Vijgt = b0 + b1PD + b2GP+ b3PD ·GP+ b4DED2 + b5PD · DED2 + b6DED3 (5.5)
+b7PD ·DED3 + b8COINS + b9PD · COINS + b10HOSP + b11ACC
+b12HIA + b13P + b14PD · P + b15HMO + b16GATE+ bxX,
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where the b’s are the parameters of interest, X denotes the vector of control variables,
and bx the vector of coefficients of the control variables.
5.6 Data
5.6.1 Chemical agents selected
The data was provided by a major Swiss health insurer covering about 15 percent of the
Swiss population. They relate to the years 2005 to 2007. The chemical agents selected
for analysis are omeprazole (O), amlodipine (A), and ciprofloxacin (C).9 Omeprazole is
used to treat gastric and duodenal abscesses; amlodipine is a calcium channel blocker
for the treatment of angina; ciprofloxacin is used to treat specific bacterial infections.
Their choice can be justified on the grounds that they have many bioequivalent generic
competitors that are available on the Swiss market.10 Furthermore, these agents belong
to the therapeutic categories with substantial sales volume, causing the number of
prescriptions in the data to be high. We observe 183,874 (O), 143,358 (A), and 95,580
(C) prescriptions where exactly one package was sold.
The shares of the three brand-name drugs in the sample are depicted in Figure
5.1 for 33 months, starting from March 2005. They dropped throughout 2005, quite
likely because prescribing physicians anticipated the increase of coinsurance for certain
brand-name drugs from 10 to 20 percent effective January 2006. The new rate was to
apply to brand-name drugs whose sales price was 20 percent higher than the cheapest
therapeutically equivalent generic.11 During the first months of 2006, this was the case
for all three agents. However, the brand-name producers of amlodipine and ciprofloxacin
lowered their prices in month 20 (August, 2006) in order to avoid the extra copayment.
In month 29 (May, 2007), the producer of the brand-name for omeprazole lowered its
prices as well, but only for the most commonly prescribed dose (10 mg).
9 ATC-code: omeprazole (A02BC01), amlodipine (C08CA01), ciprofloxacin (J01MA02). For more
details about the investigated agents see www.drugbank.ca/drugs.
10 Number of generics available on the Swiss market (2005–2007): omeprazole (11), amlodipine (12),
ciprofloxacin (11).
11 This is regulated by national law (specifically paragraph Art.38a KLV).
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Figure 5.1: Share of brand-name drug between March, 2005 and December, 2007
As to amlodipine, the brand-name drug (NorvascR©) went off patent in the spring
of 2005, causing it to lose its monopoly position. Since then, the generic Amlodipin-
MephaR© has expanded its share in the sample from 18 to 37 percent (2006) and to 38
percent (2007), respectively.
Omeprazole Amlodipine Ciprofloxacin
Physician dispensed? Yes No Yes No Yes No
Sample share of generics 94% 89% 82% 66% 86% 79%
Sales of generics a) 6.3 9.2 3.7 3.5 2.0 1.7
Sales of brand-names a) 1.0 2.8 1.5 3.1 0.4 0.6
Note: a) Values are shown in CHF, mn. for the period between March 2005 and December 2007.
1 CHF ≈ 1.1 USD at 2011 exchange rates.
Table 5.3: Sample shares and sales volumes of generic and brand-name drugs
5.6.2 Physician and patient descriptors
In the data set, there are 7,441 physicians prescribing O, 5,995 prescribing A, and 7,693
prescribing C, respectively (the three subsets are overlapping); the share of PD varies
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between 43 and 54 percent from March 2005 to December 2007. With 78 to 88 percent,
the majority of the prescribers are GPs rather than specialists.
The median deductible is the lowest possible (CHF 300). During the study period,
about 70 percent of omeprazol prescriptions were subject to the increased rate of coin-
surance while this share was lower for amlodipine and ciprofloxacin with shares of 21
and 20 percent, respectively. The share of consumers with extra hospital coverage lies
between 22 and 27 percent. The majority of physicians have their practice in urban
(36-40 percent) or suburban (25-27 percent) areas while only 3 percent are located in
high-income areas. The average savings per prescription for a patient or insurer due to
the substitution of the brand-name by a generic counterpart is highest for O with CHF
102, followed by CHF 28 and CHF 12 for A and C, respectively. The share of insured
with an HMO policy varies between 2 and 3 percent, of those with a gatekeeping policy,
between 5 and 6 percent. In contrast, between 87 and 90 percent of the insured had
signed up for at least one voluntary extra option to broaden the scope of reimbursed
services. High shares of 68 and 83 percent have purchased accident insurance. Both the
61,825 patients receiving O and the 27,080 patients receiving C have an average age
of about 60 years, and 40 percent are male. The 58,489 patients obtaining A have an
average age of 70 years, and 48 percent are male. Ciprofloxacin is prescribed with an
average total dosage per prescription of 6,126 mg, compared to a dosage of 999 mg for
O and 620 mg for A. On average, a patient receives 8 prescriptions if in need of O or
A. In contrast, C is prescribed three times per patient on average. Observations are
distributed equally over the three years, with about one third of prescriptions taking
place per year. Also, the number of patients starting medication is roughly constant
over the years.
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Omeprazole Amlodipine Ciprofloxacin
MN MD SD MN MD SD MN MD SD
Physician dispensing (PD) 0.43 0.00 0.50 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.54 1.00 0.50
General practitioner (GP) 0.84 1.00 0.37 0.88 1.00 0.32 0.78 1.00 0.42
Patient’s deductible (DED) 406 300 297 386 300 246 477 300 413
Increased rate of coinsurance (COINS) 0.72 1.00 0.45 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.20 0.00 0.40
Extra hospital insurance (HOSP) 0.22 0.00 0.42 0.27 0.00 0.44 0.25 0.00 0.43
Accident insurance (ACC) 0.75 1.00 0.43 0.83 1.00 0.37 0.68 1.00 0.47
High-income area (HIA) 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.00 0.17
Urban area 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.40 0.00 0.49
Suburban area 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.27 0.00 0.44 0.25 0.00 0.43
Average price difference (P) 102 71 75 28 11 30 12 8 9
HMO contract (HMO) 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.14
Gatekeeping contract (GATE) 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.06 0.00 0.24
Complementary insured (COMP) 0.87 1.00 0.33 0.89 1.00 0.32 0.90 1.00 0.31
Patient’s age (in years) 62 64 17 70 72 12 58 61 19
Patient’s sex (male=1) 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.48 0.00 0.50 0.40 0.00 0.49
Total dosage (in 100 mg) 9.99 11.20 5.90 6.20 5.00 2.80 61.26 50.00 28.60
Prescriptions per patient 7.84 6.00 7.55 8.05 8.00 4.02 2.83 2.00 3.78
First prescription in 2006 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.48
First prescription in 2007 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.38 0.00 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.48
Share of prescriptions in 2006 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.48
Share of prescriptions in 2007 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.36 0.00 0.48
Note: Descriptive statistics are mean (MN), median (MD), and standard deviation (SD). The prescription is the unit of obser-
vation used for calculating the statistics.
Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics
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5.7 Estimation results
The odds ratios (ORs) and standard errors resulting from the random-effects logit
model described in Section 5.5 are displayed in Tables 5.5 and 5.6.12 The physician-
specific variance component contributes 50 to 70 percent of the total error variance,
and a likelihood-ratio test clearly speaks in favor of the random-effects specification.
The physician-specific variance component is higher than the 40 percent reported by
Lundin (2000) and 29 percent reported by Hellerstein (1998). A possible explanation
is that some physicians in our dataset only have a small number of patients, the data
coming from one insurer only. Moreover, the available information does not permit to
distinguish between part-time and full-time, female and male, and younger and older
physicians. Coscelli (1998) also mentions considerable physician-specific components in
unexplained variance.
5.7.1 Testing for the influence of physician dispensing
Hypothesis 1 predicts that physician dispensing (PD) increases the likelihood of generic
prescription. It is tested by Model 1, with physician and patient characteristics con-
trolled for. Additional hypothesis testing calls for interaction terms involving PD and
patient characteristics which are added in Model 2 (to be discussed in Section 5.7.2).
Therefore, the coefficient of PD in Model 1 shows the average OR across physician
and patient groups. In the case of O, it amounts to 3.0 (2.6, 3.4), with the parentheses
indicating its 95% confidence interval.13 For a detailed discussion of its calculation, see
Norton et al. (2004) and Garrett (1997). The OR indicates that if the drug is sold on
the physician’s own account, the odds of generic substitution are three times higher no
matter whether the prescriber is a GP or a specialist. For all three agents, the likeli-
hood of generic substitution is around twice as high among GPs than among specialists.
12 The concept of odds ratios and their calculation in the presence of interaction terms can be found
in Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000).
13 The 95% confidence interval is calculated according to CI = exp(βˆ ± 1.96 · ŜE(βˆ)), where βˆ is
the logit coefficient. Because Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show ORs, the reader can calculate the necessary
quantities according to βˆ = ln(ÔR) and ŜE(βˆ) = ŜE(ÔR)/ÔR using the values from the table.
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Moreover, the interaction between PD and GP yields a positive and significant coeffi-
cient in the case of A and C. This could be a sign that GPs with their lower average
income, hence higher marginal utility of income, are more influenced by the income
contribution of PD than their specialized colleagues. In the case of O, the interaction
of PD and GP was insignificant and therefore excluded from the estimation.
The effect of (PD·GP) cannot be inferred from the interaction coefficient directly but
needs to be calculated according to the different categories has to calculated [see Norton
et al. (2004)]. In present case, it is given by exp(βˆPD) for specialists and exp(βˆPD +
βˆPD·GP ) for GPs. For amlodipine, PD has an OR of 2.4 (1.9, 2.9) for specialists and
3.7 (3.4, 4.1) for GPs, indicating that physician dispensing has a much stronger effect
among GPs than among specialists. In the case of C, the discrepancy between GPs and
specialists is even stronger. Dispensing specialists reveal a negative PD effect with an
OR of 0.7 (0.6, 0.8), while GPs again exhibit a positive PD effect on generic substitution
with an OR of 2.9 (2.6, 3.3). All the OR values discussed have confidence intervals that
do not include 1 and thus are significant.
In summary, Hypothesis 1 receives a good deal of support, permitting one to con-
clude that physician dispensing increases the likelihood of generic substitution due to
its higher contribution to physician income. This conclusion holds regardless of whether
prescribers are GPs or not and for all of the three chemical substances analyzed, with
the one exception of specialized physicians prescribing C. However, it should be noted
that there may be additional reasons for dispensing physicians to choose the cheaper
generic drug. First, storage entails capital user cost, which is lower for cheap generics.
Second, dispensing physicians may be better informed about availability and prices of
generics than non-dispensing physicians because of especially targeted marketing ac-
tivities. Unfortunately, these effects cannot be analyzed with the available data. Still,
PD is associated with increased generic substitution. It contributes to lower phar-
maceutical expenditure as long as it does not go along with an increase in drug use
through supplier-induced demand. This qualification is not addressed here but is ana-
lyzed in other recent work. In particular, Rischatsch (2011) analyzes whether dispensing
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Omeprazole (O) Amlodipine (A) Ciprofloxacin (C)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Physician dispensing (PD) 2.99∗∗∗ 3.34∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.26) (0.25) (0.24) (0.06) (0.07)
General practitioner (GP) 2.12∗∗∗ 2.13∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗ 1.92∗∗∗ 2.21∗∗∗ 2.21∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.22) (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19)
Interaction of PD and GP 1.58∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 4.09∗∗∗ 4.08∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.17) (0.42) (0.42)
Deductible category DED2 a) 2.01∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗ 1.06 1.02 1.07
(0.17) (0.23) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07)
Interaction of PD and DED2 0.70∗ 1.26∗ 0.90
(0.13) (0.17) (0.08)
Deductible category DED3 a) 1.95∗∗∗ 2.50∗∗∗ 1.25 1.42∗∗ 1.12 1.20
(0.39) (0.66) (0.18) (0.25) (0.11) (0.16)
Interaction of PD and DED3 0.51 0.71 0.85
(0.21) (0.20) (0.17)
Increased coinsurance (COINS) 2.04∗∗∗ 1.89∗∗∗ 4.52∗∗∗ 4.58∗∗∗ 2.14∗∗∗ 2.26∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.11)
Interaction of PD and COINS 1.35∗∗∗ 0.97 0.88∗
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Extra hospital insurance (HOSP) 0.68∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗ 0.93∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Accident insurance (ACC) 0.80∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.97 0.97
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
High-income area (HIA) b) 0.47∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.91 0.91
(0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.17)
Continued on next page...
Table 5.5: Estimated odd-ratios from logistic regression (generics=1), part 1
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Price difference (P, in 10 CHF) 1.03∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗ 0.93∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03)
Interaction of PD and P 0.97∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 1.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.03)
HMO contract (HMO) c) 1.94∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗ 1.99∗∗∗ 1.99∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.15) (0.15)
Gatekeeping contract (GATE) c) 2.43∗∗∗ 2.37∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗∗ 1.64∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.21) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Complementary insurance (COMP) 1.15∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 1.00 1.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Time trend (in months) 1.03∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Patient age (in 5 years) 1.01∗∗ 1.01∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Patient sex (male=1) 1.26∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.02 1.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Tot. dosage (in 100 mg) 0.93∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 1.00∗ 1.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Prescription per patient 0.94∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
First prescription in 2006 1.33∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
First prescription in 2007 1.38∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 1.04∗ 1.04∗ 1.09∗ 1.09∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Log-likelihood at convergence: -35,970 -35,918 -51,481 -51,473 -29,390 -29,388
Observations/Physicians: 183,874/7,441 143,358/5,995 95,580/7,693
Note: Standard errors displayed in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.10; Six additional area and 25 cantonal dummies
are included but not shown here. a) DED2 = CHF 1,000 or 1,500, DED3 = CHF 2,000 or 2,500. Ref. categories are: b) urban area, c) basic insurance.
Table 5.6: Estimated odd-ratios from logistic regression (generics=1), part 2
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physicians optimize their income contribution from drug dispensing by selling smaller
packages, while Trottmann (2011) looks at the impact of physician dispensing on total
expenditure for drugs, general practitioners’ services, specialists’ services and hospital
services.
5.7.2 The role of physician agency on behalf of patients
To the extent that physicians take the consequences of their prescriptions for the utility
of their patients into account, Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive relationship between
copayment and generic substitution. Patients with a higher deductible face a higher
expected level of copayment; therefore, they should be more likely to receive the generic
alternative. The empirical evidence comes from the coefficients of DED2 and DED3 in
Model 2 of Table 5.5. In the case of O, the ORs for DED2 and DED3 indicate that
a higher deductible increases the likelihood of generic substitution. Patients with a
deductible in excess of the legal minimum are two times as likely to receive a generic
drug, which supports Hypothesis 2. A stronger effect for DED3 compared to DED2
could not be found for O, however. For A, the ORs increase from the lowest to the
highest deductible category, but only the OR for DED2 is statistically significant.
The tendency is the same for C but the effect is insignificant. The dummy variable
indicating the 2006 increase in coinsurance for expensive brand-names (COINS) is
strongly positive for all chemical agents, again supporting Hypothesis 2 (see Table
5.2).
Hypothesis 3 revolves around patient income, stating that richer patients are less
likely to receive the generic drug. In Table 5.5, three indicators are used, viz. the
purchase of extra hospital insurance, accident insurance, and residence in a high-income
area. As to the first indicator, the OR values are consistently below one, indicating that
generic drug substitution indeed is less likely. The same is also true for patients with
accident insurance and from high-income areas in two of the three cases (C is the
exception with a negative but insignificant effect). Therefore, there is some supporting
evidence for Hypothesis 3 (see Table 5.2 again).
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Hypothesis 4 predicts that patients’ rate of coinsurance is less influential in the PD
mode than in the pharmacy mode. To test it, Model 2 contains interactions between
the DED dummies and PD. The interaction terms are generally negative, but only the
medium category forO is significant, giving some support to Hypothesis 4. Here, the OR
for DED2 is 2.2 (1.8, 2.7) for non-PD and 1.6 (1.1, 2.1) for PD. Evidence contradicting
Hypothesis 4 comes from A, where the interaction effect PD·DED2 is positive and
significant but the main effect DED2 is insignificant, leading to the conclusion that non-
PD providers do not react to a higher deductible but PD providers do. This difference
vanishes again at the highest deductible level since PD·DED3 does not reach statistical
significance.
A second test of Hypothesis 4 is provided by the interaction of PD with COINS.
However, the evidence is inconclusive. For omeprazole, PD·COINS is highly significant
and positive with an OR of 1.9 (1.7, 2.0) among non-PD providers and 2.6 (2.3, 2.8)
PD providers, respectively, while for ciprofloxacin, it is weakly significant but negative,
suggesting that PD providers react less to the increase in the rate of coinsurance than
their non-PD colleagues. No significant difference could be found for amlodipine. Hence,
the evidence does not permit to either confirm or reject the notion that drug dispensing
weakens physician agency on behalf of the patient.
5.7.3 The role of physician agency on behalf of insurers
Hypothesis 5 states that given agency on behalf of insurers, non-PD providers prescribe
generic drugs in spite of higher information cost. Therefore, we expect a higher differ-
ence between brand-name and generic prices (pbt − pgt) to be positively related to the
probability of prescribing the cheaper generic drug. While the estimates for O support
Hypothesis 5 with a weak positive effect in favor of generics, the estimates for A and
C do not because an increase in the price difference lowers the probability of generic
substitution slightly. However, there is other evidence hinting at agency on behalf of
insurers. In fact, the descriptive statistics in Table 5.3 show that, for the three selected
agents, the share of generic drugs is 66-89 percent in our dataset even in the non-
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PD market. Recall that non-PD providers do not benefit financially from drug choice,
while patient coinsurance beyond the deductible is rather limited compared to average
income in Switzerland. Therefore, the high share of generic drugs shows that some
physicians choose the lower-priced alternative even in situations when neither they nor
their patients derive significant financial benefit from it. It takes agency toward the
insurers to motivate physicians to prescribe generic drugs despite higher information
cost.
The interaction PD·P is again used to test whether the financial incentives attached
to PD weaken physician agency. The price difference being part of both the second and
the third term of Equation (5.2), both agency on behalf of the patient and on the behalf
of the insurer can be affected. For O, the price difference has an OR of 1.0 (1.03, 1.05)
for non-PD physicians and an OR of 1.01 (1.00, 1.02) for PD physicians, pointing to
a weakly negative association of PD and agency. The opposite is observed in the case
of A, where the OR pertaining to non-PD providers is 0.81 (0.80, 0.82) and the OR
pertaining to PD providers is 0.83 (0.82, 0.83). For C, no significant difference between
non-PD and PD providers is observed, with ORs amounting to 0.93 (0.88, 0.99) and
0.94 (0.88, 1.00), respectively. Therefore, the evidence with regard to the interaction
of PD and agency is inconclusive.
With respect to Hypothesis 6, the managed-care variables ‘HMO’ and ‘gatekeeping’
reveal an increasing likelihood of generic substitution for all three chemical agents, with
ORs between 1.4 and 2.0, as predicted (see Table 5.2).
5.7.4 Control variables
The control variables lead to the following conclusions. In Model 2 of Table 5.6, there is
evidence for the expected positive time trend towards generic drugs, a higher likelihood
of generics being prescribed to men compared to women, no evidence of the total
amount of dosage prescribed having influence on the choice of drug version, and a
negative effect of number of prescriptions on the likelihood of generic prescription.
Finally, the year when the patient’s medication started is important for drug choice
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and significant for all three chemical agents. Patients who received the first prescription
in 2006 are between 1.2 and 1.3 times more likely to be prescribed a generic. In the
case of amlodipine and ciprofloxacin, the likelihood for 2007 is higher than for 2005
but lower than for 2006. This could reflect the fact that the two pertinent brand-
name producers lowered their price in the interest of a decreased coinsurance rate,
enabling them to regain market-share. By way of contrast, the brand-name producer
of omeprazole waited until 2007, causing it to lose market share in both years.
One might criticize that dispensing physicians do not react to an individual patient
when choosing between g and b because they have already decided what pharmaceuti-
cals to have in their portfolio. However, they are likely to make this choice anticipating
the kind of patients they will face from past visits, causing them to store the drugs
that best match their clientele.
5.8 Conclusions
This research analyzes the role of physicians’ and patients’ financial incentives in the
choice between generic and brand-name drugs. Prescribing the generic alternative takes
more effort on the part of the physician for two main reasons: First, she needs to acquire
information about new drugs which enter the market only after patent expiration of
the brand name. Second, she needs to convince the patient that the cheaper generic is
not of lower quality. The physician is willing to make this effort only if the benefit from
choosing the generic is sufficiently high. Generic drugs have higher benefit because
of three reasons, namely financial benefits, agency towards the patient, and agency
towards insurers. The influence of these three components is estimated using a large
set of drug claims data from Switzerland.
Regarding financial incentives, this data is ideal for analysis because some – but not
all – Swiss physicians have the right to dispense drugs on their own account. Physi-
cians with this privilege derive a significant part of their income from the sale of drugs,
causing financial incentives associated with drug dispensing to be substantial. Physi-
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cian dispensing is found to be associated with a higher likelihood of prescribing generic
drugs, which is likely due to a higher contribution to physician income in comparison
with that of brand-name drugs (Hypothesis 1; see also Table 5.2). A limitation of our
analysis is that we are unable to separate this effect from other differences between dis-
pensing and non-dispensing physicians. In particular, information costs for prescribing
generic drugs might be lower for dispensing physicians as they are targeted by sales
representatives and may therefore be better informed about availability and prices of
drugs than their non-dispensing colleagues. Additionally, dispensing physicians have to
finance and manage storage, tying up capital and causing opportunity costs.
Turning to agency towards patients, we test whether physicians respond to the
financial burden caused by copayment. Choosing the lower-priced generic drug serves to
decrease this burden without affecting the quality of medication due to bioequivalence
of the generic substitutes studied here. We find that the likelihood of receiving the
generic increases for patients with a higher deductible (Hypothesis 2). In addition, the
rate of coinsurance (which applies when the deductible is exceeded) was increased for
certain brand-name drugs during our observation period. Although this change caused
but a small additional burden per patient compared to income, it does go along with
a strongly increased use of generic drugs. A likely contributor is that the government’s
initiative to promote generic substitution alloyed concerns about quality on the part
of both prescribers and patients.
The variation in deductibles and coinsurance permits to study the interaction be-
tween physicians’ financial incentives and their patient agency. Given imperfect agency
on behalf of patients, dispensing physicians are predicted to respond less strongly to
a hike in copayment than non-dispensing ones (Hypothesis 4). However, the evidence
found in our data is mixed, failing to support the notion that drug dispensing weakens
physician agency, as argued by pharmacists’ lobbying groups and some Swiss politi-
cians.
Moreover, most of the odds ratios pertaining to proxies of patient income (residence
in a high-income area, purchase of extra hospital and accident insurance) suggest that
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wealthier patients have a higher probability of receiving brand-name drugs because the
price difference between them and the generic substitute has less of an effect due to
lower marginal utility of income of the wealthy (Hypothesis 3).
Consideration of the savings for insurers might provide an additional motivation
for the prescription of the cheaper generic alternative (Hypothesis 5). However, this
effect could be confirmed for only one drug in the econometric estimation (see Table
5.2 again). Nevertheless, the high willingness of non-dispensing physicians to prescribe
generic drugs points to some degree of agency towards insurers. Last but not least,
physicians working in managed care-type arrangements are found to prescribe more
generic drugs than their colleagues, pointing to an increased cost awareness in the
managed care setting (Hypothesis 6).
In sum, financial incentives, agency towards the patient, and agency towards in-
surers are all found to markedly influence generic substitution. Moreover, government
initiatives to promote generic drugs can be effective even in the presence of weak fi-
nancial incentives because they may reassure physicians and patients of the safety and
high quality of generic drugs. However, if government were to try to markedly reduce
generic prices, it might weaken the incentives for generic substitution, at least for dis-
pensing physicians. The reason is that physicians’ financial incentives may encourage
rather than undermine generic substitution.
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DO DISPENSING PHYSICIANS
OPTIMIZE THEIR OWN DRUG
MARGINS? EVIDENCE FROM
SWITZERLAND
by
Maurus Rischatsch
SUMMARY
While some countries separated drug prescription and dispensation to ensure indepen-
dent drug choice, others allow combined providers to increase pharmaceutical access
or the utilization of pharmacist skills. A drawback is that combined providers may
be incentivized to increase profits through the prescription of cost-inefficient packages.
Switzerland constitutes an interesting example where dispensing and non-dispensing
physicians coexist permitting a comparison of their prescribing behavior. The paper
shows how margin optimization is possible under the current price regulation and finds
that dispensing physicians’ margin per dose is between 5 and 10 while cost per dose
are between 3 and 5 percent higher.

Chapter 6
Do Dispensing Physicians Optimize
Their Own Drug Margins?
Evidence from Switzerland
6.1 Introduction
By law, in order to prevent financial incentives affecting the way prescriptions are
issued, many countries separate drug prescription and drug dispensation. Critics ac-
cuse combined providers – dispensing physicians or prescribing pharmacists – of being
influenced by personal profit considerations when choosing a drug or drug quantity.
South Korea demonstrates one example where physician dispensing and pharmacy
prescribing was allowed until 2000, but was separated thereafter to tackle inefficient
drug allocation and consumption [see Soonman (2003)]. On the other hand, combin-
ing drug prescription and dispensation permits an increase in pharmaceutical access
across rural areas or makes greater use of pharmacists’ skills to improve system flexi-
bility with respect to prescribing, supply, and administration of medicines [see Tonna
et al. (2007)]. The former is the reason why physician dispensing is allowed in some
Swiss jurisdictions, while the latter explains why pharmacy prescribing was introduced
in the United Kingdom where patients face long waiting times to see a doctor [see
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Pearson et al. (2001)]. For similar reasons, pharmacist prescribing was successfully in-
troduced in the United States, Canada, and New Zealand [see Emmerton et al. (2005)].
Therefore, policy makers have to balance the advantages of combined drug provision
against its potential disadvantages.
Potential disadvantages of combining drug prescription and dispensation emerge
for different reasons. Providers serve as agents for their clients making diagnoses and
prescribing the most adequate drugs and drug quantities. If they act as perfect agents
they make the same decisions as their patients under full information [see Zweifel
et al. (2009), Chapter 8]. However, the relationship between drug providers and their
patients (or insurers where health insurance covers drug expenditure) is characterized
by a strong information asymmetry. Economic incentives may seduce them to deviate
from their role as perfect agents leading to a misallocation of resources. Therefore,
it is important to investigate if there are differences in the prescribing behavior of
combined and separated providers and to explore if pharmaceutical pricing mechanisms
set financial incentives that are strong enough to entrap providers to optimize their drug
margins.
In most countries, health care markets are heavily regulated and public authorities
administrate pharmaceutical prices. In some countries like Switzerland, drug prices are
regulated on manufacturer levels and so-called logistic margins are added to cover the
cost of drug provision for dispensing physicians or pharmacies, e.g. storage costs. Lo-
gistic margins are often composed of two components: a certain amount per package
and an additional contribution which depends on the manufacturer price. In Switzer-
land, particularly, the per package component is under considerable strain because it
permits dispensing physicians to increase their own profit by reducing package size and
increasing the number of packages.
The objective of this analysis is to investigate whether combining drug prescrip-
tion and dispensation leads to margin optimization activities under a pharmaceutical
pricing mechanism that contains a package price component. The paper is structured
as follows. Section 6.2 pictures the health care system and pharmaceutical pricing in
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Switzerland. Section 6.3 examines the theoretical optimal size of a package for margin
optimizing combined providers. It reveals that the package component likely incen-
tivizes combined providers to conduct margin optimization. Section 6.4 turns to the
empirical part of the analysis and outlines how margin optimization is measured for
Swiss dispensing physicians. Section 6.5 describes the used drug claims data and Sec-
tion 6.6 the estimation results that indicate the margin optimization of dispensing
physicians. Finally, Section 6.7 concludes.
6.2 Institutional background
The health care system in Switzerland is financed through lump sum premiums that
are independent of income. Purchasing health insurance is mandatory for all citizens
while low-income individuals are subsidized through premium reductions. Every year,
an individual can choose one of six deductible levels ranging between CHF 300 and
2,500 (1 CHF ≈ 1.1 USD at 2011 exchange rates) for the following year. Opting for
a higher deductible is rewarded with a lower premium and is in general chosen by
healthier individuals. In the case of annual health care expenditures exceeding the
deductible, insured individuals have to bear a copayment of 10 percent up to a total
payment of CHF 700. For expensive brand-name drugs with at least one bioequivalent
generic competitor, the copayment rate was increased from 10 to 20 percent in January
2006. All brand-name drugs explored in this study faced such an increase in 2006, but
they bought their way out by reducing their prices during the study period.
New pharmaceuticals have to be approved by Swissmedic, an independent epidemi-
ological institute. After the authorization, the Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH)
decides upon the three criteria effectiveness, safety, and adequacy if they are set on
the positive list of drugs that have to be reimbursed by health insurers. The FOPH is
in charge of pharmaceutical pricing through direct price regulation [see Bauer (2001)].
In a first step, the FOPH negotiates with producers about the manufacturer price for
the smallest package provided. This price represents the reference for the pricing of
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larger packages. The manufacturer price constitutes the maximum price at which pro-
ducers are allowed to sell their products to dispensing physicians, pharmacists, and
wholesalers. While brand-name drugs are priced with the aid of an international price
reference system, generic drug prices are set at least 40 percent below its bioequivalent
brand-name drug. If both parties agree on the reference price, manufacturer prices (P )
for different package sizes and dosages are determined, following the regulated price
relations for different package sizes and dosages (see Table 6.6 in the Appendix).
Based on P , a so-called logistic drug margin (M) for pharmacies, dispensing physi-
cians, and wholesalers is added to cover the cost of drug delivery. The logistic drug
margin is a combination of a fixed per package margin (mf) and a variable capital
margin (mv) that is calculated as a percentage of P . The per package margin increases
in increments depending on the manufacturer price category. The capital margin mv
is between 12 and 15 percent for drugs cheaper than CHF 800, and between 8 and
10 percent for prices between CHF 800 and 1,800. Pharmaceuticals with a manufac-
turer price above CHF 1,800, distribution costs are fully reimbursed through a package
margin of CHF 240. The values for mf and mv are given in Table 6.1.
Manufacturer Logistic Manufacturer Logistic
price (P ) margin (M) price (P ) margin (M)
mf mv mf mv
CHF 00.00-04.99 CHF 04.00 12-15% CHF 15.00-799 CHF 16.00 12-15%
CHF 05.00-10.99 CHF 08.00 12-15% CHF 800.00-1,799 CHF 60.00 08-10%
CHF 11.00-14.99 CHF 12.00 12-15% CHF ≥1800 CHF 240.00
Source: Drabinski et al. (2008) (1 CHF ≈ 1.1 USD at 2011 exchange rates).
Table 6.1: Logistic drug margins in Switzerland
Patient (or sales) prices paid by either patients or health insurers are the sum of P
and M and for simplicity, called drug cost (C) for the remainder of this paper. In fact,
only C is observed in the drug claims data. The true (unofficial) drug margin may differ
if dispensing physicians or pharmacists are able to buy drugs below P , e.g. because of
marketing activities of pharmaceutical representatives. Further, how the drug margin
M is split between producers, wholesalers, pharmacists, and dispensing physicians is
Do Dispensing Physicians Optimize Their Own Drug Margins? 131
not regulated and the outcome of a bargaining between the market participants. There-
fore, neither the FOPH, nor insurers, nor patients know exactly drug providers’ profit
from drug dispensing. In addition, pharmacists are allowed to charge payments directly
to the patient for checking the medication and assessing the accuracy of the treatment,
as well as to cover the cost of recording the medication. It is strictly forbidden for dis-
pensing physicians to charge these fees because they are already paid for these services
through fee-for-service. If not explicitly prohibited by the physician, pharmacists are
allowed to substitute brand-name drugs with generics, receiving a share of insurer’s
cost savings to promote generic substitution [see Drabinski et al. (2008)]. A reader
interested in a more detailed discussion of the Swiss pharmaceutical market is referred
to Hunkeler (2007) and Hunkeler (2008) for a historic review.
Table 6.1 shows that mf is relatively high compared to P , especially for cheaper
drugs. This pricing mechanism may incentivize dispensing physicians to reduce package
size and prescribe a higher number of packages.
The next section shows theoretically, how combined drug providers – dispensing
physicians or prescribing pharmacists – could exploit the design of the logistic drug
margin to optimize their own profits.
6.3 Theoretical drug margin optimization
This section uses microeconomic theory to analyze potential drug margin optimization
by adjusting package size. Starting with the general optimization problem of combined
providers, the focus then turns to drug margin optimization with respect to the number
of packages prescribed and package size. The section ends with real data examples that
illustrate the potential increase in profit through optimization (see Table 6.2 and Figure
6.1).
The decision-making process of a prescriber starts with choosing the best active
pharmaceutical ingredient, selecting a specific brand, indicating patient’s required total
dosage (Dt), and finally deciding how to prescribe Dt with respect to the number of
132 Provider and Consumer Preferences in Health Care Markets
packages (N), number of pills per package (S), and dosage per pill (D). Acting as a
perfect agent on behalf of the drug payer would require the prescription of the most cost-
efficient combination of N , S, and D available for delivering Dt. Combined providers
optimize their logistic margin by solving the following optimization problem,
max
N,S,D
M = N ·
[
mf (P (S,D)) +mv(P (S,D)) · P (S,D)
]
(6.1)
s.t. N · S ·D = Dt.
The quantity Dt denotes the total amount of dosage to be prescribed and is assumed
to be constant because supplier-induced demand is neglected [see McGuire (2000) for
a discussion of supplier-induced demand in health care]. The package (mf) as well as
the capital (mv) margin components depend on the manufacturer price (P ). Accord-
ing to pharmaceutical pricing in Switzerland, mf is defined as a discrete step-function
depending on the price category of the drug. Because only a small fraction of investi-
gated drugs are cheaper than CHF 15 and all cheaper than where mv starts to change,
mf and mv are assumed to be constant. Without this simplification, e.g. prescribing
two packages to double mf could lead to the same contribution because mf halves.
Again, a change of price category is unlikely for the drugs explored in this study. The
manufacturer price is assumed to have the following functional form
P (S,D) = pC + pS(S)S + pD(D)D, (6.2)
where pC represents the price constant and manufacturer prices increase with package
size and dosage (∂P/∂S > 0 and ∂P/∂D > 0), but at a decreasing rate (∂2P/∂S2 < 0
and ∂P 2/∂D2 < 0).
6.3.1 Choice of package size
Again, it is assumed that the total amount of dosage (Dt > 0) does not change due
to supplier-induced demand. For simplicity, D is assumed to be given exogenously
depending on the patient’s need so that it does not affect the optimization and leaves us
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with a two-dimensional optimization problem. Furthermore, all quantities are treated as
continuous even if they are discrete in practice, e.g. reducing package size by one pill is
not possible in practice because prescribers can only choose from available packages.1
Then, P does only change with S and the price function given by Equation (6.2)
simplifies to P (S|D) = cD + pS(S)S, where cD = pC + pDD is the dosage-specific
constant. In combination with Equation (6.1), we can derive how the logistic drug
margin (M) changes with N and S, respectively.2 The optimization problem is given
by
max
N,S
M |Dt, D = N ·
[
mf +mv(cD + pS(S)S)
]
(6.3)
s.t. N = Dt/SD.
Substituting the quantity constraint into the margin function, the problem reduces to
max
S
M |Dt, D =
Dt
SD
·
[
mf +mv(cD + pS(S)S)
]
. (6.4)
Taking the first derivative of drug margin M with respect to package size S leads to
∂M/∂S = −(mf +mvcD)DtS−2D−1+mvDtD−1(∂pS/∂S) and rearranging the expres-
sion to simplify interpretation leads to
∂M
∂S
= −
(mf +mvcD)N
S
+mvNS(∂pS/∂S) < 0 (6.5)
because ∂pS/∂S ≤ 0.3 Therefore, drug margin is strictly monotonic decreasing in pack-
age size, no matter if drug prices are discounted with package size or not and the maxi-
mization problem leads to the corner solution where the smallest package is prescribed
which is available to prescribe Dt (S=7 in Figure 6.1). Equation (6.5) unveils the role
1 In some countries, drugs are sold by patient-specific package sizes containing the exact number
of pills needed.
2 The logistic drug margin constitutes physicians’ net profit from drug dispensing being the dif-
ference between the reimbursed sales (or patient) price and the manufacturer price (provider’s
purchasing cost).
3 Note that in Switzerland prices are discounted with increasing package size so that ∂pS/∂S < 0
leading to ∂M/∂S < 0.
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pharmaceutical pricing plays in the optimization problem. Increasing mf raises the
incentive to decrease package size for more packages.
Conclusion 1: Pharmaceutical pricing in Switzerland permits dispensing physicians
to increase their own profits by reducing package size in return for a higher
number of packages because ∂M/∂S < 0.
The second derivative shows that ∂2M/∂S2 = (mf+mvcD)DtD−1S−3 > 0 if we assume
a pharmaceutical pricing with ∂2pS/∂S2 = 0, which is satisfied in the case of Switzer-
land (see Table 6.6 in the Appendix). Thus, margin optimization is more effective in
the lower domain of S.
Conclusion 2: A marginal decrease in package size leads to a higher increase in the
logistic drug margin for smaller packages (∂2M/∂S2 > 0) as long as prices do not
switch categories and therefore, mf decreases.
In addition to the incentive arising from the design of the logistic drug margin, rais-
ing discount rates for larger packages makes the expression ∂pS/∂S in Equation (6.5)
stronger negative. Hence, optimization is partly induced by price discounts because re-
ducing package size permits to increase the manufacturer price per prescribed dosage,
which then translates into a higher logistic drug margin.
Conclusion 3: Discounting pharmaceutical prices with increasing package size per-
mits Swiss dispensing physicians to rise manufacturer price per dose by prescrib-
ing smaller packages. If drug pricing is linear in package size, i.e. ∂pS/∂S = 0, no
such additional effect is present.
The logistic drug margin given by Equation (6.4) is depicted in Figure 6.1. The relevant
parameters for the brand-name drug of omeprazole were estimated using prices of
January 2006. The graph visualizes Conclusions 1 and 2 showing that the drug margin
increases if S is reduced and therefore N increases. For D=20 (solid line), the values
coincide with the margins discussed next and displayed in Table 6.2.
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Figure 6.1: Drug margin as a function of package size for given Dt and D
6.3.2 An example of margin optimization
To illustrate package size optimization, a patient in need of 20 mg omeprazole per
day for four weeks (28 days) in January 2006 is assumed, i.e. Dt=560 and D=20.4 The
most cost-efficient prescription (and lowest margin and cost per dose) is given by S=28,
D=20, N=1 resulting in a drug margin of CHF 33 and cost of CHF 126.5 Instead, two
packages with S=14 could be prescribed increasing patient’s cost to CHF 146 and
dispenser’s drug margin to CHF 50, an increase in profit of CHF 17 (or 52 percent).
In the extreme case that may be less likely, prescribing S=7 and N=4 increases drug
margin to CHF 85 and cost to CHF 194. Hence, current pharmaceutical price and
margin regulation in Switzerland permits to more than double profit selling omeprazole
by optimizing package size (CHF 33 versus 85). Therefore, margin optimization can
substantially affect profits leading to conflicts of interest for combined providers. Table
6.2 displays logistic drug margins for the outlined example and four generics. Logistic
drug margins could also be optimized by reducing the dosage per pill (D) in return
4 This example is chosen because it represents the most frequently prescribed package for omepra-
zole.
5 The logistic drug margin is calculated neglecting value added taxes.
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Antra Omezol- Omed Oprazol Omeprazole
MUPS Mepha MT Helvepharm
S N M ∆ M ∆ M ∆ M ∆ M ∆
28 1 32.82 1.00 22.52 1.00 22.47 1.00 25.20 1.00 21.35 1.00
14 2 49.92 1.52 38.10 1.69 38.01 1.69 41.10 1.63 29.10 1.36
7 4 84.96 2.59 57.00 2.53 – – – – 39.00 1.83
Note: Logistic drug margins are shown in CHF (1 CHF ≈ 1.1 USD at 2011 exchange rates).
Relative changes are denoted by ∆. Omed was renamed to Omeprazol Sandoz Eco later on.
Table 6.2: Example of relative changes in logistic drug margins (Dt = 560, D = 20)
for a higher number of packages (keeping package size constant). But this seems less
realistic in practice because D cannot be manipulated that easy.
6.4 Econometric analysis
This section outlines the strategy how drug margin optimization is estimated empir-
ically. Subsection 6.4.1 discusses the two dependent variables used to estimate opti-
mization activity and its effect on pharmaceutical expenditure. Subsection 6.4.2 turns
to the explanatory variables included in the regression analysis, while Subsection 6.4.3
discusses the estimated econometric model.
6.4.1 Logistic drug margin and drug cost variables
Logistic drug margin optimization by dispensing physicians is investigated comparing
margin-per-dose (MPD) values of dispensing physicians and pharmacies. Aggregating
the MPD on patient level instead of comparing MPD values on prescription level ac-
counts not only for margin optimization for single physician visits but also over time.
If drug brand changes for a patient over time, observations are treated separately. On
the one hand, this controls for different manufacturer prices. On the other hand, ag-
gregation is less problematic because it is likely that the change is due to a change in
drug seller, e.g. change from a physician to a pharmacy. However, if aggregation does
not lead to complete combined or separated drug provision, observations are treated
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as from combined providers if two-thirds of Dt is sold by a physician. The MPD for
aggregated observation n is then given by
MPDn =
∑
i
(mf,i +mv,iPi)S
−1
i D
−1
i (6.6)
for all single observations i that belong to the same physician, patient, and drug.6
Drug cost per dose (CPD) is used to measure the effect of physician dispensing on
drug expenditure. The CPD values aggregate profits for drug dispenser (dispensing
physician or pharmacy) and producer. They are calculated as
CPDn =
∑
i
CiS
−1
i D
−1
i , (6.7)
where Ci = mf,i + (1 + mv,i)Pi represents drug expenditure with respect to a single
prescription i.7
It is important to keep in mind that even if there is a positive correlation between
combining drug provision and CPD, combined drug delivery may be more cost-efficient
due to savings elsewhere, e.g. generic substitution [see Rischatsch et al. (2010)]. How-
ever, assessing overall cost-efficiency of physician dispensing is not the objective of this
study. Readers interested therein are referred to Trottmann (2011).
There are many factors that affect the outcome variables. While some of them are
under the prescriber’s control, others are not. Inference may be confounded if the latter
are omitted. The next subsection discusses the covariates included in the regression
analysis.
6.4.2 Explanatory variables
Drug margin optimization is tested using a dummy variable being one for combined
drug provision and zero otherwise. In Switzerland, physician dispensing (PD) repre-
6 Ni cancels out of the equation because prescriptions of different packages at the same time are
treated as separate observations.
7 Again, additional fees and taxes that are either small or do not differ between combined and
separated providers are neglected.
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sents combined drug provision. Thus, the analysis includes a PD-dummy to indicate
combined drug provision. A statistically significant and positive coefficient pertaining
to PD points at margin optimization activities and imperfect agency on behalf of the
payer.
As mentioned above, there are several factors affecting the outcome variables. Gen-
eral practitioners (GPs) may face patients with different needs than specialists. Hence,
a GP-dummy is included to control for these differences. Moreover, physicians who
prescribe some substances very rarely may be less informed about available package
sizes and dosages. Even if the investigated drugs are blockbusters, information may
affect MPD and CPD without being correlated with margin optimization activities.
Including the number of prescriptions might be problematic because it can be cor-
related with margin optimization. In contrast, using the number of patients (NPA) a
physician faced during the study period is independent of optimization efforts if one as-
sumes supplier-induced demand to be absent. Furthermore, facing a higher demand for
a specific substance may result in a larger drug portfolio in private-practice pharmacies.
Having different packages available permits to prescribe more cost-efficient.
Patients’ health insurance plans are used to control for heterogeneity among pa-
tients. In Switzerland, an insured can choose between different deductibles every year
(see Section 6.2). Choosing a high deductible correlates with patients’ expectation of
low need for health services in the following year. Patients with e.g. chronic diseases
most likely choose the lowest deductible. Therefore, it is important to distinguish be-
tween these groups because patients in need of a high total dosage can be provided
with more cost-efficient packages due to price discounts for large packages. Hence, pa-
tients’ latent health status is modeled using dummy variables for different deductible
categories. The lowest deductibles of CHF 300 or 500 serve as the reference category.
Patients with a deductible of CHF 1,000 or 1,500 are grouped into medium deductible
patients (DEDM) and those with the highest deductibles of CHF 2,000 or 2,500 are
represented by the high deductible category (DEDH). Additionally, individuals opting
for a health maintenance organization (HMO) contract and physicians working in HMO
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practices are expected to be more cost-aware increasing cost-efficiency. The same might
be the case for gatekeeping insured people (GATE). To control for demographic effects,
patient’s age (AGE) and gender (MALE) is included. The RUR dummy captures dif-
ferences between urban and rural located practices and the FRIT dummy incorporates
differences between French-/Italian- and German-speaking areas.
Aggregation on patient levels to model margin optimization over time requires a
time-indicator that permits to link outcome variables with price changes over time
which directly affect MPD and CPD values. Calculating the shares of prescriptions
for each year solves this problem. Hence, two year variables are included, one for 2006
(Y06) and one for 2007 (Y07), where 2005 constitutes the reference category.8
Rischatsch et al. (2010) show that financial interests encourage dispensing physi-
cians to substitute brand-name by generic drugs. In contrast to optimizing drug choice,
the present study is interested in how the combination of prescription and dispensa-
tion affects package choice given a particular drug was chosen. Therefore, drug-specific
constants (DSCs) are included to control for different manufacturer prices across phar-
maceuticals. Omitting drug choice would underestimate dispensing physicians’ MPD
due to a higher market share of generics with lower logistic drug margins. Again, the
present study is interested in separating such effects. Further, DSCs control for addi-
tional unobserved drug-specific effects.
The estimation equation can be written as
y = β0 + β1PD + β2GP+ β3NPA+ β4DEDM+ β5DEDH+ β6HMO (6.8)
+β7GATE+ β8AGE+ β9MALE + β10RUR + β11FRIT + β12Y06
+β13Y07 + β14DSC1 + β15DSC2 + β16DSC3 + β17DSC4 + ε
where y ∈ {MPD, CPD} and ε denotes the error term.
8 Controlling for the share of dosage per year is problematic because it is already used for the
calculation of the dependent variable.
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6.4.3 Model specification
The estimation of MPD and CPD values using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions
can be problematic because the data are non-negative and most often heavily skewed
so that assumed normally distributed errors are inappropriate and might lead to mean-
ingless negative predictions. A possible solution to this is to transform the dependent
variable and run an OLS on the transformed variable. The model proposed by Box and
Cox (1964) can be used to find the optimal transformation. The Box-Cox transforma-
tion of the dependent variable leads to the estimation equation (yλ − 1)λ−1 = xβ + ε,
where λ is estimated simultaneously with β. In the limiting case where λ is zero, the
left-hand side of the expression reduces to ln(y). The disadvantage of the Box-Cox
model is that the β’s are not interpretable without a re-transformation to the raw-
scale. In the presence of heteroscedasticity, this can be problematic and lead to biased
estimates.
The generalized linear models (GLMs) approach serves as an alternative. The great
advantage of these models is that no re-transformation to the raw-scale is required after
the estimation [see Manning (1998), Manning and Mullahy (2001)]. A GLM is defined
through its link function g(·) and the distributional family of the dependent variable
F (y). The link function defines the relation between the expected outcome E[y|x] and
the linear predictor xβ, so that g(E[y|x]) = xβ. The most prominent functions are
the logarithmic [ln(y) = xβ] and inverse link function [y−1 = xβ]. The optimal link
function depends on the data and can be found using the Box-Cox model discussed
previously. The distributional family F (y) defines the relation between the mean and
variance of the dependent variable. Manning and Mullahy (2001) recommend to use
the test proposed by Park (1966) to find the optimal mean-variance relation for the
data at hand. In this study, gamma family and logarithmic link function is found to
represent the data best.
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The GLMs in this study are estimated using Bayesian econometrics. The joint pos-
terior K(θ|Y ) is computed by Bayes theorem and links the observed data (Y ) with the
researcher’s expectations about the unknown parameters (θ) so that
K(θ|Y ) =
L(Y |θ) · k(θ)
L(Y )
, (6.9)
where L(Y |θ) is the likelihood of observing Y given θ, k(θ) is the prior about θ, and
L(Y ) is the normalizing constant. The denominator is independent of θ and can be
dropped resulting inK(θ|Y ) ∝ L(Y |θ)·k(θ) which is the product of the likelihood times
the prior distribution. For the gamma GLM, the likelihood is given by Γ(µτ, τ), where
Γ denotes the gamma distribution with its scale and shape parameters. The logarithmic
link function enters the model as ln(µ) = Xβ, where X is the covariate matrix. Then,
θ = {β, τ} are the unknown parameters of interest. Here, τ is the likelihood’s precision
parameter which is equivalent to the inverse of the variance (τ = σ−2) and is assumed to
have a gamma prior, i.e. τ ∼ Γ(aτ , bτ ). Physician-specific estimates (βp) are obtained
by specifying a hierarchical structure for the Bayes model so that β is replaced by
βp = β¯ + δp, where β¯ represents the population mean effect of β and δp represents the
difference in the effect between physician p and the population mean with E[δp] = 0.
Normal priors are assumed on the lower hierarchical stage so that β¯ ∼ N(µβ¯, τβ¯) and
δp ∼ N(0, τδ) and the hyperprior for τδ on the upper level of hierarchy is assumed to be
gamma distributed with τδ ∼ Γ(aδ, bδ). All prior and hyperprior parameters are chosen
to make the priors as uninformative as possible so that their choice does not affect
the estimates. However, with the large data set to be analyzed, the weight of assumed
priors diminishes so that their choice is not influential. The joint posterior is then given
by
K(β¯, δp∀p, τδ, τ |Y ) ∝
∏
p
Γ(Y |µτ, τ)×N(β¯|µβ¯, τβ¯)×N(δp|0, τδ) (6.10)
× Γ(τδ|aδ, bδ)× Γ(τ |aτ , bτ )
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which has no standard distribution and has to be simulated. To facilitate the com-
putation due to large data sets and high number of parameters to estimate, only the
coefficient pertaining to PD is modeled with a hierarchical structure.
6.5 Data
To test for margin optimization, three active pharmaceutical ingredients from ther-
apeutic categories with high sales volume are selected: omeprazole, amlodipine, and
ciprofloxacin [see Hunkeler (2008)].9 The drug claims data were provided by a ma-
jor Swiss health insurer and contain prescription-level observations between 2005 and
2007. Omeprazole is an inhibitor of gastric acid secretion and used to treat gastric and
duodenal abscesses while amlodipine is a calcium channel blocker for treating angina,
and ciprofloxacin is used to treat specific bacterial infections.10
A first univariate comparison of logistic drug margin per dose between dispensing
physicians and pharmacies shows that mean and median MPD values are higher for
dispensing physicians regardless of substances.11 For omeprazole and amlodipine, the
data reveal a negative correlation between PD and CPD.12 This can be explained by
the higher share of generics dispensed by physicians and underlines the importance of
including DSCs in the regression to separate drug choice from margin optimization.
Three additional measures permit a first impression of prescribing behavior regard-
ing package choice. On average, dispensing physicians sell a higher number of packages
to provide the median dosage per patient needed. For omeprazole, dispensing physicians
prescribe 2.3 packages versus 1.9 packages by non-dispensing physicians. The values for
amlodipine are 3.5 versus 3.3 and for ciprofloxacin 1.1 versus 1.0. This is in line with
the average package size prescribed. On average, omeprazole is prescribed through
packages containing 34.6 pills (dispensing physicians) versus 42.4 pills (non-dispensing
9 ATC-codes: omeprazole (A02BC01), amlodipine (C08CA01), ciproflocaxin (J01MA02)
10 For more information see www.drugbank.ca/drugs
11 Mean MPD (in CHF per 1,000 mg) for physicians versus pharmacies: 40.0 versus 37.6 (omepra-
zole), 53.1 versus 52.1 (amlodipine), and 4.1 versus 3.9 (ciprofloxacin).
12 Mean CPD (in CHF per 1,000 mg) for physicians versus pharmacies: 101.1 versus 101.7 (omepra-
zole), 155.8 versus 158.5 (amlodipine), and 9.0 versus 8.8 (ciprofloxacin).
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physicians). The same tendency can be observed for amlodipine (84.5 versus 87.6) and
ciprofloxacin (12.7 versus 14.4) backing the hypothesis that dispensing physicians pre-
scribe smaller packages. In contrast, average dosage per pill is higher for dispensing
physicians.
Omeprazole Amlodipine Ciprofloxacin
MN MD SD MN MD SD MN MD SD
Physician dispensing (PD) 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.45 0.00 0.50 0.52 1.00 0.50
General practitioner (GP) 0.81 1.00 0.39 0.86 1.00 0.34 0.77 1.00 0.42
Number of patients (NPA) 71 30 109 32 16 47 32 15 47
Medium deduc.(DEDM) 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.09 0.00 0.29
High deduc. (DEDH) 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.14
HMO insured (HMO) 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.15
Gatekeeping ins. (GATE) 0.05 0.00 0.23 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.06 0.00 0.24
Patient age (AGE) 58 59 18 70 72 13 57 59 19
Patient sex (MALE) 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.41 0.00 0.49
Rural area (RUR) 0.25 0.00 0.43 0.27 0.00 0.44 0.25 0.00 0.43
French/Italian (FRIT) 0.45 0.00 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.34 0.00 0.47
Share in 2006 (Y06) 0.33 0.00 0.42 0.30 0.20 0.36 0.35 0.00 0.46
Share in 2007 (Y07) 0.41 0.18 0.45 0.32 0.00 0.39 0.37 0.00 0.47
Share of generic 1 (DSC1) 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.31 0.00 0.46 0.34 0.00 0.47
Share of generic 2 (DCS2) 0.37 0.00 0.48 0.19 0.00 0.39 0.27 0.00 0.44
Share of generic 3 (DSC3) 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.18 0.00 0.38
Share of generic 4 (DSC4) 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.04 0.00 0.19
Note: Descriptives are mean (MN), median (MD), and standard deviation (SD)
Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables are shown in Table 6.3. The
share of sampled observations (not prescriptions) pertaining to dispensing physicians
is between 39 and 52 percent. Hunkeler (2008) estimates an physician-dispensing rate of
33 percent for all prescriptions covered by Swiss social health insurance. The high share
emphasizes the important role of PD in delivering pharmaceuticals. GPs prescribe more
than 77 percent of the sampled prescriptions. On average, physicians face 32 patients in
need of amlodipine and ciprofloxacin, and 71 patients requiring omeprazole. About 90
percent of sampled patients have chosen the lowest deductible category while between
3 and 9 percent signed a medium (DEDM) and between 1 and 2 percent signed a high
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(DEDH) deductible contract. Only 2 to 4 percent are HMO insured and between 4 and
6 percent signed a gatekeeping contract. Patients’ average age is 58 (omeprazole), 70
(amlodipine), and 57 (ciprofloxacin). Between 39 and 47 percent of sampled patients are
male. About a quarter of all practices are located in rural areas and between 33 and 45
percent are in French- or Italian-speaking areas. Prescriptions are distributed equally
over the three years. The DSCs display drug-specific shares of aggregated observations
where the brand-name drug is the base category.
6.6 Estimation results
Posterior summaries for the hierarchical Bayes GLM estimates with respect to the
margin per dose (MPD) are listed in Table 6.4. As proposed by the Box-Cox model,
logarithmic link functions are applied for all three chemical agents which has further
advantages in that the coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities (ξ), e.g. as the
percentage change in MPD for a change from separated (PD=0) to combined (PD=1)
drug provision.
6.6.1 Differences in margin-per-dose values
In this study, the PD variable is the one of main interest to assess if selling drugs on their
own account leads to margin optimization activities. The posterior means for PD show
that the logistic margin per dose is 10.1 percent higher for omeprazole, 5.6 percent
higher for amlodipine, and 5.2 percent higher for ciprofloxacin. All 95%-credibility
intervals do not include zero and the lowest 2.5 percentile is found for ciprofloxacin (4
percent) while the highest 97.5 percentile is found for omeprazole (11 percent). These
values point at margin optimization activities by dispensing physicians. The upper
panel of Figure 6.2 depicts Kernel densities of physician-specific semi-elasticities (ξp)
for physician dispensing. The physician-specific coefficients indicate that a share of 85
to 89 percent of the sampled physicians reveal a positive ξp underpinning that the effect
is found for a major share of prescribers. However, there is heterogeneity in the ξp’s
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MPD Omeprazole Amlodipine Ciprofloxacin
Posterior mean percentiles mean percentiles mean percentiles
2.5 97.5 2.5 97.5 2.5 97.5
PD 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.06
GP 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03
NPA 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
DEDM 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.00 -0.00 0.01
DEDH 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.14 0.01 -0.01 0.03
HMO 0.02 -0.00 0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01
GATE 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.01
AGE -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
MALE -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11
RUR -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.01
FRIT 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
Y06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.19 -0.20 -0.18 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10
Y07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.31 -0.32 -0.30 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13
DSC1 -0.31 -0.32 -0.30 -0.16 -0.17 -0.15 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11
DSC2 -0.36 -0.37 -0.34 -0.21 -0.22 -0.20 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08
DSC3 -0.49 -0.51 -0.47 -0.19 -0.21 -0.18 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08
DSC4 -0.54 -0.56 -0.52 -0.25 -0.26 -0.23 -0.15 -0.17 -0.14
CONST 3.98 3.96 3.99 4.23 4.22 4.24 1.57 1.56 1.58
Number of observations 72,488 40,749 66,236
Number of physicians 7,314 5,919 7,675
Specification: gamma GLM family (F ) with logarithmic link function (g)
Note: To facilitate simulation, the two explanatory variables number of patients (NPA) and
patient age (AGE) were standardized to have E[x] = 0, V ar[x] = 1.
Table 6.4: Margin-per-dose estimates – hierarchical Bayes GLM results
ranging from -14 to 39 percent (omeprazole), -8 to 24 percent (amlodipine), and -18 to
30 percent (ciprofloxacin).
The estimates pertaining to the GP variable show no evidence for differences in
the prescribing behavior between general practitioners and specialists. While the 95%-
credibility interval includes zero in the case of omeprazole, the interval for amlodipine
is located in the positive while the one for ciprofloxacin lies in the negative domain
only. The same conclusions can be drawn for the number of patients a physician faced
during the study period (NPA). Based on the credibility intervals, the effect is positive
for omeprazole and ciprofloxacin but negative for amlodipine. The medium and high
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CPD Omeprazole Amlodipine Ciprofloxacin
Posterior mean percentiles mean percentiles mean percentiles
2.5 97.5 2.5 97.5 2.5 97.5
PD 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03
GP -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
NPA 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01
DEDM 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.01
DEDH 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.01 -0.00 0.02
HMO 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.00
GATE 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.01
RUR -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.00 0.01
FRIT 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
Y06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.34 -0.34 -0.33 -0.21 -0.22 -0.21
Y07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.52 -0.52 -0.51 -0.27 -0.27 -0.26
AGE -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
MALE -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06
DSC1 -0.73 -0.74 -0.73 -0.38 -0.39 -0.37 -0.28 -0.28 -0.27
DSC2 -0.78 -0.79 -0.78 -0.42 -0.43 -0.42 -0.19 -0.20 -0.19
DSC3 -0.97 -0.98 -0.96 -0.44 -0.45 -0.43 -0.20 -0.21 -0.19
DSC4 -0.86 -0.87 -0.85 -0.53 -0.54 -0.52 -0.31 -0.33 -0.30
CONST 5.35 5.34 5.36 5.52 5.51 5.52 2.55 2.55 2.56
Number of observations 72,488 40,749 66,236
Number of physicians 7,314 5,919 7,675
Specification: gamma GLM family (F ) with logarithmic link function (g)
Note: To facilitate simulation, the two explanatory variables number of patients (NPA) and
patient age (AGE) were standardized to have E[x] = 0, V ar[x] = 1.
Table 6.5: Cost-per-dose estimates – hierarchical Bayes GLM results
deductible categories (DEDM, DEDH) control for patients with better latent health
status who are expected to be less likely to suffer from chronic diseases with a lower
likelihood for high drug demand. Hence, they can be supplied with less cost-efficient
packages due to discounting of large packages. Indeed, there is empirical evidence sup-
porting this expectation in the case of omeprazole and amlodipine. For ciprofloxacin
the mean effect is not statistically different from zero. Heterogeneity in cost awareness
among patients is modeled by including alternative health insurance contracts like
HMO and gatekeeping (GATE). HMO-insured patients have between 2 and 3 percent
lower MPD values. However, omeprazole constitutes an exception where a positive cor-
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relation is found. The MPD of a gatekeeping insured is not statistically different from
the one of a basic insured, which is also true for differences between rural and ur-
ban practices (RUR). For omeprazole and amlodipine, the MPD is higher for practices
located in French- and Italian-speaking areas (FRIT) compared to German-speaking
regions. However, ciprofloxacin contradicts this finding so that no clear statement can
be made without further analysis of additional substances. Having a higher share of pre-
scriptions in 2006 (Y06) and 2007 (Y07) decreases the MPD as expected due to price
reductions over time. Further, elderly patients receive packages with a lower MPD,
which can be explained in analogy to the deductible categories. Elderly patients may
receive the drugs because of chronic diseases or simply having a higher drug demand
so that they can be supplied with larger cost-efficient packages. Surprisingly, MPD for
males are significantly lower. The drug-specific constants (DSCs) have expected signs
and magnitudes considering the lower manufacturer prices of generic drugs.
De
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Figure 6.2: Dispersion of physician-specific PD effects (ξp)
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6.6.2 Differences in cost-per-dose values
Regarding the effect of combining drug prescription and dispensation on pharmaceu-
tical expenditure, the outcome variable of interest is cost per dose (CPD) prescribed.
Again, cost is defined to be equal to the sales price in this study. Other costs like phar-
macy fees are neglected here. If one is interested in assessing the overall cost-efficiency of
combined drug delivery other potential sources for cost savings should be considered,
e.g. generic substitution. The estimated semi-elasticities (see Table 6.5) signify that
physician dispensing increases pharmaceutical expenditure due to inefficient package
choice. The estimated posterior means of ξ’s for PD with respect to CPD are 4.6 per-
cent (omeprazole), 3.4 percent (amlodipine), and 2.6 percent (ciproflocaxin). Again, all
95%-credibility intervals do not include zero and the lowest 2.5 percentile is found for
ciprofloxacin (2.0 percent) while the highest 97.5 percentile is estimated for omeprazole
(5.4 percent). The shares of positive physician-specific ξp’s are 81 (ciprofloxacin), 88
percent (omeprazole), and 89 percent (amlodipine). These results point at increasing
pharmaceutical expenditure through physician dispensing if one considers only pack-
age choice. However, generic substitution and other potential savings (see above) could
overcompensate these costs. In addition, even in the case of higher pharmaceutical cost,
patients’ willingness to pay for easier access to pharmaceuticals may be higher than
additional cost and therefore legitimate physician dispensing. In Switzerland, a refer-
endum in 2009 revealed that citizens have a strong preference in favor of dispensing
physicians.
6.7 Conclusions
While many countries separate drug prescription and dispensation to ensure inde-
pendent drug choice, some countries grant the authority to physician to dispense or
pharmacists to prescribe drugs on their own account. On the one hand, it serves as
an instrument to facilitate access to pharmaceuticals in rural areas or to make greater
use of pharmacist skills and specialization to improve system flexibility with respect
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to prescribing, supply, and administration of medicines. On the other hand, a poten-
tial drawback of combining drug prescription and dispensation rises from drug margin
optimization by combined drug provider, which may lead to higher pharmaceutical
expenditure due to an inappropriate prescription of packages.
This study seeks to answer two questions. First, which role does the pharmaceuti-
cal pricing mechanism play in setting financial incentives for combined drug providers
to conduct margin optimization? Second, is there empirical evidence for margin opti-
mization of dispensing physicians in Switzerland? The theoretical part shows that the
package margin component incentivizes margin optimizing provider to reduce package
size in return for a higher quantity of packages. In the case of Switzerland, the per pack-
age component is likely to be high enough to set such an incentive. The hierarchical
Bayes GLMs estimates in the empirical part of the paper support the expected positive
correlation between physician dispensing and logistic drug margin per dose (MPD) as
well as pharmaceutical cost per dose (CPD). For MPD, the posterior means of the
semi-elasticities with respect to the physician-dispensing dummy are between 5.2 and
10.1 percent while all 95%-credibility intervals do not include zero. Physician-specific
semi-elasticities reveal that for 85 to 89 percent physician dispensing has a positive ef-
fect on MPD. The CPD is between 2.6 and 4.6 percent higher for dispensing physicians
indicating that profit considerations lead to higher drug expenditure due to inappro-
priate package choice. However, combining drug prescription and dispensation could
lower pharmaceutical bills through other cost savings. Thus, the study does not allow
a general statement about cost-efficiency of combined drug provision. The evidence
that dispensing physicians receive higher logistic margins than pharmacists points at
imperfect agency and margin optimization activities most likely arising because of a
per package margin component.
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Appendix
Package size (S) Dosage (D)
2× 3× 4× 5× 2× 3× 4×
Discount rate 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.24 0.30
Linear price, P l = δP r δ = 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 2.00 3.00 4.00
Discounted price, P d = δP r δ = 1.76 2.55 3.28 3.95 1.64 2.28 2.80
Source: FOPH (2008). P r denotes the reference price of the smallest package provided (1×).
Then, e.g. 2× indicates a package containing twice as many pills or double dose per pill.
Table 6.6: Drug price relations in Switzerland
Chapter 7
Conclusions
Industrialized countries have been spending an increasing share of their economic re-
sources on health care. Switzerland is no exception as its health care expenditure is
growing at a faster rate than its gross domestic product. Spending per capita and ex-
penditure as a share of gross domestic product is only higher in the United States and
France, calling for health care reforms. Nevertheless, high costs are not evil per se.
As long as society’s preferences indicate a willingness to pay such high premiums for
health care, cutting health care provision does not contribute to a gain in social wel-
fare. Thus, the elicitation of citizens’ preferences for health care permits us to evaluate
the extent of justifiable health care expenditure from a societal perspective. In con-
trast, provider preferences can be used to estimate potential reductions in health care
expenditure through reforms. Measuring willingness-to-pay (or willingness-to-accept)
values permits the comparison of cost of changes in health care provision with any
potential benefits. Furthermore, investigating provider preferences helps to understand
the choice of medical services provided and to explain cost differences.
Stated-choice surveys are used to measure provider preferences (Chapters 2 and
3) and consumer preferences (Chapter 4). Chapter 2 shows that even if Swiss private-
practice physicians like some Managed Care (MC) attributes, most of them require com-
pensation payments by insurers to be applied. Regarding the implementation of cost
sharing between insurers and providers, the former must be able to achieve substantial
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savings in order to create sufficient incentives to attract ambulatory care physicians to
join networks with budgetary co-responsibility (Chapter 3). General resistance against
network participation constitutes a prohibitive price to be paid by insurers wanting to
attract enough physicians to participate in networks. On the consumer side, individu-
als purchasing health insurance have be to won over to accept MC-type restrictions as
well. Chapter 4 measures the preferences of German and Dutch residents for alterna-
tive insurance policies. Of interest is the extent to which premiums have to decrease in
order to give up free physician choice and to accept a contract including gatekeeping
or accepting gatekeeping combined with a list of specialists participating in the rele-
vant network. Again, required premium reductions are high, lowering potential savings
through MC. Similar results can be expected for Swiss citizens. In sum, MC is unlikely
to have its expected cost limiting effect. This conclusion applies at least as long as
MC participation is voluntary for providers and consumers and conventional practice
remains an available alternative.
In contrast to stated preferences, revealed preferences are measured using observed
instead of hypothetical choices. This type of preferences is measured using drug claims
data. Chapter 5 investigates if prescriber’s financial interests affect prescriber’s pref-
erences in favor of brand-name or generic drugs. Measuring these preferences allows
testing physicians’ imperfect agency. The results indicate a significant and positive asso-
ciation between physician dispensing and the market share for generics in Switzerland.
While this points at imperfect agency, generics are more often prescribed to patients
with high copayments or low incomes. In contrast, Chapter 6 analyzes if drug margin
optimization is performed by dispensing physicians and if preference heterogeneity for
different package versions is traceable. Conditioned on drug brand, dispensing physi-
cians in Switzerland achieve higher profits from drug dispensing than pharmacies.
The studies presented in this dissertation could form the basis for the extension of
future research. The discrete choice experiments to elicit respondents’ taste parameters
(Chapters 2, 3, and 4) are all estimated using random-coefficient logit models. Modeling
random coefficients requires us to make assumptions about how these coefficients are
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distributed among respondents, representing preference heterogeneity. Current research
focuses on how distributional assumptions affect estimation results [compare Hess et al.
(2005)]. Further, the assumption of multivariate normally distributed utility weights is
increasingly considered to be a poor choice for modeling taste heterogeneity. According
to Fiebig et al. (2009), much of the preference heterogeneity is accounted for by a pure
scale effect. Thus, they recommend the application of a generalized multinomial logit
model that allows for taste and scale heterogeneity. Unfortunately, this model was
not implemented in any statistical software package at the time this dissertation was
written. In future, one could reestimate the discrete choice experiments from Chapters
2, 3, and 4 allowing for preference and scale heterogeneity.
Physician payment mechanisms can be designed using attributes other than the ones
discussed in Chapter 3. Physicians could prefer e.g. a bonus/malus defined in absolute
instead of relative values because financial risk is limited.
Chapters 5 and 6 do not control for a potential endogeneity problem of being a
dispensing physician or not. Physicians who want to derive additional income from drug
dispensing could locate their practices in areas where physician dispensing is allowed.
If such a selection effect is present, the estimated preferences for generic drugs might
be biased upwards. However, data were not available to control for such a selection
effect.
An alternative approach to investigate drug margin optimization and its effect on
pharmaceutical expenditure discussed in Section 6 is to model discrete choices between
packages, e.g. small versus medium versus large, or to estimate count data models to
explain differences in e.g. number of prescribed packages or total pills. However, Section
6 uses margin-per-dose values because it has the advantage of combining different
sources of margin optimization into one single measure.
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